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SUMMARY 
In this thesis, I develop a middle position, from Advaita and Yoruba philosophies, that 
avoids the logical conclusions derived from the binary representations of the individual as 
a  personal  self  with  ontologically  prior  marks  of  personhood  and  the  culturally  or 
collectivist construction of the individual. 
The analysis of the self in Advaita philosophy springs from the Advaita’s main 
proposition that Brahman is the basis of individuality and community. I argue that this 
presupposition  does  not  discourage  the  thriving  of  the  person’s  distinctive  nature. 
Consequently, I reflect on the moral implication of Advaita notion of identity. Finally, I 
reflect on the problem of alterity that may ensue from Advaita’s construction of identity. 
The notion of identity in Yoruba philosophy is developed on the belief that Emi is 
the essence of individuality. I discuss the implications of Emi as the basis of individuality 
and  community  alongside  the  criticism  that  Emi prohibits  the  development  of  the 
person’s distinctive nature. Among others, I reason that the idea gives the individual the 
liberty of self choice. This is contrary to the position that argues that community good 
determines identity in African philosophy. Again, I examine the moral implication of 
Yoruba construction of identity. Finally, I consider how Yoruba philosophy addresses the 
problem of alterity in relation to identity. 
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INDIVIDUALITY AND COMMUNITY: THE PERSPECTIVES OF CLASSICAL 
INDIAN AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHIES
PREFACE
This study is an exercise in comparative philosophy. The discussion will revolve around 
Advaita and Yoruba views of individuality in relation to community. This subject matter 
has  been  close  to  my heart  for  many  years.  I  grew up  in  an  African  culture  where 
community plays a vital role in the construction of identity. I have firsthand experience of 
the two constructs of the self that I will like to call the social and independent constructs. 
I learned through my background that both aspects of the self are crucial and that they 
ought to be developed in a balanced manner within social and political philosophy. My 
fundamental concern is to reflect on how identity is expressed in these two philosophies 
in relation to community. Over the years I have reflected on these problems from three 
independent philosophical sources: the western tradition, the Advaita sources of India and 
Yoruba philosophy. The western liberal  and communitarian philosophers hold diverse 
positions regarding the source of identity. On the one hand, we have the liberal position 
which maintains that identity is formed through rational free choice and on the other hand 
is the communitarians who depict identity as something that is derived from community 
life. I do not intend to dabble into this interesting debate. However, I will highlight, in the 
last  chapter,  the  key  issues  that  surround  the  liberal-communitarian  constructions  of 
identity.  This will  be a useful  hint for those who will  like to conduct some research 
between the western views of identity and community and the philosophical traditions 
that I am discussing here. By discussing ideas from Indian philosophy: Advaita Vedanta 
and African philosophy, especially the Yoruba tradition,  I  hope to generate a middle 
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position regarding the issue of identity and community. This position will respond largely 
to the traditional accounts of Indian and Yoruba constructions of individuality. Though 
Yoruba and Advaita endorse radically different metaphysical positions, I will argue that 
they reach similar conclusions concerning the nature of identity. Thus, this work is an 
exercise in comparative philosophy and in the constructive social dimension of political 
philosophy.     
The first chapter will introduce the reader to the key conceptual problems that are 
of concern to me in this work. The problems that are associated with identity constructs 
in Indian and African thoughts will be outlined here. More importantly, I will discuss 
why some commentators are of the opinion that the virtues that delineate genuine identity 
are devalued in India and Africa. Three issues which are central in the study are stated in 
this  chapter.  The first  issue involves  the source of identity.  Subsequent  chapters  will 
show whether the Indian and Yoruba philosophical traditions hold that identity is purely 
given  or  chosen.  The  second  problem  reflects  on  the  congruence  of  morality  and 
individuality in Yoruba philosophy. Finally, I will be concerned with the notion of self 
choice and toleration. 
Chapter two will be divided into three sections. The first section will discuss the 
Advaita notion of identity in relation to community. I will investigate Advaita’s main 
presupposition  that  Brahman  is  the  basis  of  individuality.  I  will  show  how  this 
assumption  encourages  the  thriving  of  our  distinctive  nature.  What  does  the  idea  of 
Brahman as the source of identity imply? Does it suggest that individuality is antecedent 
to community or submerged within its worldviews? These are some of the questions that 
will attract our attention. Furthermore, I will examine the view of Brahman as the basis of 
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community. Can it be said that this idea provides a basis for co-operative association 
where the development of the person’s free and equal nature are uninhibited?  Finally, I 
will examine how Advaita construes the formation of identity. Section two will dwell on 
the moral implications of the Advaita conception of identity. Here, I will focus on the 
extent  to  which the moral  identity of  the person is  construed from the standpoint  of 
community meanings and whether this gives the individual genuine satisfaction. Section 
three  will  dwell  on  the  philosophical  problem  of  alterity.  Working  on  the  Advaita 
conception of avidya (ignorance) and duality, I will attempt to develop an account of how 
the Advaita person would relate to the differences that are associated with others. 
Chapter three will develop the Yoruba account of individuality and community in 
three  sections.  The  first  section  will  reflect  on  the  idea  of  Emi as  the  essence  of 
individuality. Against the criticisms that  Emi prohibits the development of the person’s 
distinctive  nature,  this  section  will  draw  the  implications  of  Emi as  the  basis  of 
individuality and community. Does this idea give the individual the liberty of self choice? 
How can a philosophy which maintains that the community has its basis on Emi support 
the development of the person’s distinctive nature? A critical  reflection on the above 
questions  will  throw  some  light  on  the  error  of  those  theories  which  argue  that 
community meanings determine moral identity in African (Yoruba) philosophy. I will 
argue  that  though  Yoruba  philosophy  holds  that  identity  is  derived  as  the  person 
participates in the social space of the community, this does not hinder the person from 
pursuing personal goals. Section two will explore Yoruba conception of moral identity 
from a critical evaluation of the concept of  eniyan (individual). The analysis of  eniyan 
will show what the idea of the individual as a subject amounts to in Yoruba philosophy. 
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How this  philosophy harmoniously  explores  the  person’s  independent  and  dependent 
nature will be highlighted in this section. Section three will address the philosophical 
problems of alterity and identity as entailed in Yoruba philosophy. The key concepts that 
will be analyzed in order to arrive at this end are aimo (ignorance) and duality. 
The  final  chapter  will  discuss  the  findings  in  Advaita  and  Yoruba  in  a 
comparative manner.  I  will  highlight,  in this chapter, the key points  that underlie the 
western liberal and communitarian debate about identity. In both chapters two and three I 
will rely on the basic categories of thought in the Advaita and Yoruba philosophies to 
interpretively  disclose  their  philosophical  stand  on  the  issues  of  individuality  and 
community. I will then take these comparatively developed conceptions and apply them 






In  this  study,  I  will  focus  on  the  subject  of  individuality  and  community  in  the 
philosophical traditions of Advaita Vedanta and Yoruba. Advaita Vedanta philosophy is a 
non-dualistic philosophy in that it subscribes to the ultimate oneness of the self. Yoruba 
philosophy belongs to  a  dualist  tradition.  The discussion will  center  on how the two 
philosophical traditions describe the relation of the individual to the community. I hope to 
show the specific roles that these philosophical traditions give to the individual in self 
determination. The question is whether the individual is empowered to define her own 
identity or the community defines it for her. A number of commentators argue that the 
classical philosophy of India and Africa settle for the latter view. In this study, I will 
argue differently. I will be examining the idea of the self in these philosophical traditions 
in order to situate the notion of the individual in relation to community. 
Before I  proceed to discuss the issues that will  introduce us to the notions of 
individuality  in  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies,  I  should  mention  briefly  two 
interesting views of the self and identity that are prominent in the literature. 1 Advocates 
1 About these different views of identity, Amartya Sen writes: “it has not, however, always been easy to 
persuade social analysts to accommodate identity in a satisfactory way. In particular, two different types of 
reductionism seem to abound in the formal literature of social and economic analysis. One may be called 
“identity disregard,” and it takes the form of ignoring, or neglecting altogether, the influence of any sense 
of identity with others, on what we value and how we behave … In contrast with “identity disregard,” there 
is a different kind of reductionism, which we may call “singular affiliation,” which takes the form of 
assuming that any person preeminently belongs, for all practical purposes, to one collectivity only-no more 
and no less”. See Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, (London: Penguin Books 
Limited, 2006), pp. 19-20.    
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of these two positions hold opposing views regarding the source of identity. Both schools 
of thought formulate their thesis as if identity issues cannot be pursued in a way that 
incorporates the thesis of both camps. I will attempt to show in this study that Advaita 
and Yoruba philosophical constructions of identity indicate that this is possible. The main 
assumption of the first school of thought is that the self is an independent, autonomous 
and complete entity.2 The self, in this perspective, is not to be defined externally for this 
has the tendency of inhibiting its freedom. Owing to the fact that the self is a complete 
entity, it is argued that the individual will experience self fulfillment when she is allowed 
to exercise the right of self legislation. And what this means is that individuals should 
choose their central projects independently of any external influence. This is a necessary 
condition  for  genuine  individuality  to  be  reflected.  Otherwise,  the  individual  will  be 
conditioned, made to serve the interests of others and, ultimately made to conform to 
ideals that are imposed on her rather than the one she chooses for herself. This idea finds 
reflection in J. S. Mill’s thinking that those who do not choose their own life are not 
better than apes. Mill’s writes: 
… the human faculties of perception,  judgment,  discriminative feeling, 
mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a 
choice … he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan 
of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of 
imitation.3 
2 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, (London: Hutchinson & 
Co. Ltd., 1964), Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1965), Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1956), R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 1977), 
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred. D. Miller, Jeffrey Paul, (eds.), Natural Rights Liberalism from Locke to Nozick, 
(Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the 
Liberal State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980)      
3 J. S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in Three Essays, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 72-73.  
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The other school defends a different position arguing that the idea of the self-
defining subject in the above philosophy reduces the influence that our social attachments 
have on us. Thus, the autonomous decision of the person is the only requirement for the 
determination of identity. Michael Sandel expresses this view in the following:  
As  participants  in  pure  practical  reason,  or  as  parties  to  the  original 
position, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an 
order of value antecedently given. And as actual, individual selves, we are 
free to choose our purposes and ends unbound by such an order, or by 
custom or tradition or inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our 
conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue 
of our having chosen them. We are, in Rawls’s words, ‘self-originating 
sources of valid claims’.4  
However, for this school, social attachments necessarily determine identity. Therefore, 
identity  is  constituted  by  the  community  of  which  one  is  part.  This  conception  of 
individuality  suggests  that  advocates  of  the  free  self  hold  a  fundamentally  mistaken 
assumption  about  who  we  are.  Community  consciousness,  this  position  argues, 
constitutes  the  way  of  our  being  in  the  world.  Without  the  community,  there  is  no 
identity.5 This position highlights the need to identify, preserve and possibly extend the 
common (community)  good.  Incidentally,  advocates  of  this  philosophy argue  for  the 
replacement of the ideology of the free self the end of which privileges the pursuits of 
4 Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” in Shlomo Avineri and Avner 
De-Shalit (ed.), Communitarianism and Individualism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 20
5 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984), Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
Charles Taylor, “Cross Purposes; the Liberal-Communitarian Debate”, in N. Rosenblum, (ed.), Liberalism 
and the Moral Life, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 159-182. Michael Sandel, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), W. Cragg, “Two 
Concepts of Community”, Dialogue, 25, (1986), W. Kymlicka, liberalism, Community and Culture, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Michael Walzer, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism”, Political  
Theory, 18, no. 1 (1990): 6-23. I must mention that those who are typically described as communitarian 
philosophers, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer do not identify 
themselves with the communitarian movement. None of them endorse the manifesto contained in the “The 
Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities” perhaps because they do not agree with 
some of the ideas in the manifesto. 
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private  interests.  In  order  to  attend  correctly  to  the  issue  of  identity,  we  should 
concentrate primarily on the way we are in the world. The person’s social, cultural and 
historical  experiences  are  primary  in  the  articulation  of  identity.  The  common good 
which is revealed to us, which we are associated with, determines our identity. Both of 
these camps maintain radically opposing positions, the former arguing that the conception 
of identity from the standpoint of the common good demeans the person’s autonomous 
nature. The hostility towards any conception of the common good is due to the belief that 
it  has  the  tendency  of  imposing  certain  conception  of  the  ‘good’  or  ‘true’  on  all 
individuals. 
A political theorist such as Michael Sandel would argue that community describes 
us as we really are, hence our identity as revealed in community life is choiceless. 
On this strong view, to say that the members of a society are bound by a 
sense of community is not simply to say that a great many of them profess 
communitarian  aims,  but  rather  that  they  conceive  their  identity-the 
subject and not just the object of their feelings and aspirations-as defined 
to some extent  by the community of  which they are  a part.  For  them, 
community describes not just what they  have as fellow citizens but also 
what  they  are,  not  a  relationship  they  choose  (as  in  a  voluntary 
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a 
constituent of their identity6. 
This conception of identity is deemed to be exaggerated. Amartya Sen writes: 
However,  an  enriching  identity  need  not,  in  fact,  be  obtained  only  through 
discovering where we find ourselves. It can also be acquired and earned.7 
Amartya Sen rejects the idea that identity discovery can only occur within the community 
that one finds herself in. If a person is convinced that her community’s worldview is 
deficient in defining an enriching life, she has the right to acquire the worldviews of 
6 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 150. Author’s emphasis.
7 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, p. 36.
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others. Sen’s position supports the middle line approach that I hope to defend in this 
study.  
My  discussion  will  proceed  from  a  critical  discussion  of  the  philosophical 
traditions of  Advaita  Vedanta and Yoruba.  Let  me note  at  this  juncture that  the two 
philosophical traditions (Advaita Vedanta and Yoruba) do not explicitly treat the kind of 
social and political problems that are dominant, for instance, in the western liberal and 
communitarian  discussions  of  identity.  These  philosophies,  however,  give  elaborate 
metaphysical constructions of the nature of the individual and the society. The social and 
political implications of these constructions have not been given due recognition. I intend 
to  develop  the  Advaita  and  Yoruba  perspectives  of  identity  from  these  theoretical 
frameworks.  To  discuss  the  sources  of  identity  in  Advaita  Vedanta  and  Yoruba 
philosophical traditions, I will attempt to answer how the two philosophies answer the 
question Who am I? I will also examine the issue of morality and individuality. I will 
explain how Advaita Vedanta and Yoruba represent the influence that communal ethics 
has on identity definition. I will argue that the two philosophical traditions do not agree 
that  the  worth  of  the  individual  can  only  be  expressed  by  following some universal 
abstract laws or by adhering strictly to some community ethics. 
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Thirdly, I will examine the concept of toleration. The idea of toleration will be 
used interchangeably with tolerance.8 Tolerance, one would think, is a crucial virtue that 
the rational person ought to exhibit. This virtue is central for individuals to be accorded 
notable respects as autonomous subjects.9 The understanding of identity as something 
that is solely derived from some universal abstract principle and the one that merges the 
person  within  the  social  meanings  of  the  community  are  inadequate  as  they  do  not 
actually promote diversity in moral and intellectual pluralism. For our purpose, tolerance 
refers to an attitude, a pleasant disposition which stems from a willingness to accept the 
possibility of a contrary position as valid. It is such an open mindedness that induces one 
to be patient or hesitant to pass value judgment on others’ belief but encourages rational 
deliberation in some given circumstances that engender disagreement. This conception of 
tolerance will fit into the Advaita and Yoruba scheme of thoughts because they do not 
support that a single comprehensive conception of the good could exhaust the totality of 
knowledge.  The  two  systems  do  not  accord  ultimate  priority  to  the  good  of  the 
community  or  that  of  the  individual  such  that  it  becomes  intolerant  to  change.  This 
8 Certain commentators have shown the difference between toleration and tolerance. Toleration is 
acknowledged to be integrally linked with liberal tradition but not tolerance. Toleration, as defined by 
Andrew R. Murphy, “denotes forbearance from imposing punitive sanctions from dissent from prevailing 
norms”. It “involves at least disapproval of the behavior or thing tolerated … it involves a complex blend of 
rejection and acceptance”. Andrew R. Murphy, “Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition”, Polity, 
29, no. 4 (1997): 596. Nick Fotin and Gerard Elfstrom argue that “toleration decisions challenge models of 
behavior postulating direct correspondences between attitudes and actions”. Cited in Ibid. Toleration is 
classified as a form of liberty that fits into classical liberalism which understands liberty as absence of 
constraint. Preston King claims that the “calculus that goes into a toleration decision involves weighing the 
disapproval of one thing (the thing tolerated) against the disapproval of other things, including the 
unpleasant action necessary to prohibit that thing and competing values violated in the process of 
prohibition”. Cited in Ibid. For further discussion about toleration, see Preston King, Toleration, (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1976). Jonathan Harrison, “Utilitarianism and Toleration”, Philosophy, 62 (1987). John 
Horton and Peter Nicholson, Toleration: Philosophy and Practice, (Brookfiled, VT: Avebury, 1992). Susan 
Mendus (ed.) Justifying Toleration: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). W.F. Adeney, “Toleration”, in Paul Edwards (ed.) Encyclopedia of Religion and 
Ethics, (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 8. Nick Fotion and Gerard Elfstrom, Toleration, (Tuscaloosa 
and London: University Alabama Press, 1992).                
9 Stephen Kautz, “Liberalism and the Idea of Toleration”, American Journal of Political Science, 37, 
(1993): 610-632.  
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springs  from the  understanding  that  any  conception  of  the  good  that  is  held  in  any 
community or by any individuals is a partial  view of the ultimate good. Here, I  will 
explore the various conceptions of the free individuals  in the philosophical  traditions 
under  study via  this  conception of  tolerance.  I  will  show how the two philosophical 
traditions view differences and how the individual ought to live with them. The moral 
responsiveness of the individual to difference is crucial as it promises both improved self 
understanding and any aspects of the community life which need change.  To appreciate 
identity as presented in Advaita and Yoruba philosophies, it is important to highlight how 
some  ethno-sociologists,  social-psychologists  and  anthropologists  view  the  notion  of 
plurality of individuals in South Asia and Africa. This will further acquaint us with the 
way some critics think that individuality is understood in Indian and African cultural 
traditions.
II
In  the  paper  entitled,  “Conceptualizing  the  Person:  Hierarchical  Society  and 
Individual Autonomy in India”, Mattison Mines asks whether individual autonomy has a 
place  in  the  understanding  of  Indian  social  thought.  Before  Mattison  delves  into  a 
detailed discussion of the question, he says, “it is commonly accepted that individualism 
is  devalued  in  India” .10 According  to  Mines,  the  debate  about  the  devaluation  of 
individualism  in  India  takes  two  approaches,  namely,  sociological  and  social-
psychological.11 Two  viewpoints  are  espoused  by  sociologists,  one  of  which  is 
10 Mattison Mines, “Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual Autonomy in India”, 
in Roger T. Ames, Wimal Dissanayake, Thomas P. Kasulis, (eds.), Self as Person in Asian Theory and 
Practice, (New York: State University of New York, 1994), p. 317. 
11 Ibid, p. 319
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championed by Louis Dumont and his followers.12 The sum of Louis Dumont’s argument 
is contained in the following: “individualism, as a virtue, expressed by values as equality 
and liberty” is disapproved of in India because the person is submerged in the social 
whole”.13 Dumont’s work is founded on the works of others like Max Weber, Marcel 
Mauss etc.14 McKim Marriot and Ronal B. Inden advocate the second viewpoint. Their 
attention is shifted to the analysis of what they term “the cognitive nonduality of action 
and actor, code and substance” in India.15 They claim that ‘holism’ does not properly 
capture the notion of personhood in South Asia as its counterpart ‘dividual’. The term 
‘dividual’ is preferred by Marriot and Inden because, to them, the person is conceived as 
a composite of transferable particles. What they intend to show with the term ‘dividual’ is 
that the Indian conception of individuality stands at the opposite pole to that of the West. 
Both  Marriot  and  Inden  acknowledge  that  the  western  notion  of  individualism  is 
intimately associated with the philosophic  notions of  dualism and characterized by a 
separation of action from actor. Contrariwise, the notion of the ‘dividual’ represents the 
Hindu person as open, a kind of thing that derives her personal nature interpersonally. 
This view is contrasted with the conception of the western individual as someone who 
has an indivisible nature which is enduring, something like a monad with closed and 
12 Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970), p. 9. Also, Louis Dumont, “The Individual as an Impediment to Sociological 
Comparison and Indian History” in Religion, Politics and History in India: Collected Papers in Indian 
Sociology, (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), pp. 133-150. 
13 Cited in Mattison Mines, “Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual Autonomy in 
India”, p. 319. See, Louis Dumont, “Hierarchy: The Theory of the ‘Varna’ ” in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), 
Caste and Democratic Politics in India, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), pp. 44-58 
14 See for example, Louis Dumont, “Caste, Racism and “Stratification” Reflections of a Social 
Anthropologist”, in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), Race, (USA, UK: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 218- 234. Max 
Weber, The Religion of India, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958). Marcel Mauss, “A Category of the Human 
Mind: The Notion of Person; The Notion of Self”, in Michael Carrithers, Stephen Collins, Steven Lukes 
(eds.), The Category of Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, transl. W. D. Halls, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985).
15 McKim Marriot and Ronald B. Inden, “Toward an Ethnosociology of South Asian Caste Systems”, in 
Kenneth David, (ed.), The New Wind, Changing Identities in South Asia, (Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1977), 
p. 229.
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internally homogeneous nature. 
The social-psychological discussion of the Indian devaluation of the individual is 
predicated on the view that the ideologies which are associated with Indian hierarchical 
social system encourage conformism and punishes autonomy.16 Since the classification of 
individual is done on caste basis, it is believed that each individual will have to pattern 
her life in accordance with the codes of conduct peculiar to her caste. On this ground, 
individuals will be forced to regulate their behaviors in some manners relevant to the 
hierarchy, caste and family codes.17 Not only this, it is maintained that at a later stage of a 
person’s existence, the necessity to move towards a kind of fusion with the absolute is not 
negotiable.  Hence,  the  individual  must  conform  at  every  stage  of  life  with  external 
values. The humanity that one carries is only achieved on the condition that one can 
imitate the lifestyle that typically represents one’s social group. The life of the individual 
is characterized by dogmatism, blind conformity to community beliefs as against a life of 
independence and liberty. Ramanujan argues that this manner of life  
does  not  permit  the  emergence  of  a  cogent  adult  role  as  perceived  in 
Western societies. Subordinating one’s individual needs to the interests of 
the group, be it a family, a kinship group, a clan or a class is upheld as a 
virtue … Thus self-assertion becomes selfishness,  independent decision 
making is perceived as disobedience.18 
16 Mattison Mines, “Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual Autonomy in India”, 
p. 320. 
17 See Mattison Mines, Public Faces, Private Voices Community and Individuality in South India, 
(Berkeley, Los Angelis, London: University of California Press, 1994), p. 6.
18 Cited in Mattison Mines, “Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual Autonomy in 
India”, p. 320. See also B.K. Ramanujan, “Toward Maturity: Problems of Identity Seen in the Indian 
Clinical Setting” in , Sudhir Kakar (ed.), Identity and Adulthood, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 
pp. 37 – 55. 
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The works of Levy Bruhl, Evans Pritchard, Placide Tempels, Leopold Senghor, 
John S Mbiti and others stimulate the discussion about individualism in Africa.19 Father 
Placide Tempel writes that the conception of separate forces is foreign to Bantu thought. 
In his words, “Bantu speak, act, live as if, for them, being were forces. Force is not for 
them an adventitious, accidental reality, force is even more than a necessary attribute of 
beings: Force is the nature of the being, force is being, being is force”.20 The implication 
of  this  is  that  Bantu  man/woman  will  never  think  of  himself/herself  as  a  separate 
individual.  In  the  book  African  Religions  and  Philosophy,  Mbiti  argues  that  the 
conception of identity that is peculiar to Africa is derived from a social cooperation of 
individuals. His common dictum “I am because we are: and since we are, therefore I am”, 
summarizes  his  position.21 This  idea,  to  some,  is  a  confirmation  of  the  inability  of 
Africans to conceptualize an individual as an independent subject. Thus, Africans are said 
to be incapable of making independent decisions. In this regard, a befitting term which 
describes African way of thinking is ‘unanimism’.22 This term suggests that “all men and 
women  in  … societies  speak  with  one  voice  and  share  the  same  opinion  about  all 
fundamental issues”.23 
I need to mention that a number of thinkers have reacted to the criticisms above. 
Some ethno-sociologists  and anthropologists  claim that  it  is  not  true that  Indians  are 
motivated by external forces. Based on the empirical studies that are conducted by these 
19 See Richard A. Shweder, E. J Bourne, “Does the Concept of Person Vary Cross-Culturally?” in R. A. 
Shweder and R. A. Vine (eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984). Levy-Bruhl L, Primitive Mentality, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1923), Placide Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, English Translation (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1959). John S. 
Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, (London: Heinemann, 1969).   
20 Cited in V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1988), p. 139
21 John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, p. 108.
22 See Paulin J. Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 2nd edition, (Bloomington and Indiana 
Polis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. xviii.
23 Ibid.
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scholars, they claim that Indians are able to develop personal goals that are separate from 
the goals of the group. Mattison Mines, Milton Singer, McKim Marriot among others 
disagree that the Indians are lacking the motivation for individual goals.24 Reading the 
works of philosophers like Sarvepalli  Radhakrishnan,  Rashbihary Das,  G.R. Malkani, 
T.R.V. Murti and T.M.P. Mahadevan, P. T. Raju, it is sure that Indian thoughts do not 
encourage dogmatism or rigid conformity to social values.  African philosophers such as 
Kwasi Wiredu, Segun Gabdegesin, Robin Horton, Peter H. Coetzee, Kwame Gyekye, K. 
C. Anyanwu among others have argued against the claim that the concept of individuality 
is  alien  to  African  thought  systems.  I  will  pursue  this  line  of  reasoning  by  looking 
specifically into the relation of the individual to the community in Advaita Vedanta and 
Yoruba philosophies. 
III
The two philosophical traditions which I propose to discuss in this study approach 
the subject of self from two different perspectives. Let me mention here that I will reflect 
more  on  Shankara’s  idea  of  self  in  my  deliberation  on  individuality  in  Advaita 
philosophy. I choose to do this because Shankara holds that the fundamental nature of the 
person is identical to Brahman. Since Brahman is ultimately dissociated from anything 
that  is  presented  to  us  in  the  world,  it  is  assumed  that  Shankara  holds  that  the 
24 See Mattison Mines, Public Faces, Private Voices, Singer Milton, “Industrial Leadership, the Hindu 
Ethic, and the Spirit of Socialism” in Milton Singer (ed.), When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An 
Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972). McKim Marriot, 
“Hindu Transactions: Diversity without Dualism”, in Bruce Kapferer (ed.), Transaction and Meaning: 
Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behavior, (Philadelphia: Ishi Press, 1976). B. N. 
Ganguli, Concept of Equality: The Nineteenth Century Indian Debate, (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced 
Studies, 1975). Kwame Gyekeye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African 
Experience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars:  
An African Perspective, (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1996). Marcel Griaule, Conversation 
with Ogotomeli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). K. 
C. Anyanwu,, The African Experience in the American Market Place, (USA: Exposition Press Inc., 1983).  
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fundamental nature of the finite individual is dissociated from the world. I hope to reveal 
how Shankara’s philosophy advances our knowledge of individuality, showcasing it as 
something that is not estranged from the community meaning or totally immersed in it. 
Interpreted from the standpoint of identity, Shankara may be misunderstood to represent 
the person’s identity as something that is antecedent to community. In his exposition of 
Advaita philosophy, Shankara submits that the ultimate subject which defines the identity 
of the individual is the transcendental Brahman. The analysis of Brahman, as we shall see 
later, indicates that the choice of identity is not entirely free as some think; neither is it a 
fixed thing that is given by the community. Yoruba analysis of identity is founded on the 
indefinable permeating force known as Emi. Yoruba philosophy subscribes to the thesis 
that  the  community  is  the  source  of  identity,  but  it  does  not  claim that  community 
meanings  exhaust  the  nature  of  the  self.  Brahman  and  Emi share  many  features  in 
common: whereas Advaita philosophy uses the idea of Brahman to unfold the relation 
between  the  transcendental  and  the  immanent  nature  of  the  individual,  Yoruba 
philosophy  uses  Emi  to  illustrate  the  immanent  and  transcendental  nature  of  the 
individual. Both philosophies subscribe to the thinking that the individual is, in reality, a 
moral subject.    
Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  distinguish  between  the  lower  self  and  the 
higher  self.  The  lower  self  is  the  self  that  is  known with  qualities  such  as  fatness, 
thinness, the self that belongs to an association, a culture, family, nation etc. Advaita and 
Yoruba philosophies hold that the self which shares any relation of whatever kind to any 
particular group belongs to the category of the lower self. The higher self is believed by 
both philosophies  to  share  none of  those  relationships.  But  the  higher  self  is  known 
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through the lower self. Although the knowledge of the higher self may come from the 
lower self, the higher self is not identical with any of the particularities of the lower self. 
This self  is not a thing that is thin, fat  or belongs to any association.  This is why it 
constantly negates the particularities of the lower self. The two philosophies argue that 
the knowledge of the higher self gives a superior understanding of individuality. Both 
philosophies agree that the knowledge of the higher self facilitates the understanding of 
the individual as an intelligent and moral chooser. In addition, these philosophies argue 
that  the  identity  of  the  higher  self  transcends  whatever  experience  (personal  or 
communal) that anyone can claim to have about the self. The kind of individuality that 
emerges from the above will be shown shortly, and how the ideas of Brahman and Emi 
explain a  balanced idea of authenticity  will  be discussed in  detail  later.  This will  be 
discussed in line with the thinking that the philosophies of Brahman and Emi curtail the 
development  of  genuine  identity.  The  next  two sections  below summarize  the  major 
presuppositions of Advaita Vedanta and Yoruba about the ultimate self. 
IV
Advaita Vedanta philosophy is developed on the proposition which claims that 
Brahman is the reality behind the individual and the world. Brahman is the highest self. It 
has no inside or outside; it is the all encompassing force in the universe. To Shankara, 
… Brahman is coextensive with all that is external and internal, since He 
is birthless”, “That Brahman is without prior or posterior, without interior 
and exterior. The self, the perceiver of everything is Brahman.25 
25 Brahma-Sutra-Bhasya of Shankaracharya, III.ii.14 transl. Swami Gambhirananda, foreword by T. M. P. 
Mahadevan, (Delhi: Advaita Ashrama, 1983), henceforth known as BBS. Also, see Katha Upanisad I. iii. 
15, Chandogya Upanisad, VIII. Xiv. 1, Mundaka Upanisad, II. i. 2. 
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Brahman is  here  declared as  the one  without  parts  and without  an other.26 It  is  also 
revealed as the transcendental subject which is aware of everything. If Brahman is really 
a subject of awareness, is it not the case that it is aware of something that is different 
from it? Shankara says no because there is no other reality that Brahman can be aware of 
apart  from  itself.27 Shankara  describes  Brahman  as  the  all-pervasive  oneness  which 
excludes all possibility of relation to others. Even when Brahman is described in relation 
to the world and thus given some dual qualities, Shankara contends that the purpose is to 
aid  the  knowledge of  the  self  which  is  non-dual.  The  ultimate  nature  of  the  self  is, 
according to Shankara, non-dual. He writes:
… for along with (the mention of)  each difference created by limiting 
adjunct, the scriptures affirm the non-difference alone of Brahman, as in, 
“The same with the shinning immortal being who is in this earth, and the 
shinning immortal corporeal being in the body … Hence, the difference 
having  been  spoken  of  for  the  sake  of  meditation,  and  non-difference 
being the real purport of the scriptures, it cannot be held that the scriptures 
support the view that Brahman is possessed of diverse aspects.28 
The nature of the individual is identical with the nature of Brahman. Here is a claim 
about the individual’s reality. To Shankara, the difference-less subject (Brahman) is the 
ultimate nature of the individual. If the above assumption about the individual’s reality is 
not  carefully  interpreted,  taking  into  consideration  the  other  crucial  points  that  are 
26 Ibid 
27 Shankara contends that in the world we perceive things from the standpoint of subject-object division, 
our perception seems to indicate that there is a kind of relation between the subject that is aware of an 
object. If our perception is correct, it must mean that the relation between the subject and the object is real, 
the fact of the separateness between the subject and the object also cannot be denied. If Brahman is the 
reality in the subject and the object, then Brahman cannot be one, it must be many. Shankara rejects this 
position. To him, Brahman is not many, it is one. If Brahman is many, we need to conceive of its parts 
which could either be identical with it or different from it. If identical, the parts will not have any individual 
existences and, if different it will be impossible to conceive of any relation between them. A part is 
different from another by becoming what the other is not, Shankara holds. If the many that we perceive in 
the world is different from Brahman, we will not be able to conceive Brahman in them as the ultimate 
reality. The fact that the many which appear in the world lapse into Brahman as their reality upon thorough 
investigation confirms that Brahman is not many but one.
28 BBS. III.ii.14, see also, Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, II. v. 1.
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highlighted  by  Shankara  about  the  nature  of  this  subject,  Shankara’s  conception  of 
individuality may be read as cutting off the person as a subject from community. We will 
see  shortly  why  it  will  be  incorrect  to  read  Shankara’s  philosophy  in  this  manner. 
Shankara describes the difference-less subject in the following passage:
As a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, and purely saline in taste, 
even so is the Self without interior or exterior, entire, and pure Intelligence 
alone, which means that the self has no internal or external aspect apart 
from pure consciousness. Its nature being mere impartite consciousness 
without any interstices.29 
It is evident that worldly qualities which are associated with individuals are false. The 
only thing that is real in the individual is its transcendental nature which Shankara claims 
to be identical with Brahman. Let me say at this junction that Shankara does not refer to 
the individual’s finite consciousness as the transcendental subject.  In other words, the 
individual’s subject of awareness that is identical with Brahman is not the mind. The 
consciousness  that  the  individual  shares  with  Brahman  is  higher  than  finite 
consciousness.
One  may  wonder  how  a  philosophy  like  this  will  construe  the  notion  of 
individuality. This sense of wonderment may increase as one encounters Shankara’s idea 
of reality and the individuals in the world. Many have misinterpreted Shankara’s position 
to imply a denial of the reality of separate individuals and the world. In order to attend to 
the above, we need an analysis of the conception of the world in Shankara’s philosophy. 
Shankara does agree that the world and the individuals in the world have their reality in 
Brahman. When the reality of individuals is focused upon, their distinctiveness will be 
seen to be unreal. As I engage in the study of Shankara’s conception of the individual, I 
29 BBS. III. ii. 16.
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will show the kind of reality which Shankara gives to individuals’ distinctive identity. Let 
me  quickly  mention  that  Shankara  does  not  claim  that  the  separate  existence  of 
individuals is unreal. Advaita metaphysics identifies Brahman as the ultimate Existence. 
As the ultimate Existence, it is wrong to determine Brahman by the qualities that appear 
with  Existence.  Doing  this  means  that  we  are  qualifying  Brahman  and  qualification 
involves negation. So, in what way are we to relate with appearance since it is perceived 
as many and Brahman is not? Shankara holds that we should relate with the many as false 
since Brahman alone is true. However, Shankara argues that because these qualities affect 
us and we, indeed, feel them to be real, we cannot deny them of some level of reality. 
Though the attempt to deny them does not necessarily involve self negation as in the case 
of Brahman, they cannot be taken to be completely unreal so far as they exert their forms 
on us. We may ask, what are the implications of the foregoing on identity? This will be 
seen in chapter two. Just to mention here in passing, the position shows us how to treat 
the particular features that distinguish us in the world. Shankara’s position presupposes 
that we treat them with the sense that they are relatively real. If we construe the various 
identities that we hold in the world to be relative, we will stand a better chance to reflect 
on our essential nature which transcends whatever identity we may be associated with in 
the world.  
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VYoruba philosophy will  be  read  from the  perspective  of  the  Purist  School  of 
thought.30 Advocates of this School argue that the term African philosophy is problematic 
simply  because  it  presupposes  that  the  whole  of  Africa  subscribes  to  one  system of 
thought.  To  overcome  this  problem,  it  is  proposed  that  conceptual  issues  should  be 
approached  from  the  point  of  view  of  individual  thinkers,  and  in  cases  where  the 
individuals  behind  certain  thoughts  could  not  be  traced  because  of  the  problem  of 
documentation, such thought should be discussed from the perspective of the specific 
tribe  where  it  had  flourished  or  is  still  flourishing.  This  essay  will  follow the  latter 
method in the discussion of individuality and community. The ancient idea of Yoruba 
will attract my attention. 
There are two distinct senses of the self in Yoruba philosophy. The first refers to 
the  self  whose  real  nature  goes  beyond  what  the  senses  can  apprehend.  This  is  the 
ultimate self. It is known only in introspection and it antedates all things. This self is also 
believed to be present  in  all  things.  It  is  the primordial  self  called  Emi (literally,  its 
English equivalence is Spirit but it is not defined in terms of the sharp contrast which the 
English version delineates between spirit and matter). Metaphysically, Emi is the ultimate 
reality. It is also present in the individual. It is the subject that is not amenable to change. 
30A number of eminent scholars belong to this School. Among others are, Campell C. Momoh, Sophie 
Oluwole, Claude Sumnea, W. E. Abraham, Barry Hallen, J. O. Sodipo, Akin Makinde, K. C. Anyanwu, I. 
C. Onyewuenyi, Jim Unah. This school holds that African philosophy should be reflected upon as it 
emerges from the experiences of the author or the experience of the people it bears upon. Although, this 
will not mean that African philosophy cannot be compared with other philosophical traditions neither will it 
mean that African philosophy cannot discuss issues that are of universal relevance, but it should be free 
from foreign influence. This means that African philosophy needs to break away from the control of 
western conceptual schemes. It should stem from a view of reality which represents how Africans 
understand their environments and cultures.
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By nature,  Emi is formless. It is the One. It is the indivisible substance without parts.31 
Before the coming into being of individual beings, Emi is the one indivisible Being that 
is. It lacks any quality with which it could be exhaustively defined. The Yoruba describes 
Emi as a no thing. It could not be curtailed by anything. It transcends all things. Emi has 
neither interiority nor exteriority. Its pure form is indescribable.32 
Following the philosophical conception of the person in Yoruba philosophy, Emi 
refers to the inmost being of the individual. Its close semblance with emi (I) supports this 
claim.  Emi is written in the same way that  emi (I) is written, the only difference being 
that the first letter (E) in  emi (I) is not marked underneath with a dot. When emi (I) is 
used by an individual, it is used to refer to one’s inmost being. The expression depicts a 
kind of self understanding which no other person can possibly claim to have. The term 
emi (I) refers to an unmistaken knowledge of one’s total being. While other persons can 
refer to me as iwo (you), I am the only individual who can identify myself as emi (I). In 
its strict sense,  emi (I) and  Emi (roughly called Spirit) have the same meaning. As the 
inmost nature of the individual,  Emi’s ultimate identity is only known with certainty to 
31 For an in-depth conception of the relevance of Emi to the Yoruba worldviews, see Bolaji Idowu, 
Olodumare; God in Yoruba Belief, (London: Longman, 1962), William R. Bascom, Ifa Divination: 
Communication Between Gods and Men in West Africa, (Indiana University Press, 1969), Jim I. Unah, (ed.) 
Metaphysics, Phenomenology and African Philosophy, (Nigeria: Hope Publications, 1998), K. C. 
Anyanwu, “The African World-View and Theory of Knowledge” in E. A. Rauch and K. C. Anyanwu, 
(eds.), African Philosophy, An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, 
(Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1981), Ulli Beier, Yoruba Myths, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), E. T. Lawson, Religions of Africa, (USA: Harper and Row, 1984), E. Geoffrey 
Patrrinder, West African Religion, A Study of the Beliefs and Practices of Ewe, Yoruba, Ibo and Kindred 
Peoples, (London: Epworth Press, 1961), Stephen Larsen, A writer and his gods : a study of the importance 
of Yoruba myths and religious ideas to the writing of Wole Soyinka, (Stockholm : University of Stockholm, 
1983), Wande Abimbola, Ifa : an exposition of Ifa  literary corpus, (New York : Athelia Henrietta Press, 
1997), R Dennet, “West African Categories and the Yoruba Language”, Journal of the Royal African 
Society, 14, no. 53 (1914): 75-80, Andrew Apter, “The Historiography of Yoruba Myth and Ritual”, 
History in Africa, 14, (1987): 1-25.        
32 D. E. Idoniboye, “The Idea of an African Philosophy: The Concept of Spirit in African Metaphysics” 
Second Order, 2 (1973): 83-89, Jim I. Unah, “The Nature of African Metaphysics” in Jim I. Unah (ed.) 
Metaphysics, Phenomenology and African Philosophy, pp. 341-342, C. S. Momoh, “African Philosophy, 
Does it Exist?” Diogene, 130 (1985): 104. 
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the individual. Though, the identity which is associated with the individual through her 
external  appearance confirms the reality of  Emi,  it  does not exhaust its  nature.   Emi 
encapsulates  both  the  physical,  emotional,  psychological  etc.  dimensions  of  the 
individual. 
This understanding of the nature of the person leads Yoruba to conclude that Emi 
is the only reality which knows the ultimate identity of individuals in the world.  All 
individuals are possessed with Emi. The Emi in each individual contains the dynamics of 
growth and decay. One Yoruba expression states that the dynamism of emi in all beings 
makes it possible for them to strive toward self development, none is satisfied with self 
preservation. This striving is innate. It  is an essential mark of life. Everything passes 
through different stages of self development, and when the dynamism of growth is not 
activated, it reverses to the condition of decay. How can a philosophy like this explain the 
notion of identity? Can it provide a robust understanding of individuals as free and equal 
beings given the fact that the individual’s reality is Emi? Will it be right to say that the 
philosophy  makes  the  individual  a  mere  object  rather  than  a  subject?  Will  it  imply 
necessarily that the philosophy encourages the individual to seek her identity in some 
external forces? These are parts of the questions I will be looking at in order to enunciate 
the Yoruba thinking on how identity is constituted. 
VI
In this study, I will argue that the fundamental claims of Advaita and Yoruba 
philosophies suggest that it is a mistake to think that the individual must choose between 
being autonomous and being a member of the community. This conclusion is premised 
on the assumption that takes individuality to be antithetical to community. One of its 
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many  consequences  is  that  it  privileges  individuality  over  the  community.  A  rigid 
construction of individuality and community is apparent in this position. In this study, the 
community  is  construed  as  a  whole  made  up  of  individuals  as  its  parts.  Since  the 
community is a collection of individuals, it cannot be opposite to its parts. So, the terms 
individuality  and  community  will  be  explained,  in  this  study,  as  mutually  inclusive 
concepts. In this regard, it will not be inaccurate for the individual to define herself from 
the  standpoint  of  her  relation  to  the  community.  Again,  it  will  be  incorrect  for  the 
individual to conceive her autonomy as something that must negate the authority of the 
community.  On the  other  hand,  the  nature  of  the  individual  cannot  be  exhausted  by 
community experience. Her true identity is something that is always kept in view. This 
suggests  that  the  identity  that  is  constituted  by  shared  meanings  does  not  exhaust 
individuals’ self. Although the shared meanings have some authoritative influence over 
the individual in that it constitutes her primary mode of being in the world, she is beyond 
this mode of being because she could change or extend its frontiers. 
The individual’s higher self depicts her as a being that is part of the community 
and  beyond  it.  In  the  former,  this  nature  is  understood  from the  perspective  of  the 
constitutive  consciousness  which  defines  identity  in  terms  of  the  rules  of  social 
engagements. As I will argue later on, it is dangerous, on the one hand, to deny this fact. 
But, on the other hand, it is wrong to posit individuals’ nature as embedded in the world 
as something that is formally alike. In both cases, the individual is not given a due respect 
that accords with her nature. One possible effect this may have on the person is to cause 
her to lose insight into the fact of her difference or her specific mode of being and how 
this finds connection with the common good which allows her to live the satisfactory life 
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that  she  alone  cannot  live.  I  will  argue  that  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  lay  a 
balanced account of individuality and community that allows for a fruitful development 
of the independent and dependent aspects of identity. This shows that the supposition of 
the  two  philosophies  cannot  be  depicted  as  denying  the  reality  of  human  concrete 
existence.  Furthermore,  the  affirmation  of  an  indivisible  transcendental  being  as  the 
ultimate nature of the individual does not subsume the individual under the authority of a 
few individuals who are in charge of the affairs of the community; instead, the idea is 
meant to show why the values that govern the community life must always be developed. 
Self understanding requires, for the two philosophical systems, the virtue of sociableness. 
The individual is not only assumed to be a free chooser, she is an intelligent and moral 
chooser.  I  will  argue  that  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophical  systems  maintain  that 
community  contexts  ought  to  be  taken  as  the  starting  point  for  the  knowledge  of 
individuality.           
My  discussion  will  construe  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  as  important 
communitarian systems which accord great importance to dialogue in self understanding. 
The  systems  of  dialogue  that  these  philosophies  develop  are  consistent  with  the 
harmonious  interpretations  of  the  two  crucial  aspects  of  the  person,  namely  the 
independent and the dependent aspects. Also, the two philosophies show that communal 
values are not to be regarded as static or eternally given. They are to be fine-tuned from 
time to time to meet current realities. This study will show that the systems of Advaita 
Vedanta and Yoruba concede that identity and the quest for the good life requires the 
notion of autonomy that respects communal or cultural contexts but is not limited to it. 
Thus, showing moral respect for one’s cultural values and critiquing it cannot be deemed 
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to be contradictory. Rather, they should be seen as harmonious. Alternatively, a departure 
from one communal context to another is also a legitimate thing. This is acceptable in the 
two philosophical systems because the rigid classification of cultures is weakened; hence, 
individuals can freely choose to belong to some other cultures and choose to develop 
themselves there. 
The systems of Advaita and Yoruba reconcile the freedom of the person and the 
authority of the community through their systematic development of the higher and lower 
selves into one compatible entity. Firstly, the compatibility of the two selves allows for 
the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  central  authority  is  not  immune  to  the  freedom  of 
individuals to subject its beliefs to criticism and possible eradication in view of better 
alternatives. Secondly, by giving the final authority of self legislation to the individual as, 
to put in the Vedantic construction, the atman that is in Brahman, individuals are to be 
armed with one important truth, namely, I am by nature the sole reality, a complete entity 
independent of any external relations and what this connotes, to put in an African sense, 
is that I am because we are. Here, the individual is told that the ultimate definition of her 
self lies entirely in her hand. A refusal to pursue any of her clear aims because of some 
social  factors will  not imply a loss of self but a loss of relative identity.  In the next 
chapter, we shall see how Advaita discusses the subject of individuality and community. I 
will explore the relation of the self to the world in the first section of this chapter. Here, I 
will dwell on the issue of identity. Is it correct to say that identity is solely chosen by the 
individual or solely by the community? My focus in the second section of chapter two is 
to see who determines the values by which individuals’ identities are to be measured. 
Finally, I want to see whether the nature of the individual, as held in this philosophy, 
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gives room for tolerance. If the individual is truly free by nature, will her freedom allow 
her to tolerate difference? Let us see the interesting way Advaita Vedanta attends to these 




A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF ADVAITA VENDANTA PHILOSOPHY
I
THE WORLD IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 
With half a sloka I will declare what has been said in thousands 
of volumes: Brahman is real, the world is false, the soul is only 
Brahman, nothing else.33
The above declaration is contained in a stanza in the Balabodhini, a work that many have 
attributed to Shankara. Interestingly, it reveals a profound fact about the nature of the 
world and the individual. Fredrick Max Muller identifies the claim as the main content of 
Shankara’s philosophy. The focus and logical consistency with which Shankara pursues 
the  claim  accumulate  so  much  that  the  term  ‘Vedanta’  is  frequently  used  to  depict 
Advaita  Vedanta.  Muller  sums  the  thesis  of  Shankara’s  philosophy  in  the  following 
words, “… Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else”.34 
To Mohanty, the claim summarizes Advaita’s main belief, “Brahman (alone) is real, the 
world is false, the finite individual is identical with (and) none other than Brahman”.35 
Incidentally,  the core of this claim prompts one to think that Shankara is an idealist. 
Idealism  subscribes  to  the  position  that  the  fundamental  constituent  of  the  world  is 
immaterial. To think in this manner however raises another important question, what kind 
of idealist is Shankara? Is he a subjective idealist? Is he not? A subjective idealist holds 
that the world exists only in the mind. This position denies the objective existence of the 
33 Cited in Richard Brooks, “The Meaning of ‘Real’ in Advaita Vedanta” Philosophy East and West 19 
(1969): 385. 
34 Friedrich Max Muller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, with an introduction by G. P. Guha, (New 
Delhi : Associated Publishing House, 1982), p. 114.
35 J. N. Mohanty, Explorations in Philosophy, vol. 1 edited by Bina Gupta, (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), p. 67.
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world. In view of some other arguments used by Shankara in defense of his position, it 
will not be right to categorize him as a subjective idealist. For example, Shankara rejects 
the point that denies the existence of the external world on the ground that it ends in 
nihilism.  Nihilism,  Shankara  holds,  is  an  indefensible  philosophical  position.36 In 
addition, Shankara rejects the thinking that the external world exists merely in the mind. 
He says,
Not so; because it  is  accepted that  Atman,  like space,  is  by nature not 
composite. Although, Atman exists as connected with nothing, it does not 
follow that the body and other things are without Atman, just as, although 
space is connected with nothing, it does not follow that nothing has space. 
Therefore,  there  would  not  arise  the  fault  that  [I  shall]  arrive  at  the 
Nihilist’s position.37 
The external world, Shankara argues, cannot be said to be unreal because its appearance 
is real, and the effect of the contents of the world on us cannot be denied to be real. 
However, the true nature of the world is different from what is presented in appearance. 
In order to apprehend this nature, we will need to transcend all that is temporal to reach 
the eternal. Shankara considers this eternal substance to be true. This is Brahman, the 
only reality whose knowledge opens one to the knowledge of all the individuals in the 
world. This explains why Muller includes the following words in his description of the 
essence of Advaita philosophy. 
36 Tom Rockmore argues in Hegel, Idealism and Analytic Philosophy that “no idealist denies the existence 
of the external world. It would indeed be absurd to do so, since there seems to be no way to argue for such 
a conclusion”. Rockmore makes an insightful comment about the relevance of idealism to the 
understanding of individuality, to him, idealism enables the individual to come to term with human 
incapacity or frustrations to escape from the limits of certain historical moment but, regardless of the hurdle 
in which the individual finds herself she understands that the claims to know are objective but also 
historically relative. See Tom Rockmore, Hegel, Idealism and Analytic Philosophy (New Haven-London: 
Yale University Press, 2005).
37 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, (transl.) Sengaku Mayeda, (Japan: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1979), p. 236.
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“There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth enjoying, there is 
nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman, 
is Brahman”.38
Muller’s  point  reveals  the  existential  import  of  Advaita  philosophy.  The  deeper  one 
explores Advaita thought, the more one is convinced that the knowledge of Brahman 
does not separate one from the world. It  is  clearly stated that the one who possesses 
Brahman’s  knowledge  is  blessed  with  the  intuitive  capacity  which  unfolds  the 
connectedness between the inner and external realities of the world.39 Mohanty writes, 
The goal of this process is not supernatural, other-worldly, sotereological. 
It is not salvation. It is discovery of the identity between the innermost 
truth  of  one’s  ‘psyche’  and  the  innermost  being  of  the  world:  of 
psychology and physics.40 
Although Shankara did not talk about social and political philosophy, the import 
of his philosophy to the social and political dimensions of identity remains significant. 
This will be the focus of this study. An interpretive discussion of Advaita in the above 
sense can be classified under practical Vedanta.41 This calls for a rethinking of the views 
of some commentators who hold that the postulation of Brahman as the absolute and the 
38 Friedrich Max Muller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 114. 
39 BBS 1. iv. 23. 
40 J. N. Mohanty, Explorations in Philosophy, p. 113.
41 In his discussion on the practical relevance, “and the ethical and social applicability of the Vedantic 
metaphysics of nondualism”, Wilhelm Halbfass reflects on the four lectures delivered by Swami 
Vivekananda in London between 10 to 18 November 1896, Wilhelm Halbfass identifies the following 
comment by Swami Vivekananda as capturing the spirit of practical Vedanta, “therefore, I will ask you to 
understand that Vedanta, though it is intensely practical, is always so in the sense of the ideal. It does not 
preach an impossible ideal, however, high it be, and it is high enough for an ideal. In one word, this ideal is 
that you are divine, ‘Thou art That’. See Wilhelm Halbfass, “Practical Vedanta’, in Representing Hinduism 
the Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity, Vasudha Dalmia, Heinrich Von Stietencron 
(eds.), (New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, 1995), 211. In the same paper, Wilhelm Halbfass quotes 
the following as the sum of what M. S. Golwalkar perceives as the core of ‘practical Vedanta’, “the ‘I’ in 
me being the same as the ‘I’ in the other beings, makes me react to the joys and the sorrows of my fellow 
living beings just as I react to my own. This genuine feeling of identity born out of the community of the 
inner entity is the real driving force behind our natural urge for human unity and brotherhood. Thus it is 
evident that world unity and human welfare can be made real only to the extent that mankind realizes this 
common Inner Bond”. Cited in Ibid, p. 213. For further studies on ‘practical Vedanta’, see Swami 
Vivekananda, Complete Works, 8 vols. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1979).     
34
declaration of the individual and the world as false represent a major difference in the 
philosophical styles of the west and India.42 The latter is regarded as inward, religious and 
mythical, the former is said to be scientific.43 To understand Shankara’s view about the 
individual  and  her  relation  to  the  community,  we  need  a  careful  exploration  of  his 
conception of Brahman and its relation to the individual and the world. Relevant to this 
discussion is the question of how Brahman determines the identity of the individual. If it 
can be established that the Brahman that is granted to be our reality is external to us, then 
we will need to know the kind of influence that it will have on us. If it is the case that 
Brahman imposes itself on us and forces us to conform to its will, then it will mean that 
the philosophy of Brahman represents the individual as an object, not a subject. It will 
imply  that  individuality  and  the  virtue  of  freedom which  is  supposed  to  go  with  its 
conception is devalued in this philosophy. This section will  explore the philosophical 
nature of identity in Advaita philosophy. Three headings will be entertained, Brahman: 
basis of individuals, Brahman: basis of community and self identity: how is it formed?  
42 The belief in Brahman as the absolute, according to Rajendra Prasad, creates the “impression in the 
minds of many that Indian philosophy is philosophy in a sense different from the one in which Western 
philosophy is philosophy. See R. Prasad, “The Concept of Moksha”, Philosophy and Phenomenological  
Research, vol. xxi, no. 3, (1971), 383. A similar idea is highlighted by Ramakrishna in the following, 
“Samkara makes no concessions of any kind. He begins and never parts with his conviction that whatever 
is, is one and the same in itself, without variableness or shadow of turning. This, what he calls the 
Brahman, does not possess any qualities (visesha), not even those of being and thinking, but it is both being 
and thought. To every attempt to define or qualify Brahman, Samkara has but one answer--No, No! When 
the question is asked as to the cause of what cannot be denied, namely, the manifold phenomenal world, or 
the world as reflected in our consciousness, with all its individual subjects, and all its individual objects, all 
that Samkara condescends to say is that their cause is Avidyâ or Nescience. Here lies what strikes a 
Western mind as the vulnerable point of Samkara's Vedânta-philosophy. Available at The Internet Sacred 
Text Archive, “Vedanta-philosophy”, http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/rls/rls20.htm 
43 See C. A. Moore, The Indian Mind: Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture, (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1967). 
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Brahman: Basis of Individuals 
I  should  mention  again  that  a  social  and  political  construction  of  identity  in 
Shankara’s philosophy requires largely an interpretation of his metaphysics. A lot of his 
metaphysical positions are contained in the footnotes. However, in what follows, I will 
strive to establish the metaphysical basis of any social or political claims about identity 
that  I  associate  with Shankara.  Shankara observes that  Brahman is  the reality that  is 
immediately  known  in  the  world.  Brahman  “is  not  absolutely  beyond  apprehension, 
because it is apprehended as the content of the concept ‘I’ … it is well known in the 
world as an immediately perceived (i.e. self-revealing) entity”.44 This is a reference to the 
reality of individuality. The same idea is confirmed in Shankara’s admittance to the fact 
that Brahman is not entirely unobservable. Brahman is the ‘immediately perceived i.e. 
(self revealing) entity’ in the world. What does this imply? It means that Brahman can be 
apprehended as an entity of some sort. But, what kind of entity since Brahman is not a 
thing that has qualities? This question highlights the need to reconcile  the difference 
between the Brahman that is given in direct  perception and the Brahman that has no 
quality of any kind. Before attending to this question, let me mention that this confirms 
the above submission that Shankara is not a subjective idealist. However, if it is true that 
Brahman is directly perceived as the content of the concept ‘I’, should it not follow that 
Brahman also possesses the contents that are associated with the ‘I’? By implication, 
Brahman will no longer be without parts. Will it not be improper to admit that the ‘I’ has 
certain  contents  and deny that  this  same ‘I’  possesses  those contents? If  the  ‘I’  that 
possesses the contents  is  Brahman, why does Shankara hold that  Brahman is  a thing 
44 BBS. 1.i.1.
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without parts,  without interiority and exteriority? These questions are germane to the 
understanding of individuality in Shankara’s philosophy. 
Shankara argues that though Brahman is apprehended as the content of the ‘I’, it 
does  not  possess  any  of  the  contents.  According  to  Shankara,  the  Brahman  that  is 
presented in appearance is misconceived and thus, it is given a nature that is different 
from its real nature. He explains this with the analogy of the space which though appears 
to be divided when contained in, for example, a jar, but, in reality, it is indivisible.45 He 
pursues the same line of reasoning to resolve the doubt about whether akasa (space) and 
Brahman are identical in Chandogya Upanishad VIII. xiv. 1. Shankara holds that akasa 
and Brahman are identical. In this passage, akasa is asserted to be the ‘accomplisher’ of 
names and forms (that which makes names and forms to be possible) and Brahman is 
asserted to contain names and forms. So, it is in spatial conditions that names and forms 
make sense but the different senses that names and forms make to us are contained in 
Brahman.  Interpreting  this  position,  we  understand  that  individuals’  distinguished 
identities,  the  kind  that  occur  to  us  in  names  and forms  are  contained  in  Brahman. 
Moreover, the passage continues that  akasa which constitutes the ground of names and 
forms is different from names and forms. Hence,  the doubt as to whether  akasa and 
Brahman are identical. Shankara answers that since nothing apart from Brahman can be 
said to  be different  from names and forms,  then  akasa can plausibly be regarded as 
having the same identity with Brahman. Here, Shankara affirms that the fundamental 
basis  of  difference  is  the  difference-less  Brahman.  In  Shankara’s  words,  other  than 
45 BBS. II. i. 13.
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Brahman, “the whole of creation consists of a manifestation of names and forms (i.e. 
word and its meaning”.46 
The relevance of the above to the understanding of individuality is as follows. 
Firstly, the position confirms the reality of our plural nature. By implication, the position 
confirms that individuality is truly articulated when apprehended from the standpoint of 
its plural form. This is deduced from the consideration that akasa which is identical with 
Brahman  is  the  accomplisher  of  names.  Going  by  this  reading,  akasa is  that  which 
characterizes the individual as such. This akasa is also said to be identical with Brahman 
and Brahman is different from the individual as characterized by akasa though Brahman 
contains  the  characterization.  It  follows  that  Brahman  must  be  different  from  the 
individual only in certain respect. This reveals a kind of dual but inseparable relation 
which  Brahman  holds  with  the  individual.  The  first  relation  is  that  it  contains  the 
different experiences of the individual e.g. social, psychological, cultural, historical etc. 
Secondly,  Brahman absorbs the individual’s  experiences into itself  ultimately making 
them to be non-different from itself. Thus, Shankara shows that the two expressions of 
individuality are inseparable. The individual that appears in the world is ultimately not 
different from Brahman which lacks any of the forms of its appearance. This position, as 
it  will  be  observed  later  in  section  three,  sheds  light  on  how  individuals’  multiple 
identities can be harmoniously explored. The allegory of the sun has also been used to 
show the dual but inseparable nature of our identity. Although the sun participates in its 
different reflections in the water, that is, the sun expands when the surface of the water 
expands and it contracts when the surface of the water contracts, but in reality the sun 
remains the same all the time. While it may be true to say that the sun appears differently 
46 BBS. 1. iii. 42
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in the water at different times, it will be wrong to maintain that the ultimate nature of the 
sun is what is reflected in the water. Shankara describes the permanent identity of the sun 
as a reflection of Brahman and he contends that it is this permanent nature that ought to 
guide our reflection about identity.47  
What is deducible from the above is that, in appearance, the indivisible self is 
perceived  differently.  This  self  is  associated  with  diverse  qualities,  characteristically 
associated with many affiliations  out  of  which one is  dominant.  The  community life 
weighs so much on us that often the dominant identity is  the one that the individual 
inherits in the community. This identity is often over emphasized in a way that makes the 
person relapse in the pursuit of reality. What happens is that she will begin to wax cold in 
cultivating the moral identity which would enable her to put equal importance on her 
other  membership  categories.  According  to  Shankara,  the  identity  that  associates 
Brahman with names can never be classified as the highest. Shankara argues that it is the 
lower self that manifests this identity. Nonetheless, the ultimate nature of the lower self is 
identical  with  the  highest  self.  This  self  is  eternal,  pure,  intelligent  and  free.48 
Indisputably,  this,  for  Shankara,  is  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  person.  In  a  manner 
analogous  to  Amartya  Sen,  Shankara’s  philosophy  presupposes  that  “the  singular-
affiliation  view  would  be  hard  to  justify  by  the  crude  presumption  that  any  person 
belongs to one group and one group only”.49 The kind of singular characterization of the 
person that is dominant in, for example, caste identity is here declared unjustifiable. The 
person is thus understood as a being with an unbounded nature. The human nature is free. 
If this is correct, it implies that the person can choose to belong to any community, group 
47 BBS. IV. i. 5. 
48 BBS. III. ii. 22.
49 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence The Illusion of Destiny, p. 25.
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or social organization that suits her interests. This confirms nothing other than the fact 
that the individual is an autonomous subject. Defining the individual as such, Shankara 
cautions any constituted authority from curtailing the capacity of choice of the individual 
as this is not given by the community. This capacity depicts the person as someone that 
transcends community meanings. From Shankara’s perspective, the individual’s nature is 
wholly free, but this nature is also rational and not until we give due recognition to these 
attributes will we be able to gain an accurate view of autonomy. I will discuss Shankara’s 
notion of rationality and how this impact our understanding of identity in chapter two. 
Then, we will see that regardless of the crucial recognition of human capacity of choice, 
Shankara rejects the construction of rationality that abstracts the person from community. 
An understanding of the rational individual as someone who knows her identity prior to 
her participation in the community is, to Shankara, mistaken.   
As the basis of individuals, Brahman makes the individual a subject. The nature 
of this subject is radically characterized with negation. In this wise, it stands out as a 
complete  entity,  negating  anything  that  represents  it  as  ultimately  depending  on 
something  else.  The  implication  of  the  above  on  identity  is  interesting.  Firstly,  it 
represents identity as something that is inexhaustible by the empirical circumstances that 
one belongs to. Let us note that this is not saying that the knowledge of identity can occur 
independently of one’s empirical circumstances. The higher nature of the person depicts 
her being as something that is beyond the community meanings. Thus, she is capable of 
evaluating and readjusting her choices in relation to any community good. But Shankara 
argues that the essence of the transcendental nature is to enable us to view the ultimate 
unity of plurality. On the one hand, this indicates that identity is not a rigid thing such 
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that once it is inherited, it cannot be changed. On the other hand, Shankara’s position 
reveals  that a  person cannot be wholly defined by a  singular  identity no matter  how 
dominant  this  may  play  in  her  life.  By  virtue  of  our  higher  nature,  we  are  able  to 
understand that  our  real  identity  goes  beyond  anything  that  is  revealed  to  us  in  the 
community. 
Shankara presents two important ways of knowing identity. He identifies the way 
of knowing which represents the individual as she is in reality and the way of knowing 
which represents her as she is associated with the community.50 Both ways of knowing 
are true, the only difference being that one represents her highest nature and the other 
represents  her  lower  nature.  Both  representations  must  not  be  confused  and  a 
misrepresentation of the lesser nature for the highest nature is, according to Shankara, 
false.  In  Shankara’s  analysis,  the  two  ways  of  knowing  the  individual  are  not 
contradictory. The higher nature of the individual is bliss and this is depicted by Shankara 
as the sole reality of the person, the principal function of this reality is to provide fruitful 
ground  for  meditation.  The  identity  of  the  lower  and  the  higher  self  is  unfolded  in 
meditation. 
But all the other attributes like bliss, which are spoken of for propounding 
the real nature of Brahman, are to be understood everywhere, since they 
have an identity of purport, that is to say, the Brahman, which possesses 
these attributes and which they seek to establish, is the same. Hence, there 
is a difference (between the two groups of attributes), inasmuch as these 
(latter)  are meant simply for the attainment of knowledge (and not for 
meditation).51  
Shankara highlights in the above passage the crucial role of the other attributes of 
Brahman  (the  attributes  that  represent  Brahman  as  having  dual  forms),  these  other 
50 BBS. III. ii. 22.
51 BBS. III. iii. 12.
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attributes,  in  Shankara’s  view,  ‘are  meant  simply  for  the  attainment  of  Knowledge’. 
Hence, the knowledge of one’s existential reality as depicted by one’s lower nature is 
genuine. It follows that the independence which is associated with the higher nature does 
not necessarily warrant the extermination of one’s dependent condition in the world. In 
the  world,  the  individual  has  many  affiliations  and  it  is  by  taking  the  various 
contingencies of her life experiences seriously, reflecting on them from her innermost 
feelings that she will be able to attain her true identity. This explains why her identity in 
the world cannot be expressed wholly as an asocial thing. Thus, her specific aims and 
historical  conditions  cannot  be  entirely  overlooked  as  she  steps  out  to  exercise  her 
autonomy in the world. This position shows that Shankara’s individual is not bound to 
the community and she is not entirely disconnected from it.  
Surely,  Shankara’s  representation  of  the  individual  as  a  subject  has  certain 
consequences. An understanding of identity which seems to represent the individual as an 
impersonal subject, the one that is ultimately driven by a system of abstract rationality, is 
in Shankara’s view inaccurate.  This is  explicable in his  refusal  of any description of 
Brahman as something that dissociates the individual from experience. He claims that 
such is  condemned by the scripture  which says,  “if  anyone knows Brahman as  non-
existent,  he  himself  becomes non-existent”.52  Interestingly,  Shankara uses  the above 
passage  to  react  to  the  view  that  Brahman  is  completely  a  non-existent  entity.  In 
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad III. i. 1, Shankara maintains that the scripture cannot mean that 
Brahman is entirely removed from the world and yet contend that “I will tell  you of 
Brahman”. The possibility of deliberating on Brahman implies that it cannot be entirely 
non-existent.  In another  place,  Shankara says that  Brahman cannot  be far  apart  from 
52 BBS. III. ii. 22. See also Taittiriya Upanisad,  II. vi. 1. 
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experience and another scripture will affirm that “The Self is to be realized as existing”.53 
The  foregoing  refutes  the  claim  that  identity  can  be  known  solely  by  pure  reason. 
Shankara’s  emphasis  denotes  that  individuals  should  first  reflect  on  their  practical 
conditions  for  them to  apprehend  their  real  identities.  Shankara  regards  individuals’ 
experiences as possible means of reflecting on identity as contained in Brahman. One 
other thing that is underscored in this philosophy is the possibility of transcending every 
local and historical affinities without fearing any loss of identity. Shankara maintains that 
when the statement ‘Brahman is beyond speech and mind’ is mentioned, it is intended to 
show that the denial of the phenomenal expressions of Brahman still leaves Brahman 
irrefutable.54 This entails that even when one reflects and rejects certain associations that 
one finds affinity with in one’s community, one is demonstrating her real nature as an 
autonomous subject. All of the above shows the importance that Shankara gives to the 
individual’s experiences in the articulation of the authentic identity. In order for us to 
show how the individual is related to community in Shankara’s conception of identity, we 
need to discuss the relation of Brahman to the community. 
53 Ibid. See also Katha Upanisad,  II. iii. 13.  
54 Ibid. Upadhyaya writes that Brahman is incomprehensible in any affirmative proposition. In 
Upadhyaya’s words, “even the affirmative mode of speech, such as “Brahman is real, knowledge and 
infinite” (satyam jnanam anatam Brahman Taittiriya II. I. I) is to be understood only negatively as 
conveying that Brahman is different from all that is not real, laden with ignorance and finite”. See K. N. 
Upadhyaya, “Sankara on Reason, Scriptural Authority and Self-Knowledge”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 
19, no. 2 (1991): p. 128.
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Brahman: Basis of Community 
The story in Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1. 4. 1 suggests that Brahman is the basis 
of community.   
In the beginning this world was just a single body (atman) shaped 
like a man. He looked around and saw nothing but himself. The 
first thing he said was, ‘Here I am!’ and from that the name ‘I’ 
came into being. Therefore, even today when you call someone, he 
first  says,  ‘It’s  I’,  and then states whatever  other name he may 
have.55 
Here, the supreme reality which contains the distinctive names of individuals is atman. 
Every instance in which an individual is identified with a particular name, the ‘I’ (atman) 
is attached to the name. The ‘I’ is the universal identity shared by all, not the names. As 
mentioned above, the view that Brahman shares no identical relation with individuals’ 
identity  as  manifested  in  names  does  not  imply  that  Brahman  is  incomprehensible. 
Brahman is  here  depicted as  the  self  shining consciousness  which is  revealed at  the 
dissolution of all qualified identities. Hence, it becomes a legitimate basis of universal 
cooperative relationship. What does this mean? I mean atman becomes the basis or the 
ideal of social cooperation. This position may be contested since atman, by nature, is 
different from any distinctive identity associated with the name that any individual or 
community holds. Conversely, this will render Brahman as a thing that is not identical 
with  any  particular  identity,  personal  or  communal.  Therefore,  the  question  of  how 
Brahman can be the basis of social cooperation remains. At best, it may be said that any 
stipulated ideal that is associated with Brahman is as assumed by individuals. This point 
will render the whole project of self realization nothing more than mere expression of 
personal feelings and beliefs. Then, we will need to worry about a possible relapse into 
55 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1,4,1. Parenthesis is mine.
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moral  subjectivism.  It  has  been  said  that  any  theory  which  subscribes  to  moral 
subjectivism will find it difficult to promote the common good for the very reason that it 
disrupts the basis of social cooperation. But the atman based notion of identity expresses 
a different position. It conveys the idea that community good does not exhaust the nature 
of atman. However, this is less satisfying as it opens another question, namely, what kind 
of values and virtues may legitimately be said to be inherent in atman? Only when we 
have been able to attend to the above question will it make sense to hold that atman can 
stand as the legitimate basis of community. 
Atman as the ground of social cooperation is not able to predicate a particular way 
in which community good must be defined because this is not part of its nature, but it is 
able to situate the fair good for all. This is a kind of good that allows for the development 
of  the  equal  and  free  nature  of  all  individuals.  However,  it  may be  asked  how will 
individuals who subscribe to this philosophy pursue their own goods and at the same time 
preserve community good? This is important as it raises the issue of the primacy of the 
community. Often, this primacy is misconceived to imply that any personal idea of the 
good that is not definable in terms of the central social good is insignificant. A careful 
analysis of the image of the atman indicated in the above passage cast some light on how 
Advaita deals with this problem.
The passage above describes atman in the form of a man, yet atman is said to see 
nothing in the community apart from himself. Literally, this raises some difficulties. How 
can atman identify  himself  as  a  man if  there  were no other individuals  he compares 
himself with? Let us recall that the difficulty of this identity is further compounded by the 
fact that this is the beginning. I mean the possibility of atman distinguishing himself as a 
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man is more contestable at this stage particularly when it is affirmed that there is no other 
person apart from him. It would possibly make better sense if atman’s identity is said to 
be derived through a system of classification. In this case, it would mean that atman has 
something to contrast itself with, thereby realizing his distinguished identity. But, the 
story is illuminating as it  illustrates the possibility of identifying differences with the 
contents  of  the  ultimate self.  This is  made possible  by what  Kanada,  the founder  of 
Nyaya School, calls the ‘particular’. I will explain in detail this idea of the particular 
below. The story represents for us how our different identities ought to be explored from 
the  perspective  of  the  ultimate,  formless  self.  It  presupposes  that  the  person  has  the 
capacity to see beyond the realm of difference to the essence which contains it.  One 
important thing that this philosophy emphasizes is that we are first unitary and then we 
become plural. Therefore, we must long to live by the unitary nature which is showcased 
in the depth of self consciousness rather than the shallow division which is revealed in 
our plural nature. More often than not, the divisive nature of the plural nature is given 
more  emphasis.  This  shallow  emphasis  takes  the  lead  in  the  approach  of  some 
philosophers to identity. It is the bedrock of certain political theories which characterize 
people as having singular affiliation which predominantly needs to be discovered and 
ought to be preserved even at the expense of other identities. This goes against the moral 
extension of the self in which others are covered and loved. Some commentators are 
skeptical  about  the  genuineness  of  this  so  called  moral  intuition.  Especially  in  the 
contemporary world that is polarized with various distinctive identities each of which is 
badly seeking recognition and dominion over the others, they claim that the reference to 
our  moral  oneness  is  simplistic.  But  Advaita  philosophy  stresses  that  the  prominent 
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division  which  characterizes  our  time  results  from  the  increasing  loss  of  the 
understanding of the true self. This loss can be remedied by the knowledge of our worldly 
identity as the Brahman in disguise. The possession of this knowledge would eradicate 
the fear that is generated from holding unto the false self. 
Going by Shankara’s analysis of Brahman as the ultimate self, the qualified atman 
represents the real individual in the world. Knowing that the worldly form that this atman 
assumes represents the lower self is very important. Among other things, it guides the 
scope of our choices and it helps us to act in a way that will not jeopardize our own 
interests and those of the community. It brings to our understanding that the lower self is 
explicated  through  the  social  life  of  the  community.  Therefore,  the  community  life 
becomes necessary in the understanding of identity. Nevertheless, this idea of the self that 
is  derived  from  the  community  life  only  points  to  the  higher  self,  highlighting  its 
profundity.  The  higher  self  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  meanings  enunciated  in  the 
community. The higher self is not antithetical to the lower self. In fact, the higher self is 
revealed through the lower self. On this note, we may answer the question about what the 
Upanishadic  literature  means  by  saying  that  atman  as  an  individual  looks  at  the 
community  and  finds  none  else  than  himself.  It  means  that  atman  sees  the  original 
identity as transcending anything that is affiliated with others. The atman sees plurality as 
it  is contained in itself.  This identity stems from the underlying consciousness which 
gives meaning to every particular mode of living. This consciousness is what makes the 
individual  to  be  a  member  of  the  community.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  that  which 
distinguishes the individual as a unique person in the community. Having established the 
uniqueness of individuals, Advaita philosophy claims that individuals ought to deliberate 
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on their differences. This grants the philosophy’s subscription to the fact that individuals 
have the power of self choice. It confirms that individuals are transcendental subjects 
who are capable of choosing their lifestyles and central projects. Self choice implies, in 
this tradition, that individuals have the capacity to explore their worldly identities and 
that they can cultivate it  as they deem fit.  However, the core of the self can only be 
reached when the individual transcends the division that is characterized with worldly 
identities. I will elaborate on this point in the third section.
Let us recall that atman is identical with Brahman and, as we have initially shown, 
the theory of Brahman represents the individual as a subject. What this presupposes is 
that  the guiding principles  which define the cooperative association of these subjects 
must not be strictly fixed. In other words, it implies that any good which the community 
is identified with at any point in time must be taken as relatively true. This is in the sense 
that such good can be reevaluated and possibly repealed in light of new knowledge. This 
shows that Advaita philosophy concedes to the view that individuals ought to choose 
their lives. It also supports the idea that a fixed conception of the good has the tendency 
of constraining individuals’ freedom thereby demeaning their liberty. The narrower and 
stricter the good identified with the community becomes, the more chances it has to limit 
the choices of individuals. The possibility of measuring the good of individuals by the 
contributions they make to the community is higher in any system that imbibes the above 
ideology.  Since  Advaita  rejects  this  ideology,  it  will  be  mistaken  to  argue  that  the 
philosophy attaches identity to community. Advaita philosophy argues for the claim that 
we  do  have  choices  over  alternative  identities.  More  importantly,  the  person  is 
acknowledged as having substantial  freedom regarding the various identities she may 
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have at  the same time. Interestingly,  the Advaita notion of individuality supports  the 
virtue of freedom. It also defends the virtues of equality and fairness. Considering the 
nature of atman, it is certain that the philosophy allows for the articulation of the widest 
possible idea of the common good which individuals of free and equal nature may find 
satisfactory in self development. 
Advaita philosophy takes any stage of self definition and the differences that are 
associated with it as the relative face of the self. Also entailed in this philosophy is the 
submission  that  the  inherent  capacity  for  self  choice  does  not  need  to  separate  the 
individual  from the community.  In  an important  sense,  the  demonstration of  genuine 
autonomy implies that individuals reflect on the multiple identities showcased in different 
communities as the manifestation of the ultimate Brahman. This demands that individuals 
consider their responsibilities to themselves as people sharing the same reality seriously. 
The idea of autonomy that is revealed in this passage highlights the need to respect each 
other’s  experiences  because  they  presuppose  the  reality  of  Brahman.  There  are  no 
presuppositions that indicate that the knowledge of Brahman can only be accomplished as 
individuals measure their  lives by certain paradigm of thought which are taken to be 
universally valid. This view is agreeable to most Advaitins. N. K. Devaraja describes the 
Advaitins conception of Brahman as:  
the  informing  spirit  of  all  experience,  the  light  of  awareness  that 
constitutes  the  very  core  of  the  phenomenon  called  experience.  The 
Advaitin  reaches  the  notion  of  Brahman  or  Atman  not  through  any 
rationative  or  dialectical  processes,  but  through  reflective  scrutiny  of 
experience as such.56 
56 N. K. Devaraja, “Contemporary Relevance of Advaita Vedanta”, Philosophy East and West, 20 (1970): 
133.   
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As  revealed  in  the  above  passage,  the  idea  of  Brahman  stems  out  of  experience. 
Therefore,  to  make  Brahman  the  intuitive  idea  of  the  community  of  autonomous 
individuals need not hinder them from pursuing their own central projects. 
Autonomy, as conceived in Advaita philosophy, is not an asocial concept. The 
person  understands  her  autonomous  nature  correctly  when  she  apprehends  it  as  the 
essential attribute that should guide her relation to others in the world.57 This is illustrated 
in the question posed in Mundaka Upanishad 1. i. 3: 
O adorable sir, (which is that thing) which having been known, all this 
becomes known? 
The answer comes in Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, IV. v. 6: 
All  this,  my  dear,  becomes  known  when  the  self  is  seen,  heard  of, 
reflected on, and meditated upon. 
The passages above indicate that there is a necessary link between the knowledge of 
oneself and the knowledge of others. Mainly, the knowledge of the self guides one’s 
dealings  with  others.  Shankara  encourages  every  individual  to  hold  their  worldly 
experiences as true because they are actually real.  However, he holds that individuals 
must not lose sight of their distinctiveness when they relate to one another but they must 
be mindful of the fact of their ultimate oneness. In Shankara’s words: 
This distinction can be upheld from our point of view as well; for 
so it is seen in the world. Thus though foam, ripple, wave, bubble, 
etc.  which  are  different  modifications  of  the  sea,  consisting  of 
water, are non-different from the sea, still amongst themselves are 
perceived  actions  and  reactions  in  the  form  of  separating  or 
coalescing.  And  yet  the  foam,  wave,  etc.,  do  not  loose  their 
individuality in one another, they are never different from the point 
of view of their being sea. Similar is the case here. The experiencer 
57 BBS. I. iv. 23.
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and the things experienced never get identified with each other, nor 
do they differ from the supreme Brahman.58  
Shankara shows a worthy respect for the distinctive experiences of individuals situated in 
some local contexts. He mentions that individuals should preserve their individualities 
even though he thinks that the forms that they assume are different from the true nature of 
Brahman. 
In Shankara’s philosophy, we understand that the basis of social cooperation is to 
be developed on the ultimate unifying nature, the nature that is all pervasive, holding the 
multi-various  identities  that  are  visible  in  the  world.  When  this  nature  is  cultivated, 
individuals will be able to follow the moral prompt which makes them listen to, care for, 
and be compassionate to those who seemingly belong to other groups. This nature does 
not divide us in a way that makes it difficult to respond to the plight of others mainly 
because  we  are  afraid  not  to  interfere  with  their  own conceptions  of  the  good.  The 
cultivation of the nature of Brahman allows individuals to display their true humanity. 
This  further  supports  what  has  been  said  before,  that  Advaita  philosophy  accords  a 
worthy  respect  to  the  virtues  of  freedom  and  equality  which  are  crucial  in  the 
understanding  of  individuality.  But  the  kind  of  freedom  that  is  illustrated  in  this 
philosophy is  the  freedom to  be  at  one  with ourselves  regardless  of  our  differences. 
Advaita philosophy directs our attention to Brahman. Seeking Brahman implies seeking 
the knowledge of one’s inmost being. For now, we see roughly that the foundation on 
which the ideal of the community thrives is able to aid the understanding of the universal 
self regardless of the depth of experience that anyone might be affiliated with. There is no 
experience that  is  not  viewed under  this  system of  thought  as  a  relative  face  of  the 
58 BBS. II. i. 13.
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inexhaustible Brahman. Each compartmentalized experience is to be constantly dugged 
and redefined to meet current realities. Although the individuals in the community are not 
denied of having certain affections and devotions which are distinct from one another, 
their understanding that the differences are contained in Brahman makes them seek their 
point of unity. Ultimately, these individuals understand that the distinctive attachments 
that they pick in the society do not exhaust their nature. Hence, they are challenged to 
embrace  the  differences  in  the  particularities  which  they  find  comfortable  to  define 
themselves. None of these is able to exhaust the nature of the extensive self which is the 
innermost being in all. If this is the case, it means that the violence which we sometimes 
engage  in,  and  which  at  other  times  leads  to  a  lot  of  destructions,  results  from the 
erroneous thinking that our real self is exhausted in those distinctive forms which we 
adopt from our participation in the world. Shankara develops an interesting philosophy 
on how to approach differences. 
As we shall see later, contrary to the kind of shallow tolerance that is seen in the 
action  of  the  modern  individual  who  is  faced  with  tribal,  religious,  cultural  etc. 
differences,  Shankara’s  philosophy  provides  a  platform that  enables  everyone  to  see 
difference from the perspective of the one ultimate reality which underlies the many.59 
59 The idea of the modern individual is here used to refer to someone who sees the self as nothing more than 
what is experienced mentally and physically. This reductionism engendered the ignorance that the self can 
be realized or lost in actions. Hence, each individual must strive unwaveringly and without any serious 
consideration of the interests of others to realize the self. This is the characteristic of the modern world, this 
modern conception of the self has created a kind of tension and strains between individuals. Not only this, 
the institutions which are supposed to bridge the gap and restore the bond which ought to guide human 
relations and the whole of existence are tailored in the mechanistic paradigm which excels in dividing and 
separating people into inconclusive groups. 
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This is the significance of Indian philosophy.60 Although, Shankara refuses to grant the 
highest level of reality to the separate individuals in the world, he emphasizes the need to 
see individuals as we see Brahman. The respect that is given to Brahman as the supreme 
Lord of the universe is also to be given to individuals who are identical with Brahman. I 
shall  now  proceed  to  the  discussion  of  the  formation  of  identity.  I  will  reveal  one 
fundamental problem that is inherent in the way the question of identity is posed in what 
follows.
Self Identity: How is it Formed?  
The question  about  identity  is  often  posed  in  two  senses,  namely,  is  identity 
chosen? Or, is it given? When the question of identity is posed in the above ways, we 
expect a kind of answer that is definite. Thus, if identity is chosen, then it cannot be given 
and vice versa. The view of identity as a thing that is chosen follows from the conception 
of the individual as a self determined agent. It seems to mean that if we agree that the 
individual  is  really  capable  of  self  choice  then  she  has  all  the  freedom  of  self 
determination. David Gauthier expresses this view as follows: 
60 Reading from Raju, one sees a very crucial nature of Indian philosophy, how it connects the essentially 
inward life to the outward. Indian philosophy presents a clear notion of the person with passion and critical 
reflection. Raju shows the holistic approach in the following remarks, “The Advaita conception of the 
constitution of the individual also is the same as that given by the Upanisad in its doctrine of the levels of 
the atman and body. These levels are interpreted by this school as sheaths (kosas). The original pure atman 
is encased, first, in the sheath of bliss; this is encased in the sheath of reason, this is in the sheath of mind, 
this is in the sheath of life, and this, finally, in the sheath of matter. The original nature of atman is 
saccidananda, existence, consciousness, and bliss”. See P. T. Raju, “The Concept of Man in Indian 
Thought” in P. T. Raju and S. Radhakrishnan, (eds.) The Concept of Man A Study in Comparative 
Philosophy, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1955),  p. 287.
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But if we admit that individuality may be socially caused, so that persons 
are social products, then must we not reject the contention that persons are 
autonomous? And if we sacrifice autonomy, then are we not undermining 
the conception of the liberal individual, which is at the core of our answer 
to those who would reject morals by agreement as the pseudo-morality of 
economic man?61
From the above quotation, we understand that thinking about individuality as a product of 
some  social  histories  or  cultural  values  demeans  autonomy.  Thus,  the  concept  of 
autonomy requires a belief in nothing other than self-chosen values, nothing external is 
able to determine the individual’s mode of being in the world. This position is developed 
on certain idea of the self. However, to some, the conception of identity that stems from it 
is inadequate. 
The question about identity, as posed in Advaita philosophy, is directed at the 
core of the individual’s constitution. First of all, the question goes thus, who am I? The 
answer to the question, from the standpoint of the Upanishad, is ‘Tat Tvam Asi’. The 
English equivalence of ‘Tat Tvam Asi’ is ‘Thou art That’.62 
61 David Gauthier, “The Liberal Individual” in Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (ed.), 
Communitarianism and Individualism, p. 157.
62 There are four great sayings (mahavakhya) in the Upanishadic scriptures which illustrate Atman-
Brahman identity. They are: Consciousness is Brahman (Prajnanm Brahman), it occurs in Aitareya 
Upanishad of the Rg Veda. That art Thou (Tat tvam asi), found in Chāndogya Upanishad of the Sāma 
Veda. This self is Brahman (Ayam ātman Brahman), contained in Māndūkya Upanishad of the Artharva 
Veda. I am Brahman (Aham Brahma Asmi), in Brhadāranyaka Upanishad of the Yajur Veda. 
54
Simply speaking, the phrase ‘Thou art That’ confirms that the constitutive consciousness, 
that is, the consciousness which contains the distinctive identities or the mode of being of 
all individuals in the world, is Brahman.63 The question of whether the phrase refers to 
the merger of individuals at the ultimate level of existence has been variously answered. 
63 The statement ‘Thou art That’ can be explained from three linguistic usages. The primary or direct usage 
(vakyartha), the implied usage (lakshana) and the suggested usage (vyangyārtha). The primary usage of the 
‘That art Thou’ statement can be grasped from two perspectives; the relation of duality (bheda- samsarga) 
and the relation of non-duality (abheda-samsarga). In the former, an understanding of difference is 
conveyed in the relation between the ‘That’ and the ‘Thou’. Shankara rejects this position because it does 
not, at the highest level of reality, tally with the identity of Brahman and Atman. See Vensus A. George, 
Self Realization [Brahmaanubhava] :The Advaitic Perspective of Shankara, (Washington, D.C. : The 
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001) pp. 44 – 50, see also, Sadananda Yogindra, 
Vedaantasaara (The Essence of Vedaanta) of Sadananda Yogindra, transl Swami Nihilananda, (Calcuta: 
Advaita Ashrama, 1968), and A. N. Bhattacharya, Essence of Vedānta, (Delhi: Durga Publications, 1986), 
pp. 47 – 51.  
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I  do  not  intend  to  dabble  into  this  discussion  since  it  goes  beyond the  limit  of  my 
discussion. 64 The question at hand dwells on how the notion of identity is explored in 
Advaita philosophy. I mentioned earlier that the exploration of the question of identity in 
Shankara’s philosophy centers on knowing who I am. This question is related to the other 
ones raised initially i.e. is my identity chosen by me or given by the community? 
64 Ramanuja refers to the passage of the scripture which says “all that consists in this” as a simplified 
meaning of the identity thesis. In his interpretation, the words “all that” includes all separate beings in the 
world ranging from intelligent beings to non-intelligent ones, and “this” refers to Brahman as the soul of 
the world. Ramanuja disagrees with Shankara’s analysis of the connective terms in the mahavakhya 
statement. To him, the term ‘art’ denotes something that is distinct although the grammatical analysis of 
‘Thou’ and ‘That’ may yield the notion of a single reality, there can be no denial of the fact that reality 
exists in different modes. In the Chandogya Upanishad. See Chandogya Upanishad, VI. Viii. 7. Brahman, 
Ramanuja contends, is described as the “all that consists in this”. What this means, in Ramanuja’s view, is 
that Brahman stands as the soul of the empirical jiva which exist in different modes, a figurative 
interpretation upon which the Shankarite notion of illusion hangs is self nullified from the view that 
individuals exist in distinctive varieties. Ramanuja supports this point with the fact that varieties of 
individual representation is expressed in the notion of ‘all that’, however, the only fact being that the ‘all’ 
have their very soul in Brahman. Shankara replies that the statement “all that consists in this” can yield 
three possible explanation of the identity connection. The first explanation describes the connection 
between the ‘that’ and the ‘this’ as having identical substance or locus (samanadhikaranya) but this 
understanding entails the notion of  time difference in which the ‘that’ is situated in the time past and the 
‘this’ in the present. This cannot be applicable to Brahman because it “cannot be said to have arisen in time, 
to be subject to the “present,” or to have an end in time-for all such sayings apply only to that which is 
relative and conditioned”. Cited in Eliot Deutsch, “The Self in Advaita Vedānta”, in Indian Philosophy, A 
Collection of Readings, edited with introduction by Roy W. Perrett, (New York, London: Garland 
Publishing Inc., 2001), p. 7. The second explanation indicates that the two words ‘that’ and ‘this’ qualify 
one another by referring to a common object (visheshanavisheshyabhava) however, the words display 
certain mutual qualifications which is untrue of Brahman. The third understanding shows the relationship 
of identity by stipulating the ‘that’ and the ‘this’ as identical, it eliminates the notion of past and present 
time associated with the two terms, giving the implied meaning of the ‘this’ as identical with the ‘that’. The 
time difference being eliminated brings about the consideration of identity exclusive of temporal 
differences. It is through this understanding alone that Shankara believes the Vedantic aphorism tvam asi 
can be uncovered. In rendering the ‘That art Thou’ statement, all the conflicting imports, namely, 
immediateness, remoteness and differences, are given up, and the absolute, pure consciousness which is 
common to both ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ is retained.  This understanding implies knowing the principle of doing 
good to all as if doing it to oneself. This is the unchanging principle which ought to guide human actions 
and it is from this medium that one should judge whether his/her actions are good or not. In all, Shankara’s 
position stipulates that the utmost identity of individuals may be read from the standpoint of certain social 
and local particularities, the individual is indeed not ultimately tied to them. 
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However, there is an interesting difference between the two questions and this must never 
be overlooked. 65 The way that the question about the given or chosen of identity is posed 
and answered presupposes that the identity that is given or chosen is not different from 
the ultimate identity of the individual. I mean here that both views, i.e. the position that 
represents  identity  as  a  given  and the other  that  says  it  is  chosen,  see no difference 
between the ultimate self and the form of its appearance in the world. Let us note that the 
confusion occurs from the misrepresentation of the forms of the self with the self itself. 
Back to the philosophy of Descartes, the foundational self is depicted as something that is 
exhaustible  by  the  mind.  In  Kant,  we  understand  the  individual  as  a  transcendental 
subject. But the form of this subject in light of Kantian and Cartesian philosophies can be 
wholly exhausted by the mind.  This is  why the mind gains  the ultimate role  in  self 
definition. The self that is totally exhausted by the mind is not identical with the real self 
that Shankara defends in his philosophy. At best, this self can be equated with Shankara’s 
lower self. For Shankara, the lower self is the self that can be identified with any image 
or symbol. This self is the one that is possible of being exhausted by the mind. Shankara 
claims that the logical representation of the self in this way is shallow and indisputably, it 
cannot lead any person to a deep understanding of her self. 
One should not fix the idea of the Self on symbols, because an aspirant 
cannot think of the separate symbols as himself. The reasoning is hollow 
65 Yoshitsugu Sawai makes an interesting distinction between Ramanuja and Shankara in the following, “In 
Shankara’s theory, there is ultimately no ground for a polarity of beings in the world, for the only 
ultimately existent being, the nirguna-brahman, is non-dual, impersonal, inexpressible and relationless; all 
other things are assumed to exist within the nirguna-brahman and thus are not ultimately real. For 
Ramanuja, however, the saguna-brahman includes the world of the individual finite souls and of finite 
matter: the diversity of the world is real. Accordingly, the relational polarity of saguna-brahman with the 
individual finite souls and things is fundamental. See Yoshitsugu Sawai, “Ramanuja’s Hermeneutics of the 
Upanisads in Comparison with Sankara’s Interpretation”, Journal Of Indian Philosophy, 19, no. 1 (1999): 
90. This interesting distinction shows how Shankara perceives the individual utmost identity as the 
container of all forms. In practice, Shankara’s position calls us to pursue how to realize the extensive 
capacity in us that can enable us to show a kind of compassion that perceives human understanding to the 
whole of creation. 
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that the symbols being forms of Brahman are Brahman itself, and hence 
are the same as the Self; for that would lead to the brushing away of all 
symbols.  For  it  is  only  when  the  names  etc.  are  deprived  of  their 
transformed states (as names etc.), that one arrives at Brahman which is 
their essence.66 
Incidentally,  Shankara’s argument  shows that  the kind of reflection which the 
person in the above picture engages in in order to understand her self is not significantly 
deep. This claim supposes that the above method does not capture the correct way to 
probe our true being. When the question, who am I, is raised, we go deeper until the 
depth of the formless self is reached. Here, the question is as follows: what is my real 
identity? I  am asking about  that  thing which makes me to be in  the first  place.  The 
answer, as seen above, is Brahman. Upon securing the answer, I step ahead to inquire 
about  that  which  makes  me  different  from  others.  The  question  here,  we  need  to 
understand, is not how my nature is different from others’ nature for I know that there is 
only one true nature, namely, Brahman. My question is about how this nature makes me 
appear  differently  from others.  This  is  not  about  ultimate  difference,  it  is  about  my 
worldly  difference  which  is  temporal,  in  the  sense  that  the  difference  which  though 
appears  in  me  truly  and  is  associated  with  my physical  identity  is  not  a  permanent 
characterization of my ultimate identity. I can reevaluate it, subject it to critical reflection 
and possibly choose an alternative identity if I feel like. However, no matter how deep 
and valuable the kind of life I feel pleased to be identified with, I am aware that it is not 
identical with my ultimate nature. My worldly identity is indisputably my choice. I do not 
deny that the community influences me in certain ways and that this influence helps me 
to articulate my preferred identity among the many alternatives that are prevalent in the 
66 BBS. IV. i. 4.
58
community. However, this influence will not necessarily determine who I ought to be, for 
my inmost idea of the good may eventually vary from that of the community. There is a 
give-and-take kind of  exchange in this  conception of  identity.  I  am presented with a 
particular way of living upon arriving in the world, I am to adopt this way of life in the 
manner I am pleased with. For me to deny that this form of identity is completely chosen 
by me is to be insincere. To also deny the fact that I internalize it and act it out in my own 
way is incorrect. What is presupposed in the question of identity, as framed here, is the 
need to know Brahman which is the reality that both makes me to be and to be distinct. 
Having known that that which makes me to be is that which makes me different, I 
will explore my difference in the world not from any premonition of division. I am sure 
that I am morally connected with others regardless of my different identity. What I am 
trying to explain here is extensively discussed by Raju in the book Spirit, Being and Self,  
Studies in Indian and Western Philosophy. Raju identifies one major distinction between 
the  individual  and  the  particular  individual.  To  Raju,  the  idea  of  individuality  and 
particularity may be used interchangeably in ordinary linguistic parlance, but when such 
usage enters into the domain of philosophy, it loses certain insights which are gained by 
classical philosophers of India. The category of the particular is introduced into Indian 
philosophy by Kanada, the founder of Nyaya School. Kanada describes the particular as 
that “which differentiates the absolute similar”.67 This definition is supposed to show that 
the individuality of  the ultimate individuals,  such as atoms and spirits,  is  only made 
possible by ‘the possession of the particular’. Finest spirits or ultimate atoms could not be 
differentiated by any special qualities but by the categorization of their particularity. The 
67 See P. T. Raju, Spirit, Being and Truth, Studies in Indian and Western Philosophy, (New Delhi : South 
Asian Publishers, 1982), p. 210
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particular  is  the  material  principle  that  distinguishes  individuals  from  one  another, 
without the particular no individual can be differentiated from the other. The particular is 
not the same with the individual which is identified with special qualities; the particular 
lacks qualities of difference and for this reason it is only an ultimate differentiator and not 
an ultimate difference.68 So, what the particular does is to differentiate things but itself is 
not  differentiated.  The idea of  the particular here fits  into the idea of Brahman.  The 
particular cannot be differentiated from that which it differentiates. It is not separate from 
it. Raju says, it is always inward to the individual transcending its individual content. In 
Raju’s view, this is the freedom of the particular, escaping the content that it individuates. 
The  interchangeability  of  the  particular  with  Brahman  (the  ultimate  nature  of  the 
individual)  supposes  that  individual’s  identity  transcends whatever  definition  that  the 
community gives her.  
Raju  highlights  two  characters,  namely,  constancy  and  activity,  as  the  best 
characters that define the inward transcendence of the particular.69 These characters are 
paradoxical. If they are not carefully explained, they may be taken to be opposite. When 
the particular is depicted by constancy, it means that it identifies itself with the content of 
its individuation. For example, when I refer to myself as a student of philosophy, that I 
am sitting down and writing my PhD Dissertation, that I am doing my PhD degree at the 
National  University  of  Singapore  and  that  my  nationality  is  Nigeria,  and  that  I  am 
specifically from the Yoruba tribe,  the particular here individuates me and constantly 
identifies itself with each of the contents of its individuation. In each of these contents, 
we should note that the particular is represented as a constant. However, it is different 
68 For further study on the idea of ultimate differentiator as conceived by the Nyaya, see Sukharanjan Saha, 
Perspectives on Nyaya Logic and Epistemology, (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi and Company, 1987), p. 33.
69 P. T. Raju, Spirit, Being and Truth, Studies in Indian and Western Philosophy, pp. 210-211.
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from the constant because it is the active force which unites the different constants and 
makes it the ‘I’ which is my ultimate identity. The ‘I’ belongs to each of the different 
categories represented above.  No single  category can be said to exhaust  my ultimate 
identity. 70 What is exemplified in this notion of identity is,  as claimed by Raju, that 
identification and transcendence are the inherent nature of the particular and this is clear 
in the case of the ‘I’. So, the ‘I’ is the particular which differentiates the individual but 
itself is not differentiated. It is this ‘I’, that is, my ultimate identity which also articulates, 
evaluates and redefines my worldly identity. The nature of the ‘I’ is the nature of Atman, 
which is identical with Brahman. This is the supreme consciousness which reflects on the 
immanent condition of the individual in the world. Its transcendental nature cannot be 
curtailed  by  any  community  ideal.  This  ‘I’  is  the  ultimate  which  determines  and 
assimilates everything in me. When I say that the ‘I’ determines everything in me, I refer 
to that which I am directly aware of, the transcendental subject which is the core of my 
being  as  an  individual,  that  which  I  can  only  use  for  none  other  than  myself.  In 
differentiating  this  ‘I’  from the  ‘me’,  Raju  says  “I  can  use  the  term  “I”  only  with 
reference to myself and to none else. When I use the term “the I” in the third person, I no 
longer speak of myself. When I use the term “me” as in “You misunderstand me,” I am 
referring to myself as I appear to you but not as I am to myself. There is, therefore, only 
one object in the universe for which I can use the term “I” … but in all contexts I can use 
70 Amartya Sen observes that in our normal lives “we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups-we 
belong to all of them. A person’s citizenship, residence, geographic origin, gender, class, politics, 
profession, employment, food habits, sports interests, taste in music, social commitments, etc., make us 
members of a variety of groups. Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously 
belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person’s only identity or 
singular membership category. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence : The Illusion of Destiny, pp. 4-5. 
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the term “I” only with reference to one object. The “I” is, therefore, the only particular of 
which conscious human beings are directly aware”.71 
We  find  similarity  in  Raju’s  and  Shankara’s  analyses.  The  ‘I’  is  for  both 
philosophers that which is directly perceived as the content of the concept ‘I’. Going by 
the fact of the transcendence of the ‘I’ as something that is higher than its individuating 
content, we see that the depth of the ‘I’ is beyond personal ego. The other interesting fact 
about the ‘I’ is that its stretching beyond the ego or its social context does not engender 
its  consummation,  rather,  it  expands  its  horizon.  The  possibility  of  the  expansion 
correlates with its true nature as the atman-Brahman. This possibility indicates that the 
self as an expansive substance is not really lost when it transcends personal interests to 
the interests of the community and from the interest of one particular community to the 
interest of the universal community. Conversely, it shows that the expansive substance of 
the self is not limited to any particular community. This explanation typifies the kind of 
enlightenment  that  individuals  ought  to  possess before they can actually  realize their 
inmost nature. Parthasarathy remarks that the whole explanation seems to be a case of 
enlightenment, a call to the individual to constantly remember that the Being of her being 
is Brahman.72 From a systemic perspective, Shankara reveals the in-depth nature of the 
individual as something that is so deep and so high that it defies all categorical definition. 
Therefore, the identity question espouses the infinite nature of the individual and calls the 
finite individual to the realization of her infinite nature. It is a call to the individual as the 
lower atman to rise up to the task of meeting the higher Atman (the all pervasive subject). 
Understanding the notion of identity in Shankara’s philosophy demands that one follows 
71 Ibid. p. 209.
72 A. Parthasarathy, Vedanta Treatise, 3rd edition, (Bombay:  Vedaanta Life Institute 1989) p. 330, as 
quoted from Vensus A. George, Self Realization, p. 44.
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his dialectics in which the real identity of the person is impossible of being exhausted by 
any  community  values  or  norms.  Vensus  expresses  this  dialectics  as  something  that 
progresses “from the ontological level of particularity to another of universality and yet 
to another of unity. When the latter state of unity is attained, the distinctions in the former 
are negated. One begins with the individual consciousness, passes on to the universal 
consciousness  that  overcomes  the  separate  reality  of  both  the  individual  and  the 
universal”.73 Will  this  entail  a  fusion of  individuals  within the community? We shall 
attempt  this  in  the  next  section  as  we  consider  the  congruence  of  morality  and 
individuality in Shankara’s philosophy.





The path of freedom is one of purification and disassociation from 
the  not-self,  from  the  false  or  superficial  aspects  of  the  self. 
Cognitively, it is a case of enlightenment or insight into the nature 
of things. We may call it a negative process, since it is a case of 
divestification of the encumbrances with which we have cluttered 
ourselves in life’s journey. It is not a negative result. For what we 
are left with is nothing, but our real being in its innate immediacy. 
Also, the path’s being characterized in negative phraseology does 
not  mean  that  we  are  to  be  inactive  or  that  it  is  easy  of 
accomplishment.74 
In this section, I will discuss the moral implications of Advaita’s view of identity for the 
individual. Among other issues that will be examined, we shall see whether the Advaita 
person is necessarily subsumed under the moral meanings of his community or whether 
he  is  the  sole  originator  of  his  value  systems.  Neither  of  these  positions  is  socially 
desirable. To regard identity definition as a thing that could be exhausted by the moral 
meanings of the person’s community is to imply that the person’s humanity can only be 
achieved by imitating the lifestyles that are dominant within her social group. Thus, the 
life of the individual will be characterized by dogmatism or even a blind conformity to 
some beliefs. This is contrary to a life of independence and liberty. The worth of the 
person will thus be defined by the degree of her conformity to the actions approved by 
her group. Self assertion will be seen as selfishness and independent decision making will 
be  perceived  as  disobedience.  This  is  inconsistent  with  the  view of  the  person  as  a 
subject, a view that entails that the person ought to choose the way of life she believes 
will make her achieve her deepest feelings. Since the individual who operates under this 
74 T. R. V.  Murti, “The World and the Individual in Indian Religious Thought”, in C. A. Moore, The 
Indian Mind: Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture, p.328.
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ideal will necessarily be expected to concentrate on those virtues which are specified by 
her group in order to gain creditable moral identity, she will be required to pay close 
attention to her every action and be sure to comply with the overall moral principles 
under which she operates. Without much disputation, it will be correct to agree that such 
a life will be difficult and boring.75 In line with B. K. Ramanujam, this ideology cannot 
encourage the development of ‘a cogent adult role’. The question we are set to answer is 
whether the Advaita philosophy’s conception of the subject avoids the above problems.    
Before I proceed to the discussion of the Advaita notion of the moral subject, I 
should allude to one possible way of construing Shankara’s philosophy and this makes 
the  philosophy  undesirable.  This  construction  presupposes  that  the  background 
motivating principle of self realization in Shankara’s philosophy lays a severe burden on 
the person. This, critics would argue, requires that the individual detach himself from the 
empirical conditions of her circumstances, counting them as unreal. The person ought to 
separate himself from the result of actions and hold on to the ideal self which can never 
be realized through actions. Another criticism against  this  philosophy suggests  that it 
75 A reflection on the ill effects of the above position is contained in Susan Wolf’s well written article 
“Moral Saints”. In this article, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is desirable neither in one’s self nor in 
others. She says “I don’t know whether there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that neither I 
nor those about whom I care most are among them. By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is 
as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be”. Wolf’s thesis is built on 
the primary assumption that individuals have the right of self choice. She believes that people ought to 
freely choose the way of life that could lead them to realize their deepest feelings. Wolf mentions that 
virtues that are expected to dominate the character of the moral saint will surely make her life dull. She 
believes that the ideal of moral sainthood demands that one necessarily concentrates on those virtues which 
are specified by one’s community. Ultimately, it implies that the moral saint must dedicate his life to 
meeting others’ needs. Wolf is not saying that meeting others’ needs is inherently problematic. But when 
this dominates the life of the individual to the point that she cannot attend to her own interests then, there is 
a problem. According to Wolf, the ideal of moral sainthood demands that she pays detail attention to every 
of her action and be sure that she complies with the overall moral principles under which she operates. 
Referring to the Kantian saint, Wolf says that she will be too good to be good for herself. This is because 
she must pay careful attention to those stringent rules which demands her attention independently of her 
physical or psychological inclinations. See Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints” in Tammy Roberts, Mical Moser, 
Don LePan, Craig Lawson, Julia Gaunce and Jane Britton, (eds.) The Broadview Anthology of Expository 
Prose (Canada: Broadview Press, 1975), p. 294.
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encourages a hard (ascetic) life, the kind that discourages the cultivation of some personal 
interests which might be legitimate aspects of a good life. I will argue in this section that 
the above claims result from a misinterpretation of Shankara’s philosophy. My position is 
that Advaita philosophy supports the pursuit of the inmost feeling, a kind of feeling that 
does not devalue the person’s good and the good of the community. Shankara, as I will 
argue,  believes  that  the  realization  of  the  inmost  feeling  is  the  only  requirement  for 
experiencing a good and flourishing life. What is suggested in the foregoing is that any 
construction  of  identity  that  merges  individuality  within  some  given  community  or 
exclusively makes it a thing that is chosen independently of the community will certainly 
not make peoples’ lives rich and flourishing. Then, one will be unable to lead her life 
inside  out.  The  important  thing  we  wish  to  accomplish  here  is  to  see  how Advaita 
philosophy depicts the way to lead such a life. The discussion will come under three 
headings, namely, the Advaita conception of the subject, the reason for action and value 
of self detachment.               
The Advaita conception of the Subject
The first concept that is synonymous with morality in the Vedas is rta. Rta refers 
to the course of things. All things, god, human and non-human objects abide by rta. Rta is 
the inner essence of all. It is that which is behind the order in the universe. The idea of 
rta later changes to dharma. Dharma is conceived as the universal cosmic law which is 
eminently fair to all. Dharma is the inherent principle in everything. Dharma is conceived 
as a  way of  life  of  things.  Understood from human social  relations,  it  is  that  which 
determines how the ideal or the good life ought to be lived. The body of knowledge 
called the Veda is the repository of dharma. The Veda is divided into two sections. The 
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first section, called Pravrtti dharma, teaches activity-based dharma. The second section, 
called Atman-dharma, teaches how to withdraw from activity through knowledge. Both 
the first and the second sections of the Veda exemplify how the individual ought to live 
as  a  member  in  the  community  and  how not  to  be  subsumed under  the  community 
meanings, that is, not taking the community meanings as something that define perfectly 
her moral identity. 76 This explains the importance that the Veda places on the individual’s 
immanent and transcendental nature. In the second section of the Veda, Atman, the core 
being of the individual is identified not as the agent of actions. On a more focused level, 
this section dwells on the person’s identity which is more inward than outward. The two 
portions of the  Veda teach how to find one’s true identity as one gets involved in the 
world and as one withdraws from the world. The individual with this knowledge will be 
able to utilize her power of self choice rightly.
The nature of dharma is expressed in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad as follows, 
“Verily, that which is Dharma is truth …”.77 Dharma, being the truth, has an identical 
nature with Brahman. By implication, Dharma’s nature is congruent with human nature 
because  the  nature  of  the  individual  is  congruent  with  the  nature  of  Brahman.  The 
76 The source of dharma has been variously contested. The Indian rationalists argue that reason is the source 
of dharma. The materialists reject reason, they argue that experience is the source of dharma. Notable 
among the materialist school is the ‘enlightened’ (Susksita). Although, the Susksita School accepts the 
distinction between vice and virtue as valid, it contends that the distinction derives its validity from 
empirical grounds. Kumarila rejects both the rational and empirical sources of morality, he claims that none 
of them could procure the basis of the dharmic law, “at best, its attainment will remain but a probability … 
the utmost that we can have is only relative assurance”. Shankara develops this argument, he claims that all 
attempt to understand the dharmic law by the mind will end in developing morality on certain 
presuppositions. Hiriyanna rejects the idea of moral relativity. His position is presented in the following, 
“to rest one’s conduct therefore on the ethics of mere relativity, at least in the case of the majority, that is, 
the very people who need moral training, is sure to result in expediency, leading to what may be described 
as moral drifting”. See M. Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values, (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1975), 
p. 162.
77 Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.14.
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Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says  knowing  Brahman  implies  knowing  the  truth  and 
speaking the truth implies speaking the dharma, 
… a man who speaks truth, He speaks the Dharma, … a man who speaks 
the Dharma, He speaks the Truth. Verily, both these things are the same .78 
Apparently, the moral law is accepted in the Indian tradition as congruent with human 
nature. We may now ask how Advaita philosophy exposes this idea. On the one hand, 
Advaita agrees that speaking and living truly within one’s experiences are identical with 
displaying  one’s  nature  or,  to  put  it  differently,  one’s  dharma.  This  is  stressed  in 
Shankara’s affirmation of our distinctive nature and how we ought to truly live it out. 
However, Shankara argues that the innermost identity remains unrealized if we stop at the 
level  where  differences  reign.  We should go deeper  until  we get  to  the point  where 
differences of identities relapse into the absolute self, namely Brahman. Both of these 
aforementioned points are very crucial if we are to enjoy the true nature of our humanity, 
that is, as people who are unique and at the same time sharing from the same reality. 
What is entailed in this context is that our moral identity cannot be perfectly explained 
from the viewpoint of those particularities  which prevail  in our community values or 
beliefs. Our identity is revealed in two possible ways. The first  is the higher identity 
which, when properly characterized, is found to be independent of any context. This is 
the identity that does not share in the contingencies of the world. Its nature is unaffected 
by what the world happens to be.  
Like ether, though abiding in all beings, I am free from [all] the faults of 
beings; I am the witness, the Observer, the pure, atrributeless Brahman; so 
I am alone.79 
78 Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.4.14.
.
79 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p. 126.
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Although  the  inmost  identity  of  the  subject  is  said  to  be  independent  of  the 
community,  this  identity  can  only  be  known  as  one  partakes  in  the  community 
experience.  It  follows  that  any  identity  that  is  abstracted  from  community  life  or 
explicable independently of community life is faulty. It is obvious that Advaita respects 
the higher or the transcendental nature of the person. Respect for this nature amounts to a 
respect for the worth of the person. Ultimately, Advaita believes that the definition of 
identity  ought  to  be  predicated  on  this  higher  nature.  However,  Advaita  position 
presupposes that this does not entail that the moral subject care less about the community, 
though he should be given the freedom to exercise his choice in the kind of life he lives. 
However, he is well informed if he acknowledges the fact that this choice will necessarily 
be constrained by certain community ideals. Firstly, the recognition of this constraint and 
the knowledge of how one ought to respond to it are essential in the demonstration of 
one’s true worth. In a sense one can say that Advaita agrees that any construction of 
identity which trivializes the community is insignificant. Identity should not be isolated 
from experience, Advaita holds. As a moral subject, Advaita philosophy suggests that 
individuals  should  take  seriously  the  challenge  that  the  reality  of  our  transcendental 
nature brings to us. The acceptance of this nature ought to lead one to acknowledge one’s 
roles within the community and one should largely respect them. These roles, however, 
are not to be performed like mere actors who are dancing to the tune of a play writer but 
as someone who is convinced of the reasons for acting. The moral subject, as expressed 
in this philosophy, should not be credulous in the sense of holding to any belief or claim 
to knowledge without sufficient evidence or good reasons for doing so. This is what the 
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statement “know that Atman alone and abandon other modes of speech” points to.80 And, 
from the standpoint of Advaita, the most plausible reasons for action are those which 
unite us rather than separate us. Thus, one demonstrates a higher responsibility when one 
abandons those worldviews which suggest that one’s identity is exhausted by the values 
of  the  community  that  one  belongs  to.  The  advice  that  one  should  abandon  any 
theoretical simplification of one’s identity does not follow that one’s identity cannot be 
expressed  at  all.  Rather,  it  calls  one’s  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  is  no  possible 
expression of this identity that can exhaust its depth. 
I am one alone; No other than that [Brahman] is thought to be Mine. In 
like manner I do not belong to anything since I am free from attachment. I 
have by nature no attachment.81
Advaita  methodology highlights  the inconclusiveness  of  the  divisive  identities 
which tend to separate people on the basis of culture, religion, race etc. Our identities in 
the world can be many, each of which takes a certain degree of relevance in different 
circumstances  but  none  of  which  could  possibly  exhaust  our  profound  nature.  The 
possession of this knowledge is inestimable as it puts the subject in a position to always 
cultivate her profound and extended self. The identity of this self extends to the others. 
This extensive self is not properly articulated in most western account of individuality. 
Advaita claims that the particularities of the lower self are not contradictory to the free 
nature of the higher self. Knowing this should make individuals accept and explore their 
contingent  identities  and  live  with  the  others  in  harmony.  To live  by  the  contextual 
prompt of the lower self alone is to misconstrue one’s reality. Then, one associates her 
real  self  with  a  false  self.  Shankara  maintains  that  reflection  on  what  defines  life’s 
80 Mundaka Upanishad, 11. 2. 5. 
81 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p. 120. Author’s parenthesis.
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meaning  for  us  must  not  stop  until  they  are  apprehended  as  having  their  basis  in 
Brahman.82 In practical terms, it means that the basis of what determines one’s worldly 
identity must always be examined.
To reiterate what we have said earlier, the identification of the individual’s nature 
with Brahman or Dharma makes her neither to be entirely separated from the community 
nor entirely dependent on the community. This emphasis is important because it shows 
that Advaita approves that the transcendental  nature of the person does not make her 
identity prior to the community. Regardless of Shankara’s belief that the nature of the 
individual  is  beyond  community  meanings,  her  philosophy  does  not  repudiate  the 
particularities of the community which individuals, at different times, find appropriate to 
define themselves. The articulation of identity which pictures the individual on a zero 
ground, in terms of social, historical and cultural constructions, and she is denoted as 
possessing  the  ultimate  knowledge  of  the  good,  is  unacceptable  in  Shankara’s 
philosophy.  Shankara  gives  crucial  importance  to  the  community.  His  allegory  that 
“when one has traversed the forest of “this” (non-Atman) which is contaminated with 
anxiety, delusion, and so on, one arrives at one’s own Atman, just as the man from the 
land of Gandhava [arrived at Gandharva]” supports this claim. It is legitimate to argue 
that Shankara shows, with this allegory, the importance of the social meanings of the 
community.83 These are the instructional materials needed for one to be correctly guided 
to one’s real being. A similar idea is contained in the dialogue between Uddalaka and his 
82 In this passage, Shankara gives the analogy of a student who is unreservedly loyal to his teacher. 
Shankara says, it will be said of such a student that he ‘adores his teacher’. Also, a woman who constantly 
meditates on her husband who is ‘on a sojourn’ is also described in the above sense. Shankara claims that 
even though these people maintain a regular meditation about their substance of knowledge, the scripture 
uses the verb vid or know to describe them. The point Shankara is making is that meditation on one’s 
worldly experiences as Brahman is a non stop activity. See BBS IV. i. 1.
83 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p. 108.
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son Svetaketu in Chandogya Upanishad VI, 14, 1-2. Here, the question about how the self 
can  be  known  is  raised.  Uddalaka  answered  that  this  happens  when  one  is  guided 
appropriately. Uddalaka explains what this means through the metaphor of someone who 
was blindfolded and left in an isolated place. He says that this individual could still arrive 
at her destination regardless of her condition. The essential thing is guidance. This shows 
the relevance of one’s culture, history, and others of its kind. These are essential in self 
knowledge. 
Understanding  this  fact,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  Advaita’s  subject  will 
respond  to  community  practices  and  institutions.  Shankara’s  individual  will  take  an 
integral approach to the investigation of community institutions and practices. He will 
evaluate community values with the understanding that his ultimate nature is independent 
of them. However, since the immanent nature is entrenched in them, and it is through this 
that  the  higher  nature  is  apprehended,  the  Advaita  subject  will  appreciate  these 
institutional values and practices. He will seek to extend their frontiers. The individual 
with  the  above  understanding  apprehends  communal  values  as  something  that  is  not 
forcefully imposed on him. Shankara observes: 
The man who is  devoted to  the self  and is  satisfied with the self  and 
content in the self alone, has no obligatory duty.84
Alternately, the values will be engaged as something that is useful in the realization of the 
authentic life. These cultural materials are not to be willed off as if doing that will enable 
one to reflect genuinely on oneself. Contrariwise, they are to be embraced as part of what 
constitutes one’s worldly identity. However, they must be thoroughly reflected upon until 
their essences are discovered to be universally consistent. What this implies is that the 
84 BBS. IV. i. 2.
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values that one approves of must be consistent with one’s nature. These values must not 
inhibit the freedom of others. We understand here that the individual has certain crucial 
part to play in identity formulation. Her part is not to step out of the community but to 
participate in the reconciliation of the logical inconsistencies and contradictions inherent 
in community’s beliefs. In doing this, she should find better alternatives that promote the 
best interest of all individuals. The Advaita subject acknowledges the usefulness of the 
social institutions which grounded her self identity in the world. However, this person 
knows for sure that the identity she carries in the world is different from her ultimate 
identity. This philosophy is remarkably interesting as it  emphasizes the importance of 
social, psychological, historical and cultural experiences in the investigation of identity. 
In this way, individuals are truly represented as they are in their respective communities. 
If we overlook this in our investigation, we overlook one important fact about ourselves, 
the fact that we are grounded in the community aspiring to realize our ultimate nature 
which indisputably goes beyond community. In what follows, we shall examine reasons 
for  action.  We  shall  investigate  what  Advaita  believes  ought  to  be  the  background 
principle for action. How ought men to act? What is it exactly that the person longs to 
realize when he engages in action?   
The Reason for Action   
Two popular theories attempt to answer the question of how human beings ought 
to act. On the one hand is non-consequentialism which says that human beings should act 
only from the standpoint of duty and not because of the rewards that will result from 
action. This philosophical position conceives the rational subject as having the capacity 
to cause himself only to act under the overall principle by which good actions can be 
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performed. Hoewever, the good of any actions must not be sought in the outcome of 
action but in the background principle which motivates the action. An act is good if it is 
accounted to be good by the rational subject. The rational subject is the one that wills and 
defines the good act. It is said that the rational deliberation is good purely on its own. Its 
goodness is independent of what  the circumstances of the world happens to be.  It  is 
independent of the specific good of the community. To be sure that one is acting freely, 
one must only listen to the intuitive command of the rational subject. And not until an 
individual  is  certain  that  her  action is  not  motivated by empirical  conditions,  natural 
inclinations and sentiments can she be sure of acting freely. Ultimately, individuals ought 
to act not because of what the circumstances of the community happen to be but because 
the duty to act takes preeminence. 
The other philosophical position, namely, consequentialism, finds the above to be 
inconsistent with human practical conditions. Consequentialism holds that it is senseless 
to make duty prior in action without a due consideration of the circumstances of the actor. 
The will to act is not active until it is prompted by the object of practical reason. To the 
consequentialist theorist, human beings do not just act but for certain end which they set 
to achieve. This end is not calculated to be right purely by formal principles. Alternately, 
the rightness of an act is calculated from the standpoint of community values and in terms 
of what the actor or the community derives from it. Thus, the determination of the good 
act ought to be based primarily on the community values, which gives it meaning, and on 
the ends of the actions. Going by the former position, the performance of one’s duty is 
not to be based on any experience of pleasure or pain which may be prior to the act or 
which may result  from the act.  These are  empirically grounded and,  as such,  do not 
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represent the autonomous decisions of the moral subject. The latter position rejects this 
idea. For instance, a person will be justified not to act if the end of her action is calculated 
to  have  some  unfavorable  consequences  on  the  higher  number  of  persons  in  the 
community. The difference between the two philosophical positions is obvious: one takes 
the community life as having no essential input in the categorization of good acts, the 
other does not. Though both philosophical positions attempt to show how human beings 
ought to act in view of their nature, they do not seem to represent the most fundamental 
reason why we engage in actions. Doing one’s duty dispassionately may be a good way 
to live - Advaita advocates this way of life - but there is a way that this can be done and 
the individual will still retain her sense of fulfillment.  
Advaita attends to the question of how we ought to act in a manner that avoids the 
problems that are typical of non-consequentialism and consequentialism. These problems 
appear in two folds. The first, which is associated with non-consequentialism, depicts the 
background principle which motivates action as something that is entirely independent of 
the  human  worldly  conditions.  The  second  problem,  notably  associated  with 
consequentialism,  suggests  that  actions  are  motivated  by  ends  which  are  largely 
quantifiable  in  terms  of  the  happiness  it  brings  to  the  community.  The  conclusions 
reached by the two positions are not surprising as they spring from their conceptions of 
the ultimate self. When a question as this is raised, one is tempted to answer that the 
differences  stem  from  the  duos’  controversial  conclusions  derived  from  the  binary 
representations  of  the individual  as  a  personal  self  with ontologically  prior  marks of 
personhood  and  the  culturally  or  collectivist  construction  of  the  individual.  Advaita 
maintains a middle line approach to this issue. It begins by associating action with the 
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lower self. The main reason for action is for the lower self to discover its true reality. 
This means that the motivation for action comes from the person’s longing to realize his 
ultimate identity. To put this in a characteristically Advaita way, it is to attain oneness 
with  one’s  innermost  nature.  Shankara  acknowledges  that  this  nature  underlies  the 
deepest feeling of the individual, feeling that is purely described as not this not that. This 
is a feeling that transcends what experience or reason could exhaust. For Advaita, the 
person acts in order to realize her blissful nature. This is the fundamental purpose which 
stands as  the background principle  for action.  However,  we should be careful not  to 
confuse the inmost feeling with natural feelings. I will return to this point shortly. 
Granted that this  feeling remains the background principle for action,  Advaita 
philosophy suggests that the right act cannot be delineated in the distinguished senses that 
are highlighted previously. Firstly, Advaita maintains that individuals cannot be said to 
have the right knowledge of what motivates them to act if the background principle is 
entirely disconnected from experience. The inmost feeling which is represented by the 
individual as the good that is worth pursuing cannot be entirely cut off from the idea of 
the good which is prevalent in the world. However, this inmost feeling is deeper than any 
worldly good. The inmost feeling enables the individual to cherish her group but the 
transcendental nature of this feeling helps her to avoid the illusion which binds her to the 
good of the group. The prompt of the deepest feeling makes one respond positively to the 
good of all. This is the ultimate good and it is firstly experienced in one’s community. 
The joy of service which one experiences by participating in the community is supposed 
to prompt us, channeling us to display our moral identity as revealed in our intuition that 
we all share the same humanity. Therefore, the individual ought to live in the community 
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as a moral participant and hopefully extend her moral identity beyond the frontier of her 
affiliated community. This point, as I have mentioned before, is crucial because it allows 
individuals to live as rational and moral choosers. But, in Shankara’s view, the individual 
needs to be aware that while engaging in the service that benefits humanity at large, the 
good that she is actually seeking is not contained in anything external. She is working 
towards union with her own self. It is ignorance that makes individuals to attach their 
inmost beings to the form of the good represented in the world. This attachment makes 
people seek their identity not from within but in action. This is incorrect as shown in the 
following passage: 
In oneself should one see  Atman, the inner  Atman which is denoted [the 
word] “Thou”. Thence one sees all to be  Atman-that is,  the One Apart 
which is meant by the sentence [“Thou art That”].85 
The idea that Atman should be sought within oneself implies that one’s genuine identity 
lies inside. Thus, one needs to act from the inside in order to be authentic. 
The injunction to look inward in order to discover one’s self implies that one 
should peep into the depth of the all permeating self and act from the standpoint of our 
ultimate oneness.  Atman is  the ‘one apart’,  so  it  cannot  be merged within the moral 
identity of any particular community. The question that may be asked is whether this will 
not put some heavy burden on the person. As it is apparent in Susan Wolf’s discussion of 
Kantianism and Utilitarianism, these philosophies make a heavy demand on people, the 
kind that overshadows any concern to sustain good feelings. Can Advaita philosophy, 
especially the kind that Shankara advocates, be freed from this charge? Going by the 
main concern of Shankara which is the sustenance of the inmost feeling that motivates 
85 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p. 195. (1. 18. 220).
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action, it could be correctly maintained that Shankara’s philosophy is free from the above 
criticism. Shankara describes right actions as the ones that aim at the sustenance of the 
inmost feeling of the person. This feeling is the feeling to be in harmony with all. All 
actions stem from the motivation to remain in union with others. This motivation is also 
identical with the motivation to be in union with one’s innermost being. The individual 
must never allow anything to hinder her from being true to this inner feeling. She must 
always bring himself to a position in which he could cause himself to act in order to bring 
about  this  end.  What  is  deeply  desired within  the individual  must  also  be  expressed 
openly  and  truly.  Thus,  one  ought  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  sympathetic  and 
compassionate responsiveness of the inmost self. This is the way to realize one’s inmost 
identity. But Shankara warns that people should be carefully guided so that they will not 
think  that  the  realization  of  the  inner  feeling  comes  by  attaching  oneself  to  action. 
Alternatively, the experience of self fulfillment comes as we detach ourselves from the 
life of action. Mahendranath Sicar’s discussion of the place Shankara gives to action in 
self knowledge explains this point better.  
The performance of sacrifices, the observance of austerities, the regulated 
course  of  moral  and  spiritual  life-all  help  us  in  dispensing  with  the 
materialistic  cast  of  mind  and  in  opening  the  door  to  knowledge  by 
clearing and purifying the heart and removing obstacles from the way … 
Knowledge  can  remove  ignorance,  Karma  is  internally  incapable  of 
removing ignorance, for, that which is opposed to ignorance can destroy it. 
Moreover, it is pointed out in the Prameya Sangraha, if the life of action 
had  been  conducive  to  knowledge,  one  could  not  have  been  asked  to 
renounce it.86 
As it is apparent in the above passage, the materialistic mind is that which conceives the 
self  as an agent  of action.  This mind deceives the person to believe that the core of 
86 Mahendranath Sicar, The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, (Calcuta: University of Calcuta, 
1925), p. 235.
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identity is realizable through action. This materialistic mind must be dispensed with if the 
individual will ever come to terms with the roles of action in self knowledge. A strict 
attachment  to  action  in  self  knowledge  is  demonstrated  in  Kantian  deontological 
philosophy  in  which  a  strict  reliance  on  the  performance  of  duty  regardless  of  its 
consequence is the sole criterion for authentic self expression. Here, the focus is on the 
performance  of  actions  though  Kant  suggests  that  the  outcome  of  action  is  not  so 
important.  But  Shankara  holds,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  attainment  of  knowledge 
destroys the thinking about the self as an agent. 
Therefore, after the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence [has been 
realized], there cannot be any injunction to action, since two contradictory 
notions, “I am Brahman” and “I am an agent”, do not [co-]exist.87  
Firstly, the individual’s nature is presented above as something that is free from 
worldly contingencies, not in the sense that Kant abstracts the authentic knowledge of the 
self entirely from the outcome of action but in the sense that actions actually confirm the 
fundamental reality of the self, a thing that is complete on its own which, nonetheless, is 
still presented as something that needs to be realized.  To think of oneself as Brahman 
and at the same time as an agent do not co-exist because the latter necessitates that one 
depends on action to realize its real nature. What is entailed in the foregoing is that the 
identity that the person longs to realize cannot be attained by a dependence on the life of 
action. This position is further elaborated in the way Advaita discusses the scriptural idea 
of action in inaction. I will discuss this idea below. Of course, Shankara shares certain 
commonalities with Kant. Kant’s view that the nature of the person is free from worldly 
contingencies is shared by Shankara. However, Shankara’s person may not experience 
87 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p. 195. (1. 18. 22).
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the struggle which, in Susan Wolf’s view, is associated with the Kantian individual as she 
engages in her moral obligation. Wolf maintains that the action of the Kantian subject 
may be unhelpful not only to her acquaintances but, to her as a person. The problem 
stems from the level at which the real self is apprehended. One will not be mistaken to 
think that  the Kantian person may not  be informed properly about  the  nature of  the 
deepest  impulse  which  Shankara  believes  should  pervade  the  physical  expression  of 
service. This impulse is supposed to give the performance of an act its real face, that is, 
the human touch. Then, it will matter if one’s action does add to or subtract from the 
community’s happiness. A careful consideration ought to be given to given to this end in 
order to take seriously the real motivation for action.88 We are motivated to act because 
we want to achieve our innermost being which is in union with others. If we neglect this 
feeling in action, the end will certainly not be satisfactory. For this reason, it seems right 
to think that anyone who makes Kant’s moral guiding principle its action guide will be 
under  some  moral  dilemma.  Actions  can  bring  different  consequences  on  people. 
Mohanty contends that actions “which when performed within the mundane structure, 
binds, may be a road to freedom if performed with ‘non-attachment’”.89 Although, Kant 
emphasizes  that  actors  should not  consider  their  sentiments  and the  consequences  of 
actions in the determinations of the worth of actions, this is not the same with Advaita’s 
view of detached actions. An action that is performed without attachment proceeds from 
88 Let us imagine the kind of gesture which an individual who successfully performs her duty and stands to 
witness the end of her action needs to put forward. This is very important in consideration of our humanity. 
We expect certain gestures to transpire between the actor and the recipient and the absence of this is 
sufficient to make life dull and boring. A good way to understand this is to think of the difference between 
a service done by a cheerful and loyal person and the one done by a robot. That of the robot may be timely 
but, it surely will not be compared to the one performed by the individual because it lacks the human input. 
An action that is performed only from a strictly formal sense of duty will likely not be received with much 
enthusiasm especially when the individual will have to dissociate her feelings from it.
89 J. N. Mohanty, Essays on Indian Philosophy, Traditional and Modern, p. 77.
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the right knowledge of the self as non agent. This knowledge is different, in some respect, 
from the one possessed by the Kantian rational subject.  
The concept of action in  inaction will  help us explain the Advaita  reason for 
action further. Inaction itself is action as we should understand. The concept of inaction 
refers to action of the real self. Here, the self that is in action is the ‘I’ that transcends the 
empirical domain. This is the self that acts from the good will, dispensing goodness to all 
regardless  of  their  differences.  But  this  self  manifests  in  such  a  pleasant  manner, 
empathizing with the conditions of others, listening to them patiently and caring for them 
in the same way she will do to her own self, rejoicing or sorrowing with them in their 
different  experiences  of  life.  Certainly,  this  individual  will  be  concerned  with  the 
consequences  of  actions.  Action  done  from the  standpoint  of  non-attachment  is  that 
which “rises above the results of pain and pleasure and enjoys bliss even in the midst of 
actions”.90 This does not eliminate the truest feeling of the individual,  a thing that is 
necessary to demonstrate a worthwhile life in the community. The Kantian individual can 
act for duty’s sake with a sense of attachment and this may come from her perspective of 
the moral law. What I intend to show here is that this individual is attached to the moral 
law. She understands the moral law as something that forcefully demands her necessary 
obedience. Painfully, she moves on to fulfill her moral obligation. This may make her 
promise to visit a friend unchangeable when the need to save a dying mother for instance 
comes up at the same time. But an action that is prompted from the depth of the person’s 
inmost  feeling  differs  because  the  individual  actor  maintains  a  state  of  equilibrium, 
giving careful consideration to the consequences of her actions on others. Since it is the 
real self that manifests its very nature in this kind of action, the person sees everyone as 
90 Cited in Michael Zammit, “Morals and Society in the Light of Advaita Vedānta, A Reflection”, p. 111.
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equally connected with his self. The difference between this individual and the Kantian 
individual  is  that  the  rational  and  emotional  aspects  of  her  being  are  in  a  calm and 
controlled condition. Unlike the Kantian individual, she understands that her action must 
project her inmost nature whose end is to achieve a true state of harmony. 
Shankara’s individual understands that action does not engender the realization of 
the self  but rather aids it.  Knowing this,  she will  act  intelligently and lovingly when 
dealing with others in the community. The important thing is that she does not detach her 
deepest feeling when performing her duty. Shankara contends that the idea of the self as 
an agent is still very much established in the life that is attached to works. In other words, 
the individual is, at this stage, not free. For this reason, he says that the life of work will 
intensify the desire for knowledge as it can only open before us the highest course of life 
which is the good. The Sruti which says that “the Brahmin wills to know Him through 
sacrifices,  penance,  charity,  austerities  and  fastings”  is,  according  to  Shankara, 
confirming that the life of work can only present the truth as something that is in view.91 
In the life of work, we understand our identity as the ultimate good, we apprehend it as 
something that is not within our reach, we pursue it with an awaken interest viewing it as 
something that is drawing us permanently to itself. But the life of work is distinct from 
the life of knowledge which knows the truth of our identity with the being of all. In the 
life of knowledge, we understand that the search for the good which characterizes the life 
of work is the search after our inmost being. The life of knowledge makes us act from 
inside out, living out our entire being which is the self. 
The ideal of authenticity that is espoused here suggests that the individual decides 
to identify with something but what she is identified with is much more relevant to the 
91 Cited in Mahendranath Sicar, The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, p. 234.
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community  as  it  aims  at  preserving  the  integral  nature  of  the  individual  and  the 
community. This ideal of authenticity seeks to promote the virtues of peace and social 
harmony. This is one of the merits of Advaita philosophy. The articulation of identity in 
this philosophy goes so deep that it frees the person from the uncontrollable commitment 
to act in view of one’s conviction even if the heaven will fall. Following this way of 
thinking, one becomes committed to something whose object is less relevant, at least in 
relation to community, as long as one does it with intensity and passion. Reasoning from 
this perspective, it becomes evident that the ideal of authenticity which Advaita proposes 
does not approve that individuals should recoil from the society in order to gain the self. 
What it  involves is the need to be a reflective individual who takes to that which is 
worthwhile within the social contexts of the community. 
Thus, Shankara’s philosophy makes it possible for anyone seeking her identity to 
do so in view of her specific status in the community. Finding one’s identity in this wise 
helps the individual to appreciate what is worth doing. But Advaita takes the matter one 
step further by showing that the individual must never take the community context as the 
fixed path to knowing what is truly worthwhile. To be able to know the good that truly 
represents one’s inmost nature, one’s attention must be directed to Brahman. This is the 
only thing that can destroy ignorance which identifies the good of life with the particular 
good  of  one’s  community.  Acting  in  accordance  with  one’s  communal  beliefs  will 
therefore  mean  that  one  has  sufficient  evidence  or  good  reasons  for  doing  so.  The 
ultimate evidence is apprehended in one’s moral identity as it is in union with others. 
When one gains true knowledge one sees all as atman. At this point, one comes to terms 
with the illegitimacy of the attachment which makes people feel good when they distance 
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themselves from other communities or when they consider it  good to eradicate  these 
others. Advaita stresses that none of the particular good of our communities exhaust our 
real identity. Those who hold to the contrary position misrepresent their ultimate identity 
with the particular meanings of their community. This is due to ignorance and ignorance 
can only be destroyed by knowledge. Shankara describes the kind of knowledge that can 
destroy ignorance as the one that makes the individual to realize first and foremost the 
limit of the good of her community and secondly, the good of the values held by other 
communities. The conceptions of the good may vary from one community to another. 
However,  their  underlying  reality  is  Brahman.  Since  Brahman  is  the  basis  of  all 
knowledge, it becomes evident that the many goods that are associated with different 
communities stem from the same source. Obviously, Shankara is not arguing that certain 
things which are denoted as good in some communities may hamper the cultivation of 
identity. His idea that the false conception of the self leads to bondage and suffering 
supports this claim. However, Shankara’s rendition presupposes that the various goods in 
different communities do not perfectly exhaust our moral identity. As such, the divisive 
ways of classifying identity which is often found in some theories of the self is erroneous. 
The implication of this philosophy to our study is that self understanding is not only 
provoked by the structural meanings of one’s community. The worldviews that prevail in 
other communities can stimulate a deep understanding of the self in us. 
Shankara’s position cautions anyone who holds that self understanding begins and 
ends with the community that one belongs to.  Consequently,  the idea that we cannot 
escape  the  constitutive  consciousness  from where  our  identity  is  discovered  without 
loosing the sense of self that we have is unfounded going by Shankara’s explanation. Our 
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attachment to the community we belong to may be crucial because the self is known 
through  our  experiences  in  this  community.  The  memory  of  our  participations,  in 
whatever respect,  in the community life enlivens the reality of our identity as deeply 
webbed with the community, but this attachment should not be taken to the extreme, thus 
making us forget that others are as much related to us.         
The renunciation of all actions becomes the means for discriminating the 
meaning  of  the  word  “Thou”  since  there  is  an  [Upanisadic]  teaching, 
“Having  become  calm,  self-controlled,  […,  one  sees  Atman  there  in 
oneself]” .92 
Entailed in the above passage is the claim that though the self may be known from one’s 
belongingness and participation in the community, its transcendence comes to the fore 
when  one  reaches  the  equilibrium state  where  its  intimate  connectedness  with  all  is 
clearly  revealed.  Then,  the  basis  of  the  good  that  affiliates  us  with  our  particular 
community becomes known as Brahman. Furthermore,  the communal  presuppositions 
which support the good also find its ultimate grounding on Brahman. Therefore, we note 
that this good is not altogether a bundle of nonsense and that for us to act in accordance 
with the good is right. As the guiding principle for communal identity, this good gains 
primacy but its status becomes secondary when it comes to living one’s life as it is in 
reality. Succinctly put, Shankara believes that the individual’s nature is more than what 
the community can exhaust. His words in the following passage shed light on this point. 
“When the  self  and  the  non-self  are  commonly  unknown,  why should 
effort be made only to know the self” … “Although, the non-self also is to 
be known, it does not require a separate knowledge other than that of the 
self, because it is by knowing this self alone that one knows all this non-
self and others arising from it.93 
92 Ibid, 1. 18. 221.
93 Sankara on Brhada, 1. 4. 7, as quoted in K. N. Upadhyaya, “Sankara on Reason, Scriptural Authority and 
Self-Knowledge”, p. 122.   
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 Here, Shankara holds that the knowledge that can give anyone a good grasp of the lower 
self (what he calls the non-self) is the knowledge of the self itself. What this entails is that 
the knowledge of the self as something that is different from what obtains in the world 
will better help the individual to apprehend her lower nature as that which is not identical 
with  her  higher  nature.  Much  more,  it  will  make  her  apprehend  her  nature  as  the 
extensive reality which permeates all. This is underscored in Shankara’s claim that by 
knowing  the  self  one  knows  all  the  non-self  as  arising  from it.  The  benefit  of  the 
knowledge is  that  it  tends  to  develop the  sympathetic  impulse  of  love  for  all  in  the 
individual. This is remarkably interesting as it reveals that the human nature longs toward 
the attainment of the good. The person is deeply motivated to do good to her own self and 
since this self is deeply connected with the self of others, she is to seek everyone’s good. 
The import of this philosophy on the community is very interesting. Firstly, it 
makes education an important aspect of conduct. The individual must first understand the 
nature of action. Rather than being a blind follower of some traditions, the person will be 
in control of the circumstances that surround her. And we should bear in mind that the 
individual is not seeking to control the circumstances for self interest. This cannot be so 
because she knows that the self is not realized through action. Her actions are based on 
the knowledge of  her  shared identity  with others in  the community.  Hence,  she will 
control her actions in the face of many challenging alternatives, always wanting to act in 
the best interest of all. Apart from the fact that the philosophy puts the individual on a 
better position to comprehend the significance of universal oneness, it  encourages the 
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individual  to  cherish  and  cultivate  her  emotion  knowing  that  these  sentiments 
demonstrate the nature of the good which is contained in the one universal self. 
Reading Shankara’s moral philosophy, one becomes unsettled with the one sided 
expositions of moral  concepts such as duty,  obligation and right  which dominate the 
mainstream ethical theories of modern time. These concepts are emphasized not as much 
as they are able to develop the wellness of the individual. What is accountable for this is 
the loss of insight into the deepest motivation which underlies human actions. Michael 
Stocker directs our attention to this problem when he says that modern ethical theories 
fail  to  “advance our  understanding of  the relations between reason and motive”.94 In 
Stocker’s  view,  ethical  theories  ought  to  approach  life  not  independently  of  the 
consideration of ‘duty’, ‘obligation’, ‘rightness’ etc. However, these should not be dwelt 
on as if that is all that needs to be known about human interactions. The motive of the 
actor  is  also important  if  we are  going to  strike a  balance in  our  account  of  human 
conducts.95 In  the  last  section  I  will  discuss  Shankara’s  view of  duality.  Shankara’s 
position tends to show that actions that are performed under the imposition of duality will 
fragment  the  community.  This  is  because  it  operates  in  the  realm where  the  ego  is 
dominant.  Reasoning  alongside  Shankara’s  thinking  that  human  beings  act  for  the 
ultimate purpose of attaining the good which is identical with the self, we understand that 
actions taken in accordance with the knowledge of identity is the only action that can 
hold  the  community  together.  Therefore,  if  the  true  identity  of  individuals  is  to  be 
realized, the consciousness of the ungraspable and infinite source of life, the origin and 
dissolution of all  things,  must  never  be detached from their  contemplation.  This will 
94 Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” in Virtue Ethics, (eds.) Roger Crisp 
and Michael Slote, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 66. 
95 See Ibid, p. 67.
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make everyone live together in truth. Lack of mutual truthfulness in the way we live has, 
in Stocker’s view, been the cause of the inability to achieve the integrated unity which we 
desire. Stocker remarks that the life that many live is “uncomfortable, difficult, or even 
untenable … making us and our lives essentially fragmented and incoherent”.96 Everyone 
is armed with the idea of right that appears more like a battle tool to engage the other. 
The emphasis of the right of self choice as a kind of empowerment and particularly a kind 
of thing that empowers individuals against themselves cannot bring about the bonding 
which the human soul is longing after.  The most probable thing it  may achieve is to 
engender  distrust  among  individuals,  groups,  nations  etc.  What  we  need  in  this 
contemporary time is to be educated about how the pursuits of rights could procure our 
oneness. This is not to say that individuals should not pursue their rights, but this ought to 
be done in a way that befits our dignified nature, that is, in a way that will not hurt others. 
This will win their trust and the commitment to strengthen the bond of friendship will 
heighten. 
Advaita  enjoins  us  to  pay  attention  to  knowledge  as  we  lead  our  lives.  The 
wholeness of this thinking has been acknowledged with respect to the positive impacts it 
has on its adherents. Nancy Bauer remarks that Vedanta system is able to uphold the 
individual in different “conditions … without falling into despair”.97 This, undoubtedly, is 
one  of  the  chief  aims  of  normative  ethics.  That  the  individual  is  not  existentially 
uncomfortable in following the Advaita Vedanta system is perhaps due to its focus on the 
pursuit of a well rounded life. This finds support from the manner in which the system of 
Vedanta focuses  on individuals’  physical,  social  and spiritual  wellness,  and therefore 
96 Ibid. 
97 Nancy F. Bauer, “Advaita Vedanta and Contemporary Western Ethics”, Philosophy East and West, 37, 
no. 1 (1987): 45.   
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avoids the state of imbalance which characterizes the emphasis of one over the other. 
Prem Lata alludes to this merit saying that Shankara’s philosophy does not separate good 
works and spiritualism, one being the starting point and the other, the end point.98 Before 
we conclude this section, let us comment briefly on the Advaita notion of detachment and 
its moral implication on identity.   
Detachment and self achievement
To lead  the  authentic  life,  it  is  essential  that  one  live  by  those  values  which 
according to one’s belief are good. But, the achievement of authenticity requires a great 
deal of critical reflection about the good that is held in the community. One should be 
able to identify the overarching principle which is able to give one the experience of self 
fulfillment.  Essentially,  one  will  need  to  know  her  true  nature  in  other  to  lead  the 
authentic life. Advaita ethics is believed to unfold in a systematic manner the sure paths 
that lead to the understanding of human nature. However, the question is whether this is a 
safe route to genuine satisfaction. Advocates of Advaita have no worry in answering this 
question positively. One easy answer may be that the Advaita system aims, chiefly at the 
deliverance of people from bondage to illusion. Ultimately, Advaita is seen as helping 
people to find true inner satisfaction. But not everyone thinks that the paths set by this 
philosophy are effective. Followers of Advaita philosophy may be understood as leading 
ascetic  lives.  This  kind  of  life,  it  may  be  maintained,  hinders  the  pursuit  of  some 
legitimate personal interests which are important in the development of a good life. This 
criticism may be supported by the Advaita position which suggests that everything in the 
world is false. 
98 Prem Lata, Mystic Saints of India: Shankaracharya, (Delhi: Sumit Publications, 1982), p. 127.
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Let us start by saying that the above position merely suggests that the mundane is 
incapable  of  procuring  the  in-depth  experience  of  bliss  which  is  entailed  in  the 
knowledge of the ultimate self. But this would not imply that the mundane could not 
point to this inner bliss. As such, the mundane is not entirely unreal. It provokes us to 
reflect on the nature of our inner reality. This explanation may not suffice as critics may 
allude to the lifestyle of the jivanmukta or put differently, the knowledgeable individual, 
to  support  the  fact  that  the  life  of  the  enlightened  person  is  extremely  difficult  and 
undesirable. The way of life of the jivanmukta is supposed to be one in which the will has 
been  eradicated.  Due  to  limited  space,  I  will  not  be  able  to  attend  to  the  Advaita 
conception of the world as false and the positive implication that this view has on self 
understanding.  I  shall  concentrate  on  the  latter  objection  by  examining  what  the 
eradication of will implies in Advaita construction of identity. From all that  we have 
mentioned earlier on, it is obvious that the eradication of the will would not mean that 
one  abandons the determination to  live in  the light  of  her  own self  knowledge.  One 
should be determined to live in such a way that the connection between one’s inner and 
external states is maintained. This kind of life is driven by the sympathetic prompt of the 
inner nature, making us pay important attention to our basic moral impulse. 
The will to abide with the inner voice which calls us to participate actively in the 
world,  investing  into  the  life  of  others  and  the  entire  community,  cannot  be  what 
Shankara wants us to eradicate. However, there is a kind of will that is motivated by a 
false idea of the self. The knowledge of this self may be derived from memories of one’s 
past involvements or the calculative image which one has about oneself in the future. 
Both of these images are presented in the mind. In both instances, the real self is falsely 
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taken to be identical with what may be called symbols. This false idea of the self and the 
will to be attached to its images is what Shankara wants us to eradicate. This point is 
illustrated in the passage below. 
The knowledge “I am  Brahman” is not sublated by [the knowledge] “[I 
am] an agent” [and] “[I] have desire and am bound” which is derived from 
the fallacious means of knowledge.99   
The above passage indicates that the individual’s reality cannot be substituted by the 
consideration of the self as an agent. The idea that one is an agent is derived from a 
‘fallacious means of knowledge’, Shankara argues. This entails, among others, the need 
to willfully detach our real self from anything that can limit its highest expression. When 
we think of our self as the agent of love, we tend to be attached to the actions of love that 
we demonstrate. When this happens, we become susceptible to seeing the false self as the 
real thing. For this not to happen, we ought to develop our mind to cognize the self in its 
pure state. The impact of this knowledge on us is tremendous. It purifies us to such extent 
where  we  are  able  to  demonstrate  the  true  sentiments  of  love,  joy  and  service  to 
everyone. This pure nature characterizes our inmost self. Shankara does not argue for a 
willful eradication of this nature. And this is the kind of life that can bring about the 
experience of true bonding in the community. When summed up, Shankara’s position 
shows that this way of life engenders, in a comprehensive sense, self understanding. 
Of course, no one will deny that we can understand ourselves from memories of 
the good experiences which we, at any particular time, had shared with our neighbors and 
the linkage we hold with our ancestors among others, but we will be lacking the fullest 
99 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p. 195. (1. 18. 223).
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understanding  of  our  being  if  we  define  our  moral  nature  only  in  terms  of  these 
experiences. Let me refer to what Mahendranath Sicar says on this point, 
Vedantism does not shrink from giving a value to the empirical order and 
interprets it as the Lila of Brahman. In fact, the joys of love, the purifying 
influence of grief and the inspiration of service are all accepted as higher 
forms  of  sentiments  but  Vedantist  take  care  to  add  that  they  do  not 
represent  the deepest  feelings.  The blessedness it  affirms which results 
from the perception of identity can have no comparison with anything of 
the empirical order.100  
It  is  certain  that  Advaita Vedanta does not  deny the fact  that  the good memories  of 
service are noble expressions of the self but it shows why we do not need to be attached 
to those particularities which produce the sentiments in us. Instead, Vedantism suggests 
that we should always look forward to the real thing which the particular events of our 
lives intend to show us. This real thing is nothing more than Brahman, the essence of the 
self. Hence, we should see these particular features of our lives as leading us to the peak 
of ultimate knowledge. And what this implies is that we represent any experiences as 
possible means of reflecting on the atman that we are. This will make us cherish the 
values and the sentiments of the society, engage them in critical dialogue in order to find 
a higher and consistent pattern in which the ideal of the community can rest. Not only 
this, our wellness will be guaranteed because we know how to be associated with the 
community life without being enslaved. 
It  is  on this  basis  that  the Advaita  person will  treasure the multiple  identities 
within and beyond her community. She will relate with them from the perspective of their 
essence. Her knowledge makes it possible for her to live a difference-less attitude in the 
society. On how she will react to the institutions in the community, she will relate with 
100 Mahendranath Sicar, The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, p. 315
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them  with  the  understanding  that  they  are  intended  to  develop  an  atmosphere  that 
encourages  self  reflection  and  freedom of  self  expression.  On  the  legitimacy  of  the 
central  authority  in  the  community,  Shankara’s  individual  will  agree  that  central 
authorities are necessary to develop an environment where individuals can develop their 
free nature. This will also mean that individuals will have equal access to the resources in 
the  community.  What  is  evident  is  that  the  philosophy  of  Advaita  supports  the 
individual’s involvement in the community. However, the individual participates to seek 
the best good for all. So, the notion of detachment from the world that seems initially 
negative is not so. The Bhagavadgita says that detached actions are “performed not out of 
selfish interests but out of altruistic motives of ‘loka samgraha’”.101 A detached action is 
one that is not motivated by the ego. Memories of such actions are hard to erase. A willed 
decision to turn against  a loving and ego-less mother,  or  teacher,  or  lover will  most 
probably engender a damaged personality. What brings about the damage is the inability 
to eradicate the force that motivates the action. In precise terms, this force is the real self. 
Its disposition of love, that is, the release of its real character in action is impossible of 
being willed off. Interestingly, the manifestation of this character permeates the whole of 
creation. Advaita philosophy aims to unleash the depth of compassion which dwells in 
the individual’s heart. What appears before, like self consummation, can now be seen 
differently. The ideal life is no longer to be lived in selfish tendencies, rather, it should be 
lived for the prosperity of all. Jesus Christ refers to this as the fullness of life. He says 
that the fullness of life is actually derived from sacrificial life. This is the idea behind the 
saying “Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, 
101 Ibid.
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it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit”.102  The individual is fulfilled as 
she sees others’ progresses. She operates on the maxim “I apprehend the fact that I am in 
all, I am true if I live my life according to that apprehension”. It becomes evident that the 
pursuit of Advaita person is not predominantly private.
Advaita philosophy describes the worth of life in terms of giving. In The Gita, it 
is said that the one whose mind is affected by desire and aversion cannot reach to the 
level of things as they are. He misses the knowledge of the external world as underscored 
by the prime reality.103 The individual cannot discover the worth of life until  she has 
overcome selfishness. When selfishness is eradicated, the individual discovers the bliss in 
her utmost being, the “all pervasive … indwelling Self of all”.104 The dharmic injunction 
says “Do your duty,  always;  but without  attachment.  That is how a man reaches the 
ultimate Truth”.105 Plato mentions something similar but related to the inmost concerns of 
the individual. He says, “in reality morality … is not a matter of external behavior, but of 
the inward self and of attending to all that is, in the fullest sense, a person’s concern”.106 
The two passages do not discriminate against seeking personal goals but that all actions 
should be motivated from the presupposition of the truest concern of the person. This 
point displays the transformation that  the individual  needs to undergo.  It  involves  “a 
letting-go  of  the  individual  ego  and  a  (re-)  unification  of  “action,”  in  the  most 
metaphysical  sense,  with  its  purpose”.107 This  ‘letting go’  of  the  ego is  according to 
Bhattacharya a loss of ‘finitude to find infinitude’. It does not imply the letting-go of life. 
102 The Holy Bible, John 12: 24. 
103 See Gita Bhashya, 7 : 27. 
104 See Katha Upanishad 1. iii. 4, see also BSB 1. i. 4
105 Cited in Bart Gruzalski, “Modern Philosophical Fragmentation versus Vedānta and Plato” in (ed.) Ashok 
Vohra, Arvind Sharma, Mrinal Miri, Dharma, The Categorial Imperative, (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld 
(P) Ltd. 2005), p. 351.
106 Cited in Ibid, p. 353.
107 Nancy F. Bauer, “Advaita Vedanta and Contemporary Western Ethics”, p. 45.
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What happens is that “the finite self dies to live as the universal self”.108 As we journey to 
the last section of this chapter, we will see the interesting way that the death of the lower 
self leads the individual to partake in the being of the universal self. When finitude is 
eradicated, the infinite takes control, then duality is no longer seen in its superficiality 
and the non-dual Brahman glows as the ultimate self. Knowing this as the self, as we 
shall see, makes one partake in what Huxley calls the mind of the universe which, among 
other things, is the peace that passes understanding. 
108 A. N. Bhattacharya, One Hundred and Twelve Upanisads and their Philosophy, (Delhi: Parimal 




The realization of one’s true nature has a lot to do with the 
eradication  of  duality  as  it  is  involved  in  our  day  to  day 
experience. Duality arises out of ignorance and because of its 
illusory nature it  prevents the seeker from knowing her true 
nature.  Removal  of  ignorance  is  the  first  condition  for  the 
actualization of Brahmanubhava.109 
Moreover, the mind of the universe is, among other things, the 
peace  that  passes  understanding.  Man’s  final  end  is  the 
realization that,  in  his  essence,  he is  one with the universal 
mind. But, if he would realize his identity with the peace that 
passes understanding, he must begin by living in the peace that 
does not pass understanding-peace between nations and groups, 
peace in personal relationships, peace within the divided and 
multiple personality.110
This last section will examine Advaita’s contributions to the philosophical discussions of 
alterity. In our discussion of alterity, we shall see how Advaita philosophy attends to how 
the question of  difference and otherness ought  to  be entertained.  Advaita  philosophy 
reflects extensively on how difference itself is constituted and how this ought to guide 
our understanding of what it means to be different. Shankara’s conceptions of duality and 
avidya highlight the practical problems inherent in certain conceptions of identity and 
otherness, in particular, the violence these views encourage. Our focus will not be on the 
ontological dimension of alterity; we are concerned with its epistemological and social 
dimensions.  Thus,  we  shall  examine  the  concept  of  avidya alongside  its  social 
implications in Advaita philosophy. In the Advaita worldview, living the authentic life is 
109 Vensus A. George, Self-realization [Brahmaanubhava] : The Advaitic Perspective of Shankara, p. 75.
110 Aldous Huxley, “Indian Philosophy of Peace” in Christopher Isherwood, (ed.) Vedanta for Modern Man, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1952), p. 296.
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characterized by an attitude of acceptance and toleration of diversity. This way of life 
comes easily for those who have been able to eradicate avidya which is the root cause of 
duality. The idea of duality is used synonymously with difference. By nature, duality is 
illusory. 
Avidya is a Sanskrit term for ignorance. Metaphysically, avidya depicts the finite 
mind as lacking the capacity of penetrating into the core of reality. Consequently, avidya 
hinders  the  individual  from perceiving  her  true  nature.  The  mind that  is  affected by 
avidya is  veiled  from apprehending  the  true  nature  of  reality,  instead  of  seeing  the 
ultimate essence of all  things as the highest reality. It  erroneously limits the ultimate 
reality  to  the  dual  forms  which  appear  to  the  senses.  Metaphysically  speaking,  the 
eradication of  avidya leads the individual to reality. Reality is accessible only to those 
who have been able to eradicate avidya. To these sets of people, appearance is illusory. 
The  effect  of  this  knowledge on  human  relationships  is  tremendous.  Aldous  Huxley 
highlights this point in the paper “Indian Philosophy of Peace”. He submits, contrary to 
casual understanding, that the end of duality is unity. The way to get to this end, Huxley 
suggests, is by participating in the ‘mind of the universe’ which, among other things, is 
revealed in the ‘peace that passes understanding’. Huxley echoes one of the fundamental 
propositions of Advaita philosophy, namely, the assumption that the mind that contains 
the differences in the world is the blissful and impenetrable Brahman. The process of 
realizing the true bliss of Brahman transcends what the finite mind can articulate and this 
is probably why Huxley claims that the way to participate in the unity that underlies 
duality is to engage in the mind that passes understanding. This mind is the universal 
mind. Huxley’s statement reminds us of the classical Indian conception of difference. 
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Generally, the Indian philosophical traditions largely agree that a dignified life is 
such  a  one  that  accommodates  and  show respect  to  others  regardless  of  their  varied 
identities and experiences. This attitude springs from the understanding that all people 
regardless of culture, race, religion etc. owe their existence to Brahman. The different 
ways  that  people  identify  themselves  are  to  be  respected.  Thus,  self  worth  is  partly 
demonstrated in the way that individuals relate with difference. The conception of duality 
as illusory typifies the fact that the person has the inner capacity to apprehend the true 
nature of appearance. Consequently, the individual who has truly gained this insight is 
believed to be capable of leading the tolerant life in the community. Though it is stated 
that the only way to attain one’s truest identity is by eradicating duality, this does not 
denote practical extermination of differences. The acceptance and toleration of different 
identities is not problematic in this philosophy because it does not agree that we must 
first of all be formally alike before we can be different. This means that we need not 
accept a similar logic about reality before we can live together in harmony. Incidentally, 
it turns out to mean that our logical standard can be many instead of one. If the view that 
argues for only one way of apprehending reality will aid the life of tolerance at all, it will 
be the imperfect type. Certainly any deviation from the logically structured ways of living 
the real life will be tolerated with dissent. The reason is that a universal system which 
indisputably  exhausts  the  ultimately  real  is  believed  to  have  been  exhausted.  The 
achievement of a harmonious and peaceful social context where individuals can develop 
their potentials genuinely requires a basis where differences can flourish. Differences will 
flourish without any threat to the society if individuals are acquainted with the nature of 
duality. Not until people possess this knowledge will they be able to relate truly with 
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others.   This  last  section  will  discuss  Shankara’s  theory  of  duality  and  ignorance  in 
relation to this end. I will examine how Shankara’s individual views difference and the 
implication of her knowledge on the community. 
Advaita Conception of Avidya (Ignorance)
As shown in the previous section, Vedanta philosophy begins by acknowledging 
the fact that the community contains a number of values or norms which could influence, 
positively or otherwise, the thinking of the individual about the ultimate good. This is the 
good that enables the individual to live in an atmosphere of peace. Hence, she is able to 
create a suitable identity for herself from her personal conception of the good. At the 
same time she concedes the good life as the way of life that allows others to create their 
own self identity. In this philosophy, there is no need to separate individuals from their 
communal particularities in order to come to terms with the basic universal principle that 
could aid individuals to co-exist in peace. The important thing that individuals must do is 
to eradicate avidya.111 
Avidya,  properly speaking,  does  not  refer  to  individuals’  ignorance.  Rather,  it 
refers to the ignorance that is inherent in human mind. The real meaning of  avidya has 
been hotly debated among classical Indian schools of thought. The Nyaya takes the prefix 
‘a’ as a negation. Thus, the prefix ‘a’ negates ‘vidya’ which is knowledge. For the Nyaya 
111 Avidya is synonymously used for maya. Shankara holds that maya is part and parcel of Brahman. For 
Shankara, it is impossible to create a thing out of a no thing, because Brahman is the only eternal reality, it 
is reasonable to infer that maya emerges out of it. On the nature of maya, Shankara says it is indeterminate. 
The form of maya cannot be predicated as real or unreal. On the question of why maya assumes a form that 
is different from Brahman, Shankara says it is a mystery that nobody can unravel. In the Advaita 
philosophy, maya is explained from six facets; it is anādi i.e. it is beginningless thus having the same status 
with Brahman but not identical with Brahman only in its form. A conception of Brahman from the 
standpoint of Saguna (qualities) may render this position thus, maya is the creative power of Brahman. 
Maya is also explained as that which terminates after the right knowledge (jnāna-nivartya) has been 
achieved. It veils (āvarana) and projects (viksepa), indefinable, having the nature of a positive existence 
(bhāvarūpa),  and located in Brahman or jiva. For further detail, see John Grimes, A Conscise Dictionary 
of Indian Philosophy, p. 203.   
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school of thought, ignorance is a negation of knowledge. Where ignorance is operating, 
knowledge is lacking. One will have to take its turn and let go for the other to occur. The 
analogy of the snake rope experience illustrates this point better. The rope that appears 
like a snake is for the Nyaya an example of how ignorance can negate knowledge. When 
the snake appears to the cognizer, the knowledge of reality i.e. the rope, is negated. When 
reality is unfolded and it is discovered to be a rope, the false awareness of the snake is 
negated. Thus, for the Nyaya, there is no compatible ground between a claim that is false 
and the one that is true. The Nyaya argument is contained in the following,
We,  thus,  feel  justified  in  holding  that  the  defective  reasons  do  not 
represent  logical  fallacies  but  imply  the  existence  of  wrong  ideas  and 
hence deviations from rules and norms that ought to be followed if we are 
to have knowledge of things on the basis of arguments about the premises 
of which there should be definite knowledge.112
The above passage explains the Nyaya view that  it  is  possible  to  exhaust the 
nature of reality simply by following certain rules of logic. The position which argues 
that reality cannot be thus known arrives at such a conclusion because it does not follow 
the  rules  of  judgment  properly.  The  Nyaya  School  believes  that  when  a  defective 
reasoning is held unto, false claims are regarded as knowledge claims. Certain ways of 
reasoning  will  be  deemed  to  be  defective  if  they  do  not  fall  within  the  Nyaya 
categorization of good logic. This conception of knowledge presupposes that all persons 
must acknowledge certain logic as the universal logic. Although this claim will not imply 
that when people accept this formal way of reasoning, they cannot adopt different values 
in their choices. The application of the formal standard of reasoning or what is otherwise 
called  the  categories  of  universal  thought  to  one’s  experience  is  not  considered 
112 Sukharanjan Saha, Perspectives on Nyaya Logic and Epistemology, p. 223. Author’s emphasis.
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illegitimate. The essential thing is that all people must first adopt this universal way of 
thinking. This becomes the license to knowing how to lead the authentic life. In fact, the 
application of the Nyaya position presupposes that  individuals  will  be able  to  reflect 
adequately on their true identities only when they are capable of evaluating their chosen 
values  on  the  platform  of  their  universal  applicability.  This  position  may  seem  to 
privilege an individual’s choice in self determination. Furthermore, it may be said that its 
emphasis on individuals’ sensitiveness to universal rules encourages toleration. However, 
as one reflects on the criterion set by this philosophy, one begins to wonder whether it 
lays a sufficient ground for effective toleration. On the one hand, the position necessitates 
our sameness in logic before we can be different. This necessitation highlights a paradox 
in the practice of toleration. It seems that it will surely be difficult if not impossible for 
any individual to willingly accept the values of others especially when such do not fall 
into the stipulated universal formal paradigm of thought. 
The difficulty is much more pronounced when this universal logic is claimed to 
be able to disclose with absolute certainty what is civilized, that is, the way of life that 
ought to characterize us as human beings. The willingness to admit the possible validity 
of alternative values or beliefs of seemingly contradictory viewpoints is doubtful in this 
scenario. Real toleration is manifested when an individual willingly admit the possible 
validity of others’ values even when they seem to be contradictory to the one she holds. It 
remains unclear how the delineated guideline of the Nyaya can produce this effect. This 
philosophy, at best, allows a variety of forms of practicing dissent as against the approval 
of diversity or moral pluralism.      
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The classification of knowledge that is typical of Nyaya is rejected by Shankara 
because it does not respect the real experience of the individual who is aware of the 
snake. According to Shankara, we cannot deny the fact that the individual who perceives 
the rope as a snake has a definite knowledge which is true. What Shankara points out is 
that  the  operation  of  avidya does  not  eradicate  knowledge.  To  Shankara,  both  the 
individual who claims that she perceives a snake and the one who says she sees a rope are 
making claims of knowledge. Shankara maintains this view because “it is preposterous to 
affirm the  existence  of  a  thing  without  presupposing  the  revelatory  knowledge.  The 
knowable can never exist without knowledge i.e. without being known”.113 Shankara’s 
claim seems to show that if we are patient enough, we will realize that the individual’s 
experience is true though there may be another experience which is truer. In order for us 
to arrive at a truer explication of reality, we need to acknowledge first and foremost that 
differences in our belief systems do not necessarily depict any lack of knowledge on the 
part of those who hold the beliefs. If this is granted, it will be consistent to concede that 
any  belief  system  that  is  upheld  in  any  particular  community  is  based  on  certain 
revelatory knowledge.  This belief  will  be meaningfully decoded if  analyzed from the 
viewpoint of its internal logic. The rationale for holding the belief cannot be decoded by 
any hypothetical rules whose basis is foreign to the culture in context. On this ground, 
Shankara  applauds  the  community  vision.  However,  as  noted  previously,  Shankara’s 
philosophy does not support the strict communitarian stance which advocates that the 
meaning of life can only be realized within the domain of the beliefs and values held in 
one’s community. 
113 BBS. I. i. 1, as quoted in K. N. Upadhyaya, “Sankara on Reason, Scriptural Authority and Self-
Knowledge”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 19, no. 2 (1991): 126. 
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The  foregoing  implies  that  the  representations  of  individuals  in  their  social, 
cultural  and  religious  experiences  ought  not  to  hinder  them from cognizing  the  true 
platform upon which the basis of universal relation ought to lie. We do not need to adopt 
identical ways of life and a standard way of thinking before we can truly live in social 
harmony.  The  idea  of  the  universal  community  in  Shankara’s  philosophy  is  largely 
interesting because it anticipates the differences of others and expresses that each of these 
others ought to flourish in their distinctiveness. However, the interactions between the 
others should be predicated on the ultimate background knowledge of Brahman as the 
inexhaustible  but  the  supreme  reality  that  harmonizes  differences.  Thus,  cultural 
traditions  should  be  construed  as  means  of  understanding  the  different  faces  of  the 
universal self. In essence, it should allow for harmonious living. Shankara’s philosophy 
suggests that in order to get to the peak of the universal knowledge, we should follow the 
dialectics of thought which progresses from the level of the particular to the universal and 
from the universal to the ultimate unity. Each of these stages is notably true but they are 
to be negated until the highest level of ultimate unity is realized. The philosophy opposes 
the point that holds that a single ideal captures the essence of the universal self and as 
such gains preeminence over other varied ideals. For Shankara, the ultimate universal 
(Brahman)  is  impossible  of  being  entirely  conceptualized.  When  avidya is  at  work, 
knowledge  is  very  much  present  acting  underneath.  Avidya,  Shankara  claims,  is  not 
antithetical to knowledge as the Nyaya would like us to think. Shankara explains the 
prefix ‘a’ as false. Thus, avidya refers to a kind of knowledge that is false.114 
114 See A. Parthasarathy, Vedanta Treatise, third edition, (Bombay: Vedaanta Life Institute, 1989),  pp. 322-
323.
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Borrowing from what we said in the first  section of this  chapter,  the kind of 
knowledge that is obtainable in the world can only be categorized as  mithya  (falsity). 
Worldly  knowledge  is  false  not  because  they  are  untrue  but  because  they  are 
intermittently corroborated in the light of new evidences. On this ground, they do not 
meet the standard of ultimate knowledge. From Shankara’s position, we understand that it 
is incorrect to condemn any cultural experiences as nonsensical. If a higher experience 
has not shown its belief systems to be misdirected, it remains valid. However, it should 
be mentioned that the higher experience that can possibly rectify certain assumptions 
which are held in any cultural tradition needs not spring from within the tradition itself. 
Other practices in a different culture may throw light on why certain practices are wrong. 
This point is not contradicting what we have said earlier in the sense that both of these 
cultural principles stem out of lived experience. Hence, the impetus for change ought not 
to be sought or limited to one culture as if it is a closed entity. If any aspect of a culture’s 
belief  diminishes  individuals’  capacity  of  choice,  such  aspect  should  be  corrected. 
Shankara accounts that, 
Human  behavior,  conforming  as  it  does  to  all  right  means  of  valid 
knowledge, cannot be denied so long as a different order of reality is not 
realized; for unless there be an exception, the general rule prevails.115 
Any  community  paradigm  which  makes  it  difficult  for  any  individuals  within  the 
community to develop their free and equal nature needs further adjustment in the light of 
the essential principle upon which the idea of Brahman is based. It is in light of this 
understanding  that  Shankara  critiques  the  practice  of  the  caste  system in  his  time.116 
115 BBS. II. ii. 31.
116 Shankara composes the Manisha Panchaka in five slokas each ending with the identity thesis (tat tvam 
asi). The identity thesis refutes the inequalities and unfair treatments that are associated with caste 
practices.  
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Shankara  discourages  repression  and dogmatism.  A close  mindedness  that  refuses  to 
admit the possible validity of the viewpoints of others is rejected by Shankara. Apart 
from the fact that this consideration promotes tolerance in a crucial sense, its implication 
on the exercise of self determination is quite interesting and it attests to the point that 
individuals’ personal knowledge ought to stand as the essential criterion for the choice of 
identity. 
Furthermore,  Shankara’s  consideration  for  the  different  layers  of  human 
experiences presupposes that the sense of personal identity or the definition of the ‘we’ is 
much more complex than what the community can exhaust.  Individuals’ loyalties are 
conceived to be varied and profound that they can transcend any identity described in any 
particular community. Undoubtedly, this point approves the rights of the individual above 
the community but it poses no threat to the continuity of the community. This is because 
it does not erode the sense of the community which makes possible a politic from where 
the individual develops the social nature. The philosophy emphasizes why the idea of 
personal identity must be construed from a broad perspective. Shankara’s ideal focuses 
on the important standard which every individual must learn to meet, this is the fact that 
as human beings our moral identity transcends our local community. Therefore, Shankara 
challenges  us  to  develop  our  moral  capacity  until  it  begins  to  radiate  its  unattached 
nature. He calls on us to understand that the difference which is projected in duality does 
not  need  to  engender  separation.  But  individuals  should  appreciate  their  distinctive 
experiences  and  tolerate  each  other  in  a  sincere  manner.  Though  Shankara  confines 
worldly knowledge within the realm of falsehood, he is very much willing to grant every 
experience some degree of reality as long as it has certain impact on the individual. 
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Against the Nyaya view which holds that ‘definite knowledge’ about the world 
can only be validly obtained by following certain ways of reasoning or some legitimate 
rules of thought, Shankara argues that reason can only be useful in the validation of truth 
if it is grounded on experience. In Shankara’s opinion, reason will function arbitrarily 
once it goes beyond the boundary of experience. 
It  is  seen  that  an  argument  discovered  by  adepts  with  great  effort  is 
falsified by other adepts; and an argument hit upon by the latter is proved 
to be hollow by still others. So nobody can rely upon any argument as 
conclusive,  for  human  intellect  differs.  If,  however,  the  reasoning  of 
somebody having wide fame, say for instance, Kapila or someone else, be 
relied on under the belief that this must be conclusive, even so it surely 
remains  inconclusive,  inasmuch  as  people,  whose  greatness  is  well 
recognized and who are the initiators of scriptures (or schools of thought)- 
for  instance,  Kapila,  Kanada,  and  others-are  seen  to  hold  divergent 
views.117
This position is better in that it recognizes the fact that human intellects differ and that 
different people have certain ways of perceiving the world, the effect of which shows in 
the way they are in the world. However, Shankara does not encourage a relapse into 
moral relativism when it comes to the validation of the good life. He makes a crucial 
distinction between reason that is used in relation to experience and reason that is used in 
pure speculation. Shankara recognizes the former as a form of inference. Consequently, 
he grants it as a valid means of knowledge. But, he undermines the latter sense on the 
ground  that  it  is  mere  speculative.  His  distinction  between  speculative  reason  and 
inferential reason appears below, 
This being the case, people should have no divergence when they have 
true knowledge, whereas the difference among people whose knowledge is 
based on reasoning is well known from their mutual opposition. For it is a 
patent fact of experience, that when a logician asserts, “This is indeed the 
true knowledge”, it is upset by somebody else. And what is established by 
117 BBS. II. i. 11.
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the latter is disproved by still another. How can any knowledge, arising 
from reasoning, be correct, when its content has no fixity of form?118
True knowledge for Shankara results from common experience. Different people have 
different perspectives on how life ought to be lived even though they may be operating 
on similar basic assumptions about reality. However, for the success of the community, 
each perspective about reality ought to be deliberated upon carefully such that it abides 
by  the  public  standard  of  the  good  life.  By  this,  I  mean  that  it  does  not  threaten 
community life. Therefore, the true measurement of authentic living is that one’s life 
must  lead  people  to  the  true reality  on  which the  basis  of  the  community  lies.  This 
conclusion denounces the utmost individualism that sprouts from an atomic conception of 
the person. Shankara applauds the fact that any good identified as the community good 
must  be  subjected  to  interpersonal  scrutiny.  This  is  because  no  single  individual 
regardless of the level of her intelligence is capable of exhausting the consciousness of all 
people. In consideration of the constitution of the human body and the continual mutation 
of human desire, Shankara’s position shows in greater depth why tolerance is essential to 
cooperative associations. It is evident that the same thing will not always cause the same 
appetite in all people and people may not consent in their desires but when human beings 
understand the relation of the self that is based on physical or emotional needs and the 
ultimate self that transcends these needs, they will be more willing to tolerate themselves. 
This philosophy escapes the charge of individualism which breeds excessive conflict and 
war. This encourages the dominance of some image that appeals to one as the self. This is 
dangerous to communal existence. For Shankara, the association of any image with the 
real self is false. This stems from illusion. To posit a false self as the ultimate self has 
118 Ibid.
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some negative implications on the individual. We shall examine these implications in 
what follows.        
Advaita on the Illusory Self 
Reading Advaita philosophy, it becomes obvious that what many commentators 
present to us as the real self is nothing other than a superimposed self. The superimposed 
self is false not in the sense that it does not depict in any sense the individual’s mode of 
being in the world but because the kind of image it projects in the world does not capture 
the true identity of the person. We need to go beyond this image, detaching its forms and 
names, to capture its reality. In Shankara’s words, 
… even when the idea of Brahman is superimposed on a name (e.g. ‘om’), 
the  idea  of  the  name  persists  and  it  is  not  negated  by  the  idea  of 
Brahman.119
Brahman, as the purest being of the individual, may truly be perceived in certain forms, 
but the perception of Brahman as the pure being is prior to the forms. This is the first 
knowledge that confirms the fact that ‘I am’. The ‘I’ that is in the ‘I am’ is the ultimate 
self,  or  the  pure  formless  being.  But  forms  are  ever  present  with  it.  This  explains 
Shankara’s argument that when the idea of Brahman (pure being) is superimposed on a 
name (its form), the idea of the name persists. But the persistence of the name does not 
mean that it is identical with Brahman. Going by this position, we see certain confusion 
in the works of some commentators between the self with names and the name-less or 
ultimate self. The latter is superimposed on the former. This superimposition brings about 
the conclusion that identity construction is independent of the community. This claim is 
untrue. But the image of the self that is associated with forms could be pursued and such 
119 Ibid. 
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pursuit will be legitimate. However, it must be understood that the image is contained in 
Brahman, the highest self. Thus, this image ought to be taken as object of meditation. The 
individual must not count herself to have attained ultimate identity until the image of the 
self that rests on her mind coalesces into the absolute. This point is illustrated in the 
passage below. 
One should not fix the idea of the self on symbols, because an aspirant 
cannot think of the separate symbols as himself. The reasoning is hollow 
that the symbols being forms of Brahman are Brahman Itself, and hence 
are the same self as the Self; for that would lead to the brushing away of 
all  symbols.  For  it  is  only  when  the  names  etc.  are  deprived  of  their 
transformed states (as names etc.), that one arrives at Brahman which is 
their essence.120
The superficiality of identifying the self with any particular form is noted in the 
above passage. We may ask why Shankara takes to this position. His reason is that the 
consciousness of this image is presented by a higher consciousness. The existence of this 
higher consciousness can only be posited as it is not cognized with any specific forms. 
This is  the ground of all  consciousness and it  is  indisputably the highest self  of the 
individual. This self is known without forms. The confirmation that it is the reality in all 
is grounded on its indisputability. In order to arrive at this self, all symbols are to be 
‘brushed away’. By implication, we should steer clear of depicting any worldly images 
as having identical nature with our inmost self. This has the negative influence of hurting 
our true nature from blossoming. In particular, it has the tendency of curtailing our moral 
identity within the social meaning of our community. Ultimately, this may hold us back 
from co-existing with others. We ought to live in peace with all people, accepting their 
differences as other ways of knowing the self. We are morally responsible to treat these 
differences respectfully. But this would not imply that we can’t engage them. 
120 Ibid. IV. i. 4. 
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Interestingly, we are back to Huxley’s assertion that the mind of the self is the 
universal  mind.  In  this  universal  mind,  we  are  told,  is  the  peace  that  passes 
understanding. The idea of the universal mind presupposes that our reality is inextricably 
webbed with those of others. Thus, our life should be guided by loving union, friendship 
with all people irrespective of their local contexts. The ignorance of the fact that the real 
self differs from the image on the mind makes one lose focus on the fountain of being. 
Then, one will concentrate singly on the ideas of the mind in order to find the self. These 
ideas dwindle over time. Patter comments that these ideas cannot be the real self because 
they are “limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely 
divisible  also;  all  that  is  actual  in  it  being  a  single  moment,  gone  while  we  try  to 
apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it 
is”.121 Reliance on this false self produces in one the kind of identity that constantly fades 
away. Consequently, the life one leads will be artificial and fragmented. The violence that 
has accrued from clinging to this false self is several, the countless marriages that had hit 
the rock because the self could not be disconnected from some images of the ego, the 
mistrust and awful treatments of friends because of some past mistakes which could not 
be overlooked, the crisis that results from religious intolerance because the self is fixed 
on some past experiences etc. All these result from attachment to the false self. Yet, the 
real  self  remains  persistent,  stable  and  unmoved.  This  is  the  reason  for  the  saying, 
“Brahman is known to him to whom It is unknown, while It is Unknown to him to whom 
It is known. It is unknown to those who know and known to those who do not know”.122 
This Brahman, it is said, is different from the ego which reflects “the consciousness of 
121 Cited in Carol T. Christ, The Finer Optic, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 107.
122 BBS. I. i. 4.
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the Atman, glows through the activities of eyes and so on, manifesting itself through 
egoism and pride of the ‘me’ and ‘mine’. It is the ego, not the eternally blissful Atman 
that takes pride in being an agent and enjoys or suffers with pains or losses”.123 In sum, 
we are introduced to the essentiality of considering others as we lead our lives in the 
community. 
Advaita philosophy will agree to a large extent with what certain communitarian 
calls community of memory. Community of memory stands as a prominent constituent of 
our identity. Community of memory is characterized as one of the essential sources of 
identity which cannot be exterminated. The idea here is that our natural integration and 
participation in the community create the sense of the community in us and our peculiar 
relation  to  it.  The  cheerful  and  painful  memories  of  the  different  activities  of  the 
members  of the community,  the peculiar  and permanent  impressions that  the various 
narratives that are attached to the community life are, among others, the kind of things 
that this theory believes will develop some legitimate bonding in the members of the 
same community. This bonding is deeply ingrained into the very life of the individual 
that  it  cannot  be  consciously  willed  off  without  the  actor  having  the  experience  of 
damaged  personhood.  The  feeling  of  bonding  by  all  the  individual  members  of  the 
community is not only described as legitimate, it is given the status of sacredness because 
of the intimate fellowship which members share and values which are well accepted to 
play some crucial role in the understanding of life’s meaning. Community of memory is 
important because of the intimacy that members of the community enjoy. Members are 
open to themselves, individuals’ rights are not construed on individualistic basis. This 
123 Cited in Vivekacūdāmani, verses 102-5, as translated by S. Madhavananda, (Calcuta : Advaita Ashrama, 
1921).
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crucial role that community of memory plays in self understanding will not be disputed 
by Advaita philosophy, but Advaita will reject the idea which seems to imply that it is 
legitimate for individuals to be tied to their constitutive memory as if it exhausts their 
ultimate  nature.  How  Shankara  will  react  to  the  above  can  be  deduced  from  his 
understanding  of  superimposition  as  “an awareness  similar  in  nature  to  memory that 
arises on a different (foreign) basis as a result of some past experience”.124 
Shankara  reasons  that  the  superimposed  self  and  the  self  that  is  recalled  in 
memory  arose  from  similar  sources.  Both  of  them  occur  as  a  result  of  some  past 
experiences. However, Shankara says that the superimposed self results from a different 
basis. What he means is rendered explicit by Eliot Deutsch. Deutsch describes Shankara’s 
notion  of  superimposition  as  the  apparent  presentation  to  consciousness,  by  way  of 
remembrance, of something previously observed in some other thing. In other words, 
superimposition takes  place  when the  qualities  of  something recalled in  memory are 
given to or projected upon another thing that is presented to consciousness and identified 
with it.125 Essentially, the imposition of certain qualities on another which is different 
from it occurs in superimposition. That which is not part of the nature of the self is falsely 
imposed on it as it is being remembered. In Shankara’s view, this idea of the self arises 
on a ‘foreign’ basis. What is conveyed in this position is that, under superimposition, the 
real self would be falsely taken to have arisen only from within the community. This self 
is predicated on certain sentiments. The recollection of the sentiments is also believed not 
to be different from the recollection of the real self. Following this belief, it becomes 
legitimate for the individual to cherish these sentiments. In a very crucial respect, the 
124 Cited in Vensus A. George, (ed.) Self- Realization [Brahmaanubhava] : The Advaitic Perspective of  
Shankara, p. 77. 
125 Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction,( Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 
1969), p. 33.
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identical relation that this reading gives the sentiments and the ultimate self makes it 
legitimate for the sentiments to be given some eternal identity and subsequently defended 
fanatically. The legitimacy of this defense is questioned in Advaita philosophy. Shankara 
insists that it is erroneous to superimpose the sentiments of the lower self on the real self. 
Of course, the experience of superimposition is necessary if the real self is to be known. 
Superimposition is not antithetical to the real self and the real self will surely not negate it 
when  it  happens.  The  real  self  persists  under  every  instance  of  superimposition.  It 
remains underneath, ascertaining itself as the reality which contains it and yet different 
from it.  
Where the idea of one of the two things is superimposed on the idea of the 
other even while the individual idea of the latter is not substantiated; the 
idea  of  the  thing  on  which  the  idea  of  another  thing  is  superimposed 
persists even when the superimposed idea of the latter is in evidence.126
The superimposed self does not gain the status of the ultimate self even though 
the ultimate self is presumed to be underneath. Just like a mirage on the highway will 
usually disappear and give way to the real thing, that is, the road, under careful scrutiny, 
the  superimposed  self  will  give  way  to  the  ultimate  self  to  unveil  itself  during  self 
introspection.  Characteristically,  the  superimposed  self  attracts  attention  to  itself  by 
posing some false qualities as its ultimate identity. The mirage on the high road often 
distinguishes itself at any particular location where it falsely occupies, but when its false 
nature is apprehended and reality gains supremacy, its false character coalesces into that 
which is real. Then, the highway is realized to be one undivided piece of land. When we 
dig deeper into the source of the so called community of memory, we will realize its main 
source and thus be free from the passion which wants to attach us to the community and 
126 Ibid.
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where possible, turns us against members of other communities. The respect that Advaita 
philosophy accords to our communal experiences is very interesting, knowing that the 
identity which I pick from my community defines my self is a right thing but to think that 
this identity exhausts my reality is misplaced. This is implied in some commentators’ 
theory. Bell, for instance, says that when I stand to define my self from the viewpoint of 
my communal experience, say my nationality, I can only say a few things after which I 
will be exhausted and yet understand that the self is left unexhausted because the real 
essence of my self is beyond definition.127 I find it practically impossible for me to bring 
the self that is known to me in my consciousness out in words.128 Asking Bell why this is 
so, he would say that it is because the non defining essence, that is, the consciousness of 
the  community,  that  which  we  are  born  into,  constitutes  my  being.129 Indeed,  the 
consciousness of the community constitutes the larger part of the way I am in the world, 
but this consciousness does not exhaust the possibilities of my real being. If this were to 
be the case, I would not be able to take my distance and reflect on it as in my reflecting 
on some cherished values of the community. Moreover, it will be impossible for me to 
experience some of them as disgusting. 
I am aware that this answer may not suffice in the light of Bell’s explanation that 
my reflection will only follow the mode of thinking which has been inbuilt into me in the 
community. So what really happens is that I am engaging in a kind of enterprise which 
will  only  carry  further  the  aspirations  of  the  community.  There  is  nothing  that 
fundamentally  sets  me outside  the  community  even  when I  undertake  this  reflective 
enterprise.130 Bell’s point makes sense only if the idea of the community is conceived 
127 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 90 – 123. 




from the ontological level of reality. In this regard, the all embracing consciousness, the 
source of the community life, becomes the essence of community meaning. No one can 
set himself aside from this all embracing consciousness. Following this line of reasoning, 
Bell’s point is incorrect. The idea of the community that is described in Advaita tradition 
paints a better picture. This community is built on the ontological nature of the highest 
reality.  In  this  account,  the kind of  identity  that  community gives does not  perfectly 
define individuals in line with their ontological nature. The identity that Bell associates 
with the individual is limited as it stems from the limited consciousness of reality that a 
particular community might embrace. On this note, the consciousness which underlies the 
reality of the person is not limited to any particular community. Although it may take 
some distinctive form in,  say,  community A, the distinctiveness cannot subsist  at  the 
ultimate level of self investigation. Example of this community, as I have shown, is found 
in the Upanishadic scripture where Brahman is depicted as the one that appears in the 
many. The Advaita typification of community presupposes that we view the physical 
world of difference as one that lacks the nature of difference at the ultimate level. This 
entails the understanding of the world as something without strict partitioning. Although 
cultures may differ from one place to another, the difference should not constitute any 
barrier to harmonious relationships. The world ought to be seen as a space where the 
consciousness of Brahman is given diverse interpretations. But this will not imply that the 
internal  experiences  of  a  particular  community  is  not  unique  and  demands  cautious 
development in line with its internal logic, but it will mean that the differences that are 
manifested  in  each  of  these  communities  should  not  threaten  the  existence  and 
development of people and other communities. 
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Although one may not deny that rationality is an essential nature of the individual, 
the ideal of rationality that seems to tie the person to the community and the other one 
that  sets  her  entirely  free  from  the  community  seem  deficient.  If  rationality  means 
reflection  and  reflection  only  occurs  in  the  presence  of  something  else,  then  an 
atmosphere  where  this  something  else  is  present  becomes  a  necessary  condition  for 
reflection to occur. This means that the rationality that will lead to self discovery requires 
the  presence  of  the  community.  Furthermore,  when  we  reflect  on  something  that  is 
present before us, our reflection follows from the way we view the world. We do not 
reflect on anything using categories of thinking that we develop from pure abstraction: 
we adopt the tradition that is familiar to us, in order words, the style of thinking which we 
are accustomed to. Although it is not being denied that one’s uniqueness is represented in 
the peculiar way one thinks about the world but it is incorrect to say that this uniqueness 
is  not  structured  by  the  linguistic  tradition  of  the  community.  For  instance,  from 
childhood, I have developed gradually the concepts that enable me to relate with the 
external world. These concepts, we must not forget, derive their meanings from the ways 
they are used in my community. Hence, the concepts that define my peculiarity in terms 
of how I view the world are based on the meanings of my community. The question of 
relevance is whether it  is  possible for me to eradicate these concepts and yet have a 
rational sense of self? If only I am able to do this will it make sense to agree with the 
conception of the rational self which is founded on ideas independent of community. But 
this is not only a difficult project, it is an impossible task, for it will require that I uproot 
the consciousness that informs my being. This is like destroying my inner being in order 
to find a new being. Since I cannot cut off my being and continue with the task of finding 
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another being, for I need to be in order to accomplish the project, the task of finding a 
being that is independent of the community seems impossible. Thus, we see the sense of 
the position that argues that theories which set individuals apart from community will end 
in  creating  split  or  damaged  persons.  This  advances  the  thinking  that  the  idea  of 
individuality,  viewed  from  a  holistic  perspective,  cannot  be  disconnected  from  its 
constitutive  consciousness,  that  is,  the  community  meaning.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
position highlights the error that is contained in the thinking that the individual is nothing 
more than what community makes her. The capacity of reflection which stands above 
community meanings and essentially defines the person as autonomous subject, affirms 
our inner being as something that is not bound within community meanings. Thus, it is 
not the case that the entire being of the individual is exhausted by community meanings. 
Contrarily, it shows that once the basic intuition of what it means to be an individual is 
set by the constitutive consciousness of the community, the individual should strive to 
establish her own identity. That is, she should grow to establish her peculiar mode of 
being in the world.
Being in the World
In one of his earlier works on Advaita philosophy, Raju highlights an interesting 
paradox which Advaita philosophy seemingly displays.  He observes that  the paradox 
creates  certain  moral  incongruity  between  Advaita  theory  and  practice.131 Raju’s 
observation shows how interested readers can get to the core of Advaita propositions. 
Apparently, Raju believes that Advaita Vedanta contributes greatly to our knowledge of 
the world and our life as it ought to be lived. More importantly, how we ought to deal 
131 P. T. Raju, “The Advaita and the Moral Pradoxes”, Vedanta Kesari, xxvi, (May 1939 – April 1940): 252 
– 257.
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with the paradox acquainted with our existence in the world. Any new comer into the 
philosophy of Advaita is likely to be baffled with its stark description of the world of 
appearance  as  false  or  unreal.  But  when  the  reader  understands  that  the  philosophy 
proceeds in this manner to direct attention to the link between the reality of the world and 
the individual, she will be willing to get to the heart of the main idea which the paradoxes 
are  supposed  to  illustrate.  Earlier  on,  we mentioned that  Advaita  philosophy focuses 
mainly on how individuals can realize their inmost being. Shankara develops this largely 
from a metaphysical perspective. Anyone who is familiar with Shankara’s metaphysical 
conception of the self  may wonder at  first  how this philosophy can contribute to the 
discussion of identity. As the study may be challenging to some, there is no doubt that 
some will  certainly  be  curious  about  the  suitability  of  Shankara’s  philosophy  to  the 
subject of identity. Having shown Shankara’s relevance to the subject matter of identity, 
some may like to know whether Shankara demonstrates the virtues of the community. Of 
course, some may say that the quality of a piece of philosophy has nothing to do with the 
way of life of the philosopher, but it cannot be denied that the life of a philosopher and 
the social circumstances that prevail at the time of his or her work may contribute to our 
understanding of the work. In a certain sense, this method has proved to be useful. For 
instance, any efforts to associate Descartes’ philosophy with the community, especially a 
constitutional democracy where all persons are deemed equal, may likely face some cruel 
criticisms. Apart from the contention that finds justification on theoretical ground, critics 
may allude to certain of Descartes’ practices. His discrimination against women may be a 
useful argument. The lives of great thinkers like Locke, Hobbes and Kant to mention but 
a few have been carefully examined in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion about 
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their ideas on toleration. 
On theoretical ground,  it is common for people to remember Shankara for his 
adamant rejection of duality. But it will not be an exaggeration to add that Shankara does 
not only reject duality theoretically, he leads his life in accordance with this philosophy. 
Topmost in his ambition is to direct human attention to the knowledge of the one true 
reality. Shankara believes that any knowledge that will set the human heart free from 
illusion must be free from stereotypical beliefs which warrant nepotism and favoritism. 
Vensus George comments that Shankara’s mission is to guide humankind to the truth, 
elevating  them  in  their  beliefs  and  practices  so  that  they  will  reach  the  supreme 
understanding of the One Reality [Brahman] .132 This knowledge encourages the need to 
live our lives in unity and the bond of peace. It intends to lead us to the peak of self 
realization where we see everyone regardless of religion, nationality, race and gender as 
members of our family. We come from the one true and original substance (Brahman) 
and  we  become  authentic  only  as  we  live  in  light  of  this  knowledge.  The  ideal  of 
Brahman  underlies  every  system of  thinking  that  promotes  freedom and  equality  of 
individuals.  Following  this  reasoning,  Shankara  enjoins  every  person  to  critically 
examine any sets of beliefs until they realize that the differences that flourish in them find 
their unity in the supreme reality. This liberal way of life comes from the apprehension of 
Brahman  as  the  constitutive  consciousness  of  the  various  systems  that  humankind 
evolves to give meaning to their lives. Shankara’s liberal philosophy sees, through the 
differences  in  the  world,  the  ultimate  unifying  principle.  Shankara’s  philosophy 
132 Cited in Vensus A. George, (ed.) Self- Realization [Brahmaanubhava] : The Advaitic Perspective of  
Shankara, p 17, 19. Author’s italics.
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enlightens  the  individual  better  on  how to  deal  with  the  multiple  identities  that  are 
associated with the self in the world some of which appear conflicting. 
Shankara’s practical commitment to the moral good of everyone is reflected in, 
among many others, the attention he gives to the complaint of the Chandala whom he 
meets on the way when he wants to take bath in the Ganges.  Shankara’s disciples are 
reported to have discriminated against the Chandala by commanding him to clear off the 
road. The Chandala retorts, ‘O venerable Guru, you are a preacher of Advaita Vedanta 
and yet you make a great difference between man and man’, how is this consistent with 
your teaching?133  In this story, we learn of the way Shankara responds to this inquiry: 
Shankara observes that Lord Siva probably assumes that form to teach him the lesson of 
identity. At once, he composes the Manisha Panchaka in five slokas each ending with the 
identity thesis (tat tvam asi). Shankara says “he, who has learned to see the existence of 
Brahman everywhere, is my Guru – be the brahmin or chandala”.134 Shankara describes, 
in this statement, one important truth that holds in all cultures, the fact that all individuals 
have the capacity of apprehending Brahman as the reality of all. However, the attainment 
of the knowledge requires learning and practice. Moreover, we learn from this story that 
the relative condition of individuals in the world is not a license to discriminate against 
them. The Chandala is from this viewpoint seen as having the same identity with the 
Brahmin. What a respect for the equality of individuals!  Shankara acknowledges that 
discrimination  against  persons  on  the  basis  of  caste  identity  is  inappropriate  and 
dangerous to communal order. He seems to be perfectly contented that the deprivation of 
133 Sri Swami Sivananda, “Sankara”, The Divine Life Society, October 17, 2004, 
http://www.dlshq.org/saints/sankara.htm. 
134 See Swami Atmananda, “Sri Shankara’s Teaching in His Own Words”, in K. M. Munshi and R. R. 
Diwakar, (eds.) Bhavan’s Book Library, vol. 52, (Bombay, Baratiya Vidya Bhawan, 1960). 
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individuals  from  earthly  goods  and  civic  rights  on  the  basis  of  caste  identity  is 
unjustified. 
Therefore, we see that the concern raised by critics about Indian belief concerning 
the possible contamination of identity through interpersonal relationships finds no basis 
in  Shankara’s  philosophy.  For  Shankara,  individuals  are  to  mingle  freely  in  secular 
affairs. On his commentary about religion and religious propositions, Shankara’s ideas 
remain consistent with the above claim. Religion remains significant because it is a useful 
medium to realize one’s inmost identity. Incidentally, religion is supposed to lead the 
individual to the understanding of her unity with the essence of others. Thus, religion is 
to encourage the intercommunications of individuals and the way they function in public 
life for physically sufficient life. The same reasoning that makes Shankara to insist upon 
absolute  sovereignty  in  the  choice  of  identity  leads  him  to  approve  the  choice  of 
individuals  with  regard  to  the  philosophical  or  religious  ideal  they  hold.  During  the 
course of his career as a guru, Shankara engages a lot of eminent scholars in dialogue. 
Systematically, he unfolds to them why the philosophy of Advaita is the best philosophy 
that anyone can live by. His disciples are converted through dialogue. There is no record, 
in  my  understanding,  that  shows  that  Shankara  forces  any  individual  to  follow  his 
doctrines. This remains an important lesson for those of us who lived in a plural society 
today.   
Social  peace  is  always  uppermost  in  Shankara’s  mind.  His  concern  about 
independent dogmatic beliefs is noted in the way he seeks his mother’s approval about 
his chosen life plan. Shankara has a clear picture of the kind of person he likes to be. He 
chooses  the  way  of  dialogue  even  when  his  mother  stands  in  his  way.  His  idea  of 
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individual’s  rights  is  overly  non  individualistic.  His  uppermost  belief  is  that  one’s 
identity can still be realized when one tolerates the views of others. This is probably why 
Shankara will not even adhere to his conceived plan at the expense of any negative effect 
that such will have on his mother. Firstly, he explains his desire to his mother and when it 
seems that she will not let him have his way, he leaves the matter until circumstances 
work it out.135 Shankara believes in peaceful coexistence and remains consistent with the 
true nature, living the meaningful life from the standpoint of his peculiar experience. 
Eventually, Shankara obtains his mother’s permission with the oath that he will come 
back to perform the last burial rite for her. His decision to perform the burial rite after his 
mother’s death raises a lot  of controversy. The Nambudin Brahmins and his relatives 
refuse to be involved because, according to the tradition of the time, Shankara, being a 
Brahmin, is not supposed to be actively involved in the burial. But Shankara’s reaction 
exemplifies his idea of traditions as the raw materials with which identity is to be defined. 
Respect for others, especially one’s parents, is here displayed as appropriate and morally 
consistent with our nature. Not only this, the thinking that tradition could exhaust our 
identity is also proven to be false.  We see the possibility of tradition falling short  in 
showcasing moral identity. Bearing this in mind, the individual is supposed to act  in 
accordance  with  the  idea  of  the  overall  good.  In  line  with  this  principle,  Shankara 
considers his promise to his mother more important than the existing communal tradition. 
135 One day as Shankara and his mother go to take their bath in the river, “Sankara plunged into the water 
and felt that a crocodile was dragging him by the foot. He shouted out to his mother at the top of his voice: 
"O dear mother! A crocodile is dragging me down. I am lost. Let me die peacefully as a Sannyasin. Let me 
have the satisfaction of dying as a Sannyasin. Give me your permission now. Let me take Apath-sannyasa”. 
The mother immediately allowed him to take Sannyasa. Sankara took Apath-sannyasa (the adoption of 
Sannyasa when death is near) at once. The crocodile let him go unharmed. Sankara came out of the water 
as a nominal Sannyasin. He again repeated his promise to his mother. He left her under the care of his 
relatives and gave away his little property to them. He then proceeded to find out a Guru with a view to get 
himself formally initiated into the sacred order of Sannyasa”. See Sri Swami Sivananda, “Sankara”, The 
Divine Life Society, October 17, 2004, http://www.dlshq.org/saints/sankara.htm.
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Certainly, the will to fulfill the promise is not backed by the motivation to fulfill one’s 
duty, i.e. to fulfill a promise irrespective of what the consequence may happen to be both 
on himself  and the community, but Shankara seems to have in view what is morally 
appropriate for any person to do in such a circumstance. Shankara’s action attests to the 
fact  that  we  could  extend  through  our  actions  the  frontier  of  our  shared  meanings. 
Shankara sets the model that any individual in his circumstance ought to follow. In this 
particular instance, he demonstrates how our moral nature demands that we honor our 
parents both in their lifetime and after. This is the duty of all individuals. 
It is instructive to note that Shankara’s individuality is revealed in his important 
works which are grounded on the Brahma Sutra, the Upanisads, and the Bhagavad Gita. 
These works remain one of the greatest philosophical works produced in India till date  .136 
The works reveal that the alleviation of human suffering is uppermost in his heart. His 
interpretations of the scriptures are,  remarkably,  an “expression of the sovereignty of 
individual choice”.137 His is an example of a mind that is  not coerced,  “resting upon 
nothing more than the freedom of the individual to do what he or she pleases, and the 
autonomy  of  the  human  imagination  to  construct  and  invent  whatever  linkages  or 
associations it finds to its liking”.138 Indisputably, Shankara practically exemplifies the 
attitude of an individual that is capable of making right choices. At the expense of the 
prevailing beliefs of his time, Shankara chooses what he considers to be the truth. To 
think along with Raju that the Advaita scheme of thought is indeed paradoxical might be 
right when one considers the worth of such a philosophy to human life, a philosophy that 
136 These three works form what is heard; the revealed scripture or direct assertion about reality. The Vedas 
are called the struti; the divine word which is heard by the seer and which constitutes the immemorial truth. 
The Vedas are the (means of valid knowledge) pramanas, they set the criteria for true opinion.
137 See an account of individuality conceived from a theological perspective in A. E. McGrath, A Scientific  
Theology, vol. 1. (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), p. 20.
138Ibid.
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seeks to put an end to the split between the real me and the masked personality could not 
at the same time condemn individuality as unreal.139 This is what Raju’s later writings 
express. His comments show that the paradox in Advaita Vedanta philosophy is only 
superficial.  Its  main  intention  is  to  challenge  a  deeper  reflection  about  our  separate 
existence. 
Shankara’s philosophy suggests that no propositions are to be accepted as true 
until it has been carefully analyzed and if found to be contrary to the truth of identity, it 
must  be  rejected.  Paranjpe  remarks  that  this  way  of  thinking  is  set  to  empower 
individuals  in  making  right  moral  choices.140 Shankara  encourages  the  individual  to 
pursue  life  goals  with  a  single  minded  devotion.  This  is  also  one  of  the  essential 
principles which make him to be ranked above many of his contemporaries. Indich says 
he “is an interpreter of most sophisticated skill and subtlety whose prime concern is the 
exposition of a particular and in many ways quite unconventional vision”.141 In terms of 
his  influence  on  Indian  elites  and  culture,  Potter  writes  that  Shankara  is  not  only 
successful in turning the hearts of ordinary folks to the knowledge of the one supreme 
reality (Brahman), his success accumulates so much that the term ‘Vedanta’ is frequently 
used to depict Advaita Vedanta.142 How much more can the virtue of individuality be 
demonstrated in a man who provides a culture, “Indian culture, with a good portion of its 
intellectual inspiration by tapping into some of the basic and vitally important traditions 
139 Shankara’s literature can be classified into three groups; “the commentaries (Bhaashyas), books dealing 
with fundamental concepts of Vedanta (Prakriya Granthas) and hymns and meditation verses (Stotras). 
Apart from his commentary on the three canon of the Hindu literatures, he wrote commentaries on Sree 
Vishnu Shahasranama and a few others. The following books; Viveeka Chudamani, Atmabhoda,  
Upadeshasahasri and Mohamuduharam are among the writings of Shankara.   
140 A. C. Paranjpe, Self and Identity in Modern Psychology and Indian Thought, (New York: Plenum, 
1998), p. 173.
141 Cited in W. M. Indich, Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980) p. 2. 
142K. H. Potter, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Advaita Vedanta,” in K. H. Potter, (ed.) The 
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. iii (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), p.6.
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which nourish that culture and which provide it with its distinctive, as well as universal, 
components”?143 Reading through the works of those who perceive him differently, we 
see again a clear reference to Shankara’s individuality. Chakravarthi remarks, “when he 
took upon himself the role of the commentator, he had no right to forget his position and 
foist  upon  the  Upanishads  a  philosophy  of  his  own”.144 As  we  read  through  the 
philosophy of Shankara, what we see is a reflection of the individual as the Brahman that 
is in me and Brahman, as the individual that is. 
What then does individuality connote in this philosophy? It means knowing that I 
am a person with physical and psychological histories, that these are associated with me 
from birth to death. This constitutes my relative self. In addition, it means knowing that 
the idea of my individuality is informed by the subject of awareness that is aware of 
itself.  This  differentiates  ‘me’  from  an  object  of  awareness,  that  of  which  there  is 
awareness. The subject of awareness is not curtailed by communal experiences. Rather, it 
validates  them and makes  them uniquely  mine.  The  uniqueness  is  confirmed by  my 
approval of those experiences but when I disapprove of them I stand out and find a way 
to alter or replace them. Nevertheless, my replacement must aim at continuing the unity 
which is exemplified in my consciousness, the consciousness that reveals the self as the 
‘that’ which differentiates me from the community and at the same time involves me in it. 
Swami Krishnananda explains this consciousness as the self. He writes: “when we say the 
Self, we mean the logical inwardness of that which is all-comprehensive. This knowledge 
of That is by That only, which includes us all. It is to be attained by the melting down of 
all extrovert impulses of consciousness imagined in space and time. This is called self-
143 Cited in W. M. Indich, Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, p. 2. (Emphasis is mine).
144 Cited in Vensus A. George, Self- Realization [Brahmaanubhava] : The Advaitic Perspective of  
Shankara, p 13. (Italics mine.)  
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control.  This is self-restraint,  this is Tapas”.145 Thus, individuality is properly focused 
when it accommodates the context of the framework of meanings provided by experience 
and  from  time  to  time  engages  it  in  a  dialogue.  Now,  I  will  proceed  to  a  critical 
discussion of Yoruba philosophy. Other comments about the application of Shankara’s 
philosophy to the community life will come in the last chapter.  




A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF YORUBA PHILOSOPHY
I
THE WORLD IN YORUBA NARRATIVES
Part  of  the  narrative  consciousness  of  a  culture  is  its 
aesthetic consciousness, and the aesthetic consciousness is 
itself a reflective consciousness-one step removed from the 
immediacy  of  sensible  experience.  An  aesthetic 
consciousness orders sensible experience to express human 
hope and wholeness.146
This chapter will  discuss the Yoruba conception of identity in relation to community 
from the background of the original self known as Emi. Let me mention now that I will 
attempt an overall reconstruction of Yoruba notion of identity. I shall retrieve some sets 
of concepts which are peculiar to classical Yoruba thought and these will be used in the 
reconstruction exercise.  Emi is the ultimate ground of identity. Emi’s nature is different 
from anything that may be apprehended physically. Yoruba believes that self knowledge 
is essentially personal in the sense that only the individual has the privileged access into 
the content of her inner self (emi). However, in the quest for self actualization, Yoruba 
gives  importance  to  the  shared  experience  of  the  people  in  the  community.  I  will 
deliberate more on this point below. Yoruba position acknowledges the importance of 
rationality in self determination but it rejects the idea that articulates identity as mere 
systems  of  rationality.  This  conception  tags  all  social  and  cultural  particularities 
146 Richard H. Bell, Understanding African Philosophy, A Cross Cultural Approach to Classical and 
Contemporary Issues, (New York, London: Routledge, 2002), p. 119.
127
irrelevant  contingencies  and  suggests  that  they  should  be  de-emphasized  in  self 
determination. The professional school of thought in African philosophy is associated 
with this particular way of thinking.147 These philosophers critique a number of works 
produced by some Africans and some western trained anthropologists, sociologists and 
ethnographers for merely documenting what they regard to be a peculiar way of thinking 
of  Africans  and  term  it  African  philosophy148.  Such  works  are  arguably  considered 
inappropriate because they lack what the professional philosophers acknowledge to be 
the standard formalism that is required in any genuine philosophical materials. African 
Philosophy,  these  philosophers  claim,  must  articulate  issues  in  the  pattern  of  formal 
science. This means that any conceptual beliefs that will qualify to enter the philosophical 
arena must pass the universal test and what this implies is that it must be independent of 
any social contexts. 
For  our  purpose,  this  theory  suggests  that  a  piece  of  work  which  sets  out  to 
describe,  for  instance,  the  self  and  the  world,  from  the  perspective  of  the  deepest 
147 The debate about the nature of African philosophy starts along this line of thinking. Attempts to 
distinguish between traditional African philosophy and contemporary African philosophy finds division 
between scholars who argue that most of the works called traditional African philosophy do not meet the 
standard of true philosophy. For the universalist philosophers or those known as professional philosophers, 
the reason why these works need to be rejected is because their content is not systematic, coherent, rational 
and enunciate issues that are of universal relevance. These philosophers argue that philosophy is a 
particular way of thinking, reflecting, reasoning, that such a way is relatively new to (most of) Africa, and 
that African philosophy must grow in terms of the philosophical work carried out by Africans. Among 
these philosophers are, P. O. Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Henry Odera Oruka. Other philosophers hold a 
contrary view, these are named ethno philosophers. Ethno philosophers hold that the substance of African 
philosophy ought to be gotten from African myths, proverbs, oral traditions etc. They hold that the issues 
that are contained in African myths, oral traditions etc. show African peculiar way of knowing the world. 
They argue also that this way of knowing is not substandard in any way to other ways of knowing 
regardless of the methodology these others imbibe. Some of the prominent philosophers who defend this 
view are, Paulin Hountondji, Barry Hallen, Campbell S. Momoh, Sophie Oluwole.       
148 Instances of these works include, Placide Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, (Paris : Presence Africaine, 1959), 
A Kagame, Marcel Griaule Conversation with Ogotomeli : An Introduction to Dogan Religious Ideas, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965), William Abraham, The Mind of Africa, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1967), John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, Leopold Senghor, On African Socialism, 
(London and New York, 1964), Julius Nyerere, Ujaama: The Basis of African Socialism, (Oxford 
University Press: Dares Salaam, 1968) and Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism, (London, New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1964) among others.   
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convictions of some people, is unqualified to be tagged philosophy in the real sense. This 
has a serious effect on the idea of identity in the sense that any view of identity that is 
philosophically sound must be cut off from the particular attachments to any specific 
community.  The  position  of  the  African  Professional  School  accords  the  historical, 
cultural, religious etc. values which constitute the particular form of the self irrelevant. 
Though the ideal of the self that is advocated in the ancient Yoruba philosophy accepts 
some of the African professional school premises, it rejects the conclusion that the true 
knowledge  of  self  identity  can  only  be  determined  by  the  kind  of  formal  systems 
emphasized in its theory. Yoruba starts the discussion of the self with the presupposition 
that  Emi is the ultimate reality.  Emi is the basis of individuality and community.  Emi 
underlies all categories of human shared experiences. Emi renders the ways of life in the 
community meaningful. It is through  Emi  that the shared notion of good comes to be. 
Thus, Emi forms the basis of social cooperation. On the other hand, Yoruba argues that 
Emi is the sole reality to be acknowledged when individuals engage in the social life of 
the community. Subsequently, there is no shared experience that can possibly exhaust 
Emi’s nature. Emi is that intricate reality whose real face is masked through the social life 
of the community. The point is that individuals alone can have knowledge of their self 
identity. 
It is important to mention that Yoruba philosophical ideas about individuality are 
partly contained in Yoruba proverbs, oral tradition and myths, some of which are not yet 
documented. Generally, Yoruba proverbs are concise and are often dressed in images that 
describe the specific background that evokes it. The common saying, owe lesin oro, oro 
lesin owe, bi oro ba sonu, owe la fi n wa (proverbs are horses on which words travel, 
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words are horses on which words ride, when the meaning of a word is imprecise, we 
search for it through proverbs) shows the significance of proverbs in Yoruba thought. 149 
Dzobo gives an illuminating interpretation of the above proverb. He describes a proverb 
as “a horse which can carry one swiftly to the discovery of ideas”.150 Proverbs are devised 
to preserve Yoruba suppositions. The imageries used in proverbs are carefully coined to 
guide users in future references. These images serve two purposes. Firstly, they are meant 
to preserve the contexts which lead to the occurrence of the proverbs. On this note, they 
are point of reference to historians, sociologists, anthropologists etc. Secondly, they are 
developed with a kind of profundity that encourages abstract thinking. This is highlighted 
in Dzobo above. Indeed, proverbs are meant to provoke reflections about issues or ideas 
of all time. This point is also emphasized in Robin Horton as follows:
Indeed, if verbal imagery has any one function in the speech of traditional 
Africa,  it  is  that  of  supplementing  and making more  digestible  use  of 
literal language. As the Ibo say, ‘proverbs are the palm oil  with which 
words are eaten. This conveys a nice sense, both of the primacy of literal 
language, and of the way in which symbolism helps it.151     
149 Some scholars have conducted some studies on some aspects of Yoruba proverbs. Each of these scholars 
has his/her specific focus. In “Ewi ni Yoruba”, Olokun, 6, (1967): 13-16, J. F. Odunjo discusses the origin 
of Yoruba proverbs with reference to natural phenomena and human relations. B Gbadamosi and U Beier 
examine, in Yoruba Poetry: Traditional Yoruba Poems, (Ibadan: Ministry of Education, 1959) some 
collected proverbs extracting the Yoruba views about right, morality, knowledge, and others. Y. K. Yusuf 
in “Women Speech in Yoruba Proverbs”, Proverbium, 11, (1994): 283-291 examines the ethical value of 
women’s speech in Yoruba proverbs. In the introductory remarks of, A Grammar and Vocabulary of the 
Yoruba Language, compiled by Rev. S. Crowther, (London: Seeleys, 1852), pp. 1-38, O. E. Vidal 
researches into some Yoruba proverbs with reference to its Hebrew similarities. J. B. Agbaje discusses 
Yoruba proverbs in “Proverbs: A Strategy for Resolving Conflict in Yoruba Society”, Journal of African 
Cultural Studies, 15, no. 2 (2002): 237-243, with respect to conflict resolution in Yoruba society.  A 
Sobande in “Awon Owe Ile Wa”, Olokun, 7, (1967): 25-29 attempts the classification of Yoruba proverbs 
according to their sources and dates. She recalls those that are derived from Islam, Christianity and 
Contemporary songs. Also she mentions those which refer to human body parts.
150 N. K. Dzobo, “African Symbols and Proverbs as Source of Knowledge and Truth”, Person and 
Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (Washington, D. C. : The Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, 2004), p. 95.
151 Robin Horton, “The Romantic Illusion: Roger Bastide on Africa and the West”, Odu, A Journal of West  
African Studies, 3, (1970): 90.
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The second sense is  useful  in  philosophical  deliberation.  From the standpoint  of  our 
study,  proverbs  are  useful  because  they  aid  self  understanding.  Proverbs  assist  the 
thinking individual to  conceptualize the good that  is  worth living for.  In  this  regard, 
proverbs  are  part  of  the  constitutive  consciousness  of  the  community  and  not  mere 
neutral  medium of  communication.  Characteristically,  proverbs  are  flexible.  In  most 
cases, they are derived from human experiences and used to depict the flexibility of the 
awareness of the community at any particular time. The principle behind the formulation 
of proverbs in Yoruba tradition expresses the Yoruba assumption that community identity 
is never rigid or fixed. 
I mention all this to show that the philosophical ideas of Yoruba can be gotten in 
proverbs as much as it can be gotten in texts. We may now proceed in our discussion of 
individuality and community in Yoruba philosophy. This section will focus on Yoruba 
conception of identity. I will entertain three subjects. Firstly, I will examine the basis of 
individuals in the world. Secondly, I will reflect on the Yoruba position on the basis of 
the  community  and  lastly,  I  will  show  how  self  identity  is  developed  in  Yoruba 
philosophy. Our focus is to see whether the conception of individuality in the Yoruba 
philosophical tradition merges the individual with or separates her from the community.   
Emi: Basis of Individuality
To comprehend the subject matter of identity in Yoruba philosophy, we should 
understand how Yoruba construes the world. I should mention as a matter of clarity that 
there  are  many worlds in  Yoruba philosophy,  one of which is  the actual world.  Our 
discussion centers on this actual world. This world is defined by two Yoruba words Ile 
and  Aiye. The term  aiye, when translated as  ai ye, refers to something that we do not 
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understand.  This  translation highlights  Yoruba  position about  appearance and reality. 
There is a striking difference between the world of appearance and the world of reality. 
Reality underlies appearance and not until one probes deeper into appearance, it reveals 
itself as the real. The compound words  Ile-Aiye  suggests that one should probe deeper 
into  appearance  and  only  then  will  its  exact  nature  be  realized.  In  its  stricter 
interpretation,  Ile stands for house,  Aiye stands for life.  The two words represent the 
world as a house of life. The first syllable, Ile (house) reflects the Yoruba typification of 
the world as something that contains individuals. This may be understood in the literal 
sense that a house contains different individual things. However, the second syllable Aiye 
(life) illustrates Yoruba belief about the fundamental constituents of these individuals. 
This  is  evident  in  the  interchangeability  of  the  term  life  and  emi.  When  I  say,  for 
example, aiye mi (my life or my self) I refer to the kind of knowledge about myself that I 
alone am privileged to have. The term emi thus refers to my ultimate identity. Looking at 
it from this perspective, the fundamental reality of individuals is emi. 
For Yoruba, the world contains emi. Each individual thing has its own emi 
which  she  derives  from  the  ultimate  Emi. It  should  be  observed  that  a  number  of 
commentators do not subscribe to this way of thinking. This is due to their thinking that 
its  presupposition leads to the understanding of the world as something that  contains 
mere spiritual things. 
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This  conclusion  is  reached  because  the  term  emi  is  synonymous  with  spirit. 152 
Furthermore, the similarity between  emi and spirit  warrants the criticism that religion 
forms the all governing principle of life for the Yoruba. If we are to go by the above 
understanding, then for the Yoruba, the natural world contains only spirits i.e.  beings 
without material qualities.153 Bastide, for instance, writes that the African (the Yoruba 
inclusive)
sees in everything which is given to his senses something other than he 
sees-he decipher the Other, that is to say the sacred, through the mineral, 
the vegetable and the animal.154 
Shanathan maintains a similar position about the Igbo of Nigeria. To Shanathan, Igbo 
views existence
152 The idea of spirit in African philosophy has mostly been discussed from the perspective of religious 
experience. This follows the belief that Africans are deeply and perhaps incurably religious. Bolaji Idowu, 
among others, seems to suggest that the only way to understand the thinking of Yoruba, for example, is to 
understand their religion. He mentions that “the keynote of their life is their religion. In all things, they are 
religious. Religion forms the foundation and the all-governing principle of life for them. As far as they are 
concerned, the full responsibility of all the affairs of life belongs to the Deity; their own part in the matter is 
to do as they are ordered through the priests and diviners whom they believe to be the interpreters of the 
will of the Deity”. Bolaji Idowu, Olodumare, God in Yoruba Belief, (London: Longman, 1962), p. 5. The 
content of the above passage presupposes that the idea of the individual as an autonomous subject is strange 
to Yoruba thinking. The need to see one’s life in one’s hand and the determination of one’s destiny by 
one’s real acts seems to be lacking in the articulation of human identity. The truth of this position is called 
into question when one examines some of the philosophical narratives of Yoruba which sheds light on the 
Yoruba account of individuality. In view of the contrasts between these narratives and the dominance of the 
so call religious thinking in the life of the Yoruba people, certain philosophers have contested Bolaji’s 
claim. Olusegun Oladipo calls for a critical reflection on the traditional belief systems of the African people 
in other to understand better their thought systems. With specific reference to Yoruba thought system, he 
says, “thus, it seems to me that, although the Yoruba may be described as being religious on the basis of the 
fact that they acknowledge the existence of a supreme being who is the ultimate reality and on whom 
human beings are believed to be dependent for their existence and also recognize some divinities as his 
ministers, there is obviously no ground for contending that religion pervade all their activities”. Olusegun 
Oladipo, “Metaphysics, Religion and Yoruba Traditional Thought”, in P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, 
The African Philosophy Reader, second edition, (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 207       
153 Hallen and Wiredu caution against the misleading interpretation of “spirits in the quasi-material sense 
(i.e. spiritistic entities) as spiritual. They are not; they are in conception, largely physical. Spiritual entities 
are supposed to be totally non-physical, immaterial. See Barry Hallen and Kwasi Wiredu, “Science and 
African Culture” http://www.princeton.edu/~hos/Workshop%20II%20papers/Hallen_Wiredu.doc.pdf .
154 Cited in Robin Horton, “The Romantic Illusion: Roger Bastide on Africa and the West”, p. 89. 
Parenthesis is mine.
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in terms of the spirit rather than of flesh. He was not materialist. Indeed 
nothing  was  further  from  his  mind  than  a  materialistic  philosophy  of 
existence. It makes no appeal to him.155 
Reading Bastide and Shanathan, one is likely to conclude that Africans, and in our 
case, Yoruba give no significance to the study of individuals, especially in the sense of 
representing them from the standpoint of their distinctive qualities This is so because 
spirits, read from the western perspective, are the finest substances which lack material 
qualities. It is interesting to note that this observation has largely been considered to be 
the background basis for explicating the notion of identity in African philosophy. The 
idea is that since the world contains only spirits, the determination of individuals’ nature 
must necessarily stem from the perspective of the spiritual. The idea of the spiritual is 
used to contrast anything that is physical. As it will be shown shortly, this is the bedrock 
of  the socially  constructed individuals,  but  I  argue differently from the standpoint  of 
Yoruba classical sources. This invites the conclusion that the respect which ought to be 
given to individuals as autonomous choosers is devalued. Here, critics stress the point 
that individuals’ nature cannot be properly exemplified by a philosophy that subscribes to 
the primacy of emi. 
Basically, the objection raised above highlights one important fact, namely, that 
primacy must be given to the freedom of self expression in the study of individuality, that 
is, the nature of the individual must never be determined by an external agent. We are left 
to  see  whether  Emi  can  be  said  to  be  external  to  the  individual  in  Yoruba  thought. 
Overall, we shall see whether the philosophy of Emi gives room for the kind of individual 
construction that is advocated above. The doubt concerning the possibility of unfolding 
155 Cited in Chukwudum B. Okolo, “Self as a Problem in African Philosophy” in The African Philosophical  
Reader, second edition, edited by P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 211.
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the  genuine  nature  of  the  individual  under  an  idealist  tradition  (a  tradition  that  the 
philosophy of emi, properly characterized, belongs) is reflected in Okolo’s writing. In the 
paper “Self as a Problem in African Philosophy”, Okolo claims that the status of the 
individual  is  in  Africa  vitiated.  In  his  thinking,  this  way  of  knowing  the  individual 
reduces her autonomy.
This cognizance of an individual, unique self notwithstanding, the truth 
remains  that  violence  is  done  to  its  status  as  an  individual,  as  an 
independent  self-consciousness.  Self  remains  dominantly  opaque,  seen 
from  the  ‘outside’,  so  to  speak,  and  in  relationships  with  others. 
Consequently,  ‘social’  is  the  main  category  for  understanding  self,  as 
indeed for all reality in African philosophy. It is the only authentic mode 
for  the  African  to  answer  the  all-important  question  in  African 
philosophy.156 
Okolo’s  position  suggests  that  the  idealistic  thinking  of  Yoruba  will  surely  have  a 
demeaning effect on individuals’ power of self choice. Owing to the fact that identity is 
construed from the outside and not as it is known to the individual herself, the choice of 
life which the individual prefers is denied him. Interestingly, Okolo’s point echoes the 
worry that the determination of individuality from community meanings blurs the identity 
of the individual. This occurs from the presupposition that the collective identity of the 
community exhausts the person’s genuine nature. This observation reflects some of the 
difficulties  which  the  philosophy  of  emi shall  have  to  overcome.  The  question  that 
concerns us is not whether Yoruba believes in the reality of individuals as they appear in 
the world, although this may be implied, going by the literal conception of emi as a pure 
spiritual substance. Okolo mentions in the beginning of the quotation that there is no 
philosophy in Africa that denies the reality of the world and the individuals in it. But the 
belief that individuals really exist as they appear in the world is not sufficient in self 
156 Ibid, p. 214.
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determination. The individual is a subject, not an object; her power of self choice needs 
to be given valuable respect and any worthwhile philosophy needs to delineate on how 
this can be achieved. Such a philosophy must support a suitable environment that will 
enable liberty of self expression. Thus, the question is how a philosophy that subscribes 
to the supremacy of emi can achieve this end. 
Yoruba does not dispute that something is known to be the ultimate constituent of 
the world.  Firstly,  this  establishes  that  something  can really  be  known in  the  world. 
Subsequently, it confirms that something is known about individuals in the world. This is 
the fact that Emi is the only reality which instantiates individuals in the world. Of course, 
this confirms that Yoruba does care about people’s physical presence in the world. But 
the  question  remains:  how  much  this  is  useful  in  the  Yoruba  thinking  about  self 
realization.  To begin with,  though  emi is  regarded as the innermost substance of  the 
individual,  it  is  not  a  thing  that  is  elusive.  Yoruba  argues  that  emi’s  nature  can  be 
observed externally. Through actions, Yoruba is able to establish the  emi  of a person. 
Someone who is hot tempered is considered as elemi gbigbona and the person with emi 
suuru is gentle. The emi of any person is classified on the basis of some external actions 
but Yoruba maintains a skeptical position about the accuracy of any identity that is based 
on  external  actions.  From  Hallen’s  discussion  with  the  Onisegun  (the  sage),  we 
understand how Yoruba links  the knowledge of  personal  identity  with behavior.  The 
Onisegun argues:
It is the self (emi) which makes man behave (hu iwa) as he is. It is the self 
(emi) which makes man behave in a good manner or in a bad manner. As 
you come to see me now, it was your self (emi) which made you think of 
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coming to see me. It is the self (emi) which causes (mun …) people [to do 
good or bad].157
The Onisegun continues,  
Before you can identify a bad person (eniyan buruku) you must see their 
acts (ise …). You cannot know them until you see (ri) the work of their 
hands.158         
  
Yoruba belief about the possibility of observing emi externally is confirmed in the above 
passages. However, Yoruba acknowledges the difficulty of delineating the true identity of 
people from their external behavior. “It is very difficult to identify (mo) … bad people 
because we don’t  know (mo)  what  their  [innermost]  thoughts (ero)  are”.159 Here,  the 
Onisegun defends  the  view  that  identity  can  be  articulated  correctly  when  people’s 
inmost  thoughts  are  known.  It  is  impossible  for  an  outsider  to  have  access  to  this 
knowledge. This establishes Yoruba accession to the privacy of self knowledge.
This further highlights the strict connection between the concepts of emi (I) and 
emi (the ultimate substance of the person).  Emi (I) refers to the firsthand knowledge of 
the person about herself. This knowledge identifies the truest status of one’s  emi. This 
knowledge depicts the privileged knowledge of the individual about herself. When it is 
used,  it  refers  to  the  ultimate  identity  of  the  person  in  question.  Apparently,  the 
consideration  of  emi as  the  ultimate  reality  of  the  individual  does  not  imply  total 
ignorance about the individual’s distinctive nature. So, when Yoruba says that Emi is the 
reality of the individual, it means that the knowledge of identity is essentially private. 
This warns us not to confuse individuals’ appearances with their reality. As I will argue 
157 Barry Hallen, The Good, The Bad and The Beautiful, Discourse about Values in Yoruba Culture, 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 45. 
158 Ibid, p. 41.
159 Ibid, p. 47.
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in this chapter, Yoruba position agrees with the thinking that individuals ought to choose 
their own lives. 
People’s appearances are mere forms. The only unalterable knowledge that could 
be derived from the perception of these forms is the fact of their being, the content of 
which is not disclosed to anyone else. The certainty of being cannot be disputed when the 
physical form of the person is perceived but no one apart from the person himself is sure 
about its content. The individual alone has this privileged knowledge. In other words, the 
real identity of individuals cannot be determined by what appears externally. This idea is 
further emphasized by another Onisegun using the allegory of the snake and its skin. 
Nigbati ejo ba bo ofo ti atijo sile, yio kuro ni ibe lo si ibo miran pelu ara 
sibesibe. Bi eni ti ko ba laya ba ri ofo ejo eni yen yio sa nitoripe a ro wipe 
oun ti (sic) ejo. Bi ofo ejo ti o bo sile yi se jo ejo gan bee ni ti ara eni to oti 
ku. Awa eniyan gba wipe oku eniyan ni eyi je, sugbon si emi eyi je ara ti o 
baje ti o si gbe sile.
When  the  snake  drops  off  the  old  skin  the  real  snake  still  exists 
somewhere else, still in a body. At the first sight of such empty carcass of 
a snake a timid person can flee believing to have seen a snake. As the 
carcass of a snake resembles exactly a snake so also does the dead body of 
a person. To we human beings the corpse is a dead person, but to the emi 
it is merely a worn out garment.160               
What I should point out in the above passage is the difference between the knowledge 
gained from perceiving the form of an individual and the knowledge gained by the emi of 
the individual. The former knowledge is not certain as it is reflected in the word ‘gba’ in 
the passage. The concept of ‘gba’ depicts the kind of knowledge that other people have 
about  the  individual  in  question.  The  passage  indicates  that  this  knowledge  is  not 
conclusive by contrasting it with the knowledge of the person’s emi. While it is not being 
160 Cited in Barry Hallen, “Phenomenology and the Exposition of African Traditional Thought”, in Sophie 
B. Oluwole (ed.,) Readings in African Philosophy, (Nigeria: Masstech Publications, 1989), p. 86.
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disputed that the perception of the external form of persons could give some hint about 
their  identity,  Yoruba takes time to add that further inquiries need to be made about 
whatever impression we have about people before we can legitimately claim to know 
them truly. Whatever knowledge we infer about an individual due to the form of her 
appearance  is  not  sufficient  to  yield  the  certain  knowledge  of  her  identity.  This 
knowledge is only available to the emi (self) of the individual. Whereas appearance can 
be articulated differently by others, the emi of the individual is all the time sure about its 
status. Hallen puts it differently in another text, 
The  importance  Yoruba  discourse  attaches  to  the  personal  element  of 
experience means that the knowledge I have of my own character (iwa), as 
arising from my conscious self, is privileged. When it comes to others I 
may have to rely upon verbal and non verbal behavior. But for the self that 
I  am,  consciousness  privileges  me  with  introspective  awareness.  My 
behavior  follows  upon  thought,  and  my  thought  originates  in  my 
conscious self, my ‘inside’ or inu.161
Emi is the subject of awareness which is ever certain about its unique identity. 
Hence,  the Yoruba assumption that  emi is  the primary content of the world suggests 
firstly,  that  individuals  with  definite  identity  exist  in  the  world,  secondly,  that  the 
appearance of the individual leads to the confirmation of their ultimate self namely emi 
and thirdly, that unmistaken identity can only be determined by the subject of awareness, 
that is, the  emi of the individual. Yoruba submits that human worldly forms can only 
yield a probable degree of knowledge about their innermost identity. External actions 
confirm the fact  of existence or the fact of being and the idea of being refers at the 
ultimate level to emi. The only thing that is inferred from the worldly form of a person is 
the indisputability of the reality of spiritual reality. As mentioned previously, there is a 
161 Barry Hallen, The Good, The Bad and The Beautiful, Discourse about Values in Yoruba Culture, p. 43.
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link between people’s emi and their external characteristics. This link is illustrated in the 
original meaning of iwa, a concept that is used interchangeably for character and being or 
existence in Yoruba worldview. 
According to Abimbola, the original meaning of Iwa is the “fact of being, 
living or existing”. So, iwa means existence. Iwa as character is therefore 
a derivative from this original. In its original meaning, the perfect ideal of 
iwa  is  aiku  (immortality). Hence, the saying  Aiku pari iwa  (Immortality 
completes existence or immortality is perfect existence) do not just have a 
homophonous relationship; they are also related by etymology and one 
appears to be a derivation of the other.162
The person’s character confirms the indisputable fact of her existence. It does not make 
available to others the epistemological status of her identity. Individuals alone have the 
unmistaken awareness about the contents of their being. This is implied in Gbadegesin in 
the following text: “Iwa is the handiwork of the Deity, the originator of existence, and her 
beauty as well as her character are expressions of her existence as an individual being … 
Existence is primary, then, and character is derivative, based as it is on human ideas of 
morality”.163 Contrary  to  Okolo  and  others,  it  is  obvious  that  self  knowledge  is  not 
determined  from  the  outside  in  Yoruba  philosophy.  The  individual  alone  has  the 
privileged  access  into  her  own identity.  I  will  return  to  this  point  later  to  show its 
relevance to the community. We should proceed to the discussion of the constitutive basis 
of the community. This will prepare us in the understanding of the socialization process 
which goes along with identity formation. 
Emi: Basis of Community
162 Cited in Segun Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community and the World Order” in (eds.,) P. H. Coetzee 
and A. P. J. Roux, The African Philosophy Reader, first edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 
p. 303.
163 Ibid, p. 304.
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 A number of works have appeared on the ontological structure of reality and its 
implication on the community in African philosophy.164 Most of these works show that 
there  are  striking  similarities  in  the  ways  Africans  think  about  the  structure  of  the 
community.  The  ontological  structure  of  reality  in  African  philosophy is  particularly 
interesting because it depicts the person as a dignified subject,  showcasing her as the 
central figure in the maintenance of the order in the universe. The individual is not there 
in the world as a brute fact, neither is she depicted as someone that is ignorant of the 
reason for being there. Her being in the world is delineated with meaningful focus; she is 
not an aimless wonderer; her goal is to create order and harmony. We may ask how the 
individual  assumes  this  position.  As  Yoruba  reflects  on  the  hierarchical  structure  of 
reality, the individual comes on the topmost position. She is discovered to be the only 
creature with the capacity of consciousness, a useful tool for evaluating, shaping and 
planning the self and the world. In her original position, the individual is exemplified as 
deeply related or participating in the essence of everything else. The individual is not 
ultimately  dissociated  from  these  others.  For  this  reason,  knowledge  of  identity  is 
explicated from a relational standpoint. How this idea remains consistent with the Yoruba 
assertion that self knowledge is exclusively known to the individual will be discussed 
164 See Paulin Hountondji, African Philosophy Myth and Reality, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
2002), Kwasi Wiredu, CulturalUniversals and Particulars: an African Perspective, (Bloomington : Indiana 
University Press, 1996), Augustine Shutte, Philosophy for Africa, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
1995), Innocent Chilaka Onyewuenyi, The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in  
Afrocentrism, (Nigeria: University of Nigeria Press: 1993), John S. Mbiti, African Religions and 
Philosophy, Campbell S. Momoh, (ed.) The Substance of African Philosophy, (Nigeria: African Philosophy 
Projects' Publications, 1989), Segun Gbadegesin, African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and 
Contemporary African Realities (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen (eds.), African 
Systems of Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), A. T. Dalfovo et al. (eds.), African 
Metaphysical Heritage and Contemporary Life in the Foundations of Social Life,  (Washington, D.C.: 
Council for Research and Values in Philosophy, 1992), C. S. Bird and I Karp, (eds.), Explorations in 
African Systems of Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), Albert G. Mosley, African 
Philosophy Selected Readings,( Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), Anthony Appiah, In My 
Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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further in section three. For now, we need to state that Yoruba believes that the status of 
the  person  is  shown in  the  kind  of  life  he  leads.  The  person  must  excel  in  making 
intelligible choices and lead a life that transcends personal interests. The ideal of self 
actualization must follow the dynamic but harmonious principle which is inherent in Emi 
or the ultimate essence of all. Self actualization should aim at progress and harmony, the 
reason being that the whole of creation is integrally related.  
The basis  of this  relationship is  Emi.   Momoh describes it  as  the chief “vital 
force”, the force of existence itself, the Being which transcends all beings.165 Prior to the 
existence of the actual community, the timeless community exists with pure vital force 
(Emi).  In Unah’s view, the nature of the vital  force is the original knowledge which 
Africans  seek  in  order  to  apprehend  the  knowledge  of  the  “over-all  process  which 
penetrates every possible  experience”.166  Whereas it  is  Emi in Yoruba,  it  is  NTU in 
Rwanda. Alexis Kagame writes, 
NTU is the universal force as such, which, however, never occurs apart 
from its manifestations:  Muntu,  Kintu,  Hantu, and  Kuntu.  NTU is Being 
itself, the cosmic universal force, which only modern rationalizing thought 
can abstract from its manifestations. NTU is that force in which Being and 
beings coalesce.167 
The philosophy of Emi as the basis of the community presupposes that all individuals in 
the world are members of one family and, just as the family has no separate existence of 
its own but finds its existence in the life of the individuals in the family, these individuals 
also know that their lives are intimately connected with the being of the family. The 
165 C. S. Momoh, “African Philosophy, Does it Exist?” Diogene, 130 (1985,) p. 104. Vital force describes 
that which is inhered in every object and makes its presentation possible. The idea of vital force was first 
introduced by Leopold Senghore. 
166 Jim I. Unah, “The Nature of African Metaphysics,” in Metaphysics Phenomenology and African 
Philosophy, pp. 339-340.
167 Ibid, pp. 341-342.
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community is derived from the operation of the functionally distinct parts each of which 
works towards the well being of the whole and with a crucial dependence on one another. 
As I  will  show shortly,  this  interdependence requires the inclusion of a large private 
conception of the good. The representation of the community like the family makes it 
assume  the  status  of  a  whole  or  an  individual  entity  whose  members  are  jointly 
participating and sharing in its resources. But as each member functions to strengthen the 
family bond not by doing anything for any individual that is notably called family but by 
working towards the development of family members, each member of the community 
concentrates on the development of some special art or capacity for the ultimate purpose 
of contributing to the good of everyone within the community. No individual member 
performs her  function in  isolation,  rather  members  function in  the context  of  and  in 
relation to other elements of the civil community. For Yoruba, the community exists for 
the  primary  purpose  of  advancing  the  well  being  of  its  members.  Augustine  Shutte 
describes the African community using the peculiar African picture of the family below: 
The family has no function outside itself. It is a means of growth for its 
members,  and  the  interaction,  the  companionship  and  conversation, 
between the growing and fully grown members is also an end in itself … 
Because of this no-one is a stranger. The world is our common home, the 
earth the property of all. Because human life only exists by being shared, 
all that is necessary for that life, for living and living well, is shared by the 
family as a whole.168 
One important factor to be noted in the above representation of the community is 
that, for Yoruba, the original description of the community highlights the pure principle 
by which individuals ought to lead their lives in the community. Firstly, the individual is 
typified as having free nature in the sense that they are not characterized on the basis of 
168 Augustine Shutte, Philosophy for Africa, p. 50.   
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what appears to us in the world. In this regard, the identification of the human nature is 
free from the particularities of the actual world. The original background of the individual 
presupposes  that  freedom,  fairness  and  equality  ought  to  be  the  driving  force  of 
cohabitation. Drawing from the original state of the person’s nature, individuals would 
have to live intelligibly and make moral choices but the limit of the choices and the 
content of the rationality that ought to guide life remains imprecise in the hypothesis of 
the  person’s  nature.  Therefore,  this  position  merely  states  the  overarching  principles 
which men of free and equal nature must observe. It presupposes that such principles 
must be adaptable to the specific realities of different people. In addition, it must pass the 
universal test in the sense that it does not constrain the cultivation of others’ identities. I 
will come back to this point in section two.  
The individual that is armed with the knowledge of her real nature will know that 
there is an all permeating essence which ties her with other individuals. Also, this way of 
knowing the self leads one to one’s transcendental nature which compels us to see our 
identity as something that is not limited to a particular domain of the world. African 
ontology  subscribes  to  the  transcendental  reality  of  the  person.  But,  instead  of  the 
transcendental nature dividing individuals on the basis of their different aspirations and 
goals, it is presented, in the manner of Advaita philosophy, as the instrument of unity. In 
fact, the way the person’s nature is presented shows that she ought to be responsive to the 
plight of all humankind regardless of the differences of culture, religion, race etc. This is 
a subtle warning against the view of the world as that which contains individuals who are 
entirely disconnected from one another. More importantly, it cautions against the pursuit 
of pure private interests. In reality, individuals share intimate ontological relationships. 
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Bantu expresses this view in the following way: “created beings preserve a bond with one 
another, an intimate ontological relationship”.169 
But  the structure of Being in  African metaphysics  is  not  left  without its  own 
problems. The hierarchical structure which is believed to characterize reality is further 
associated with community. The community is defined in terms of classes in which case 
the lower classes are subordinate to the higher classes. The division of community in the 
foregoing sense would not have generated any problem in respect of the conception of 
identity but for the fact that certain readings make the dominant values of these classes 
the  sole  criteria  of  identity  definition.  This  peculiarity  is  believed  to  be  common to 
African  philosophy.  This  methodology denies  individuals  liberty  of  self  choice.  This 
appears to be a flaw in the articulation of individuality. Here, the liberty of self choice is 
primary. The relevant question is whether Yoruba philosophy of life force is able to meet 
this challenge. Some commentators think not. To these commentators, the knowledge of 
being as the fundamental knowledge of all informs the idea of African socialism where 
each person’s identity is primarily defined in terms of communal stratifications.170  As 
much as some of the observations of these critics cannot be said to be incorrect, there is, 
undeniably,  certain exaggeration in their arguments part  of which is revealed in their 
thinking that one’s inclusion in the strata of the community will necessarily make one 
lead  a  life  of  conformity.  Truly,  one  finds  some sense  in  the thinking  that  a  life  of 
169 Placide Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, p. 58.
170 See Leopold S. Senghor, On African Socialism, (trans.) Mercer Cook, (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 
93-94. Kwesi A. Dickson, Aspects of Religion and Life in Africa, (Ghana: Ghana Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, 1977), p. 4. John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, p. 108. Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, “Person 
and Community in African Traditional Thought”, in (ed.) Richard A. Right, African Philosophy, An 
Introduction, (Lanham, Md.: University Press of Americas, 1984), pp. 171-180. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing 
Mount Kenya, (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 297. Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism – Philosophy and 
Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution 
(London: Heinemann, 1964), p. 73.   
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conformism subdues the individual as a subject. A conformed life relegates the essential 
capacity of thought of the individual to the background in the sense that it hinders the 
individual from reevaluating the good of the community and possibly stand against it if it 
is conceived to contradict the kind of life that she would like to lead. When emphasis on 
individuals’ social responsibilities comes at the expense of her right to self determination, 
her autonomy is curtailed. Okolo mentions that this way of construing the self disrespects 
the intrinsic dimension of our humanity. 
Man has an intrinsic dimension to his being. He cannot be reduced merely 
to a set of extrinsic relations. He is a subject, not simply an object; an end 
in  himself,  not  merely  a  means;  self  determined,  not  merely  other-
determined; and so on. But the very opposite appears to be predominantly 
stressed in African philosophy.171
I do not pretend that theories which characteristically fall into the above domain 
may be used and indeed has been used to humiliate persons’ liberty of self choice. My 
argument is that Yoruba theory of being does not necessarily entail this conclusion. I hold 
that  any  theory  of  individuality  which springs  from the  divisive  standpoint  in  which 
individuals are only identified with certain groups misrepresent the ultimate nature of 
persons. Thus, contrary to Okolo’s conclusion, I believe that the problem lies not in the 
principle of African philosophy itself but with the kind of interpretations given to it. In 
the Yoruba case, the concern about how to explore one’s distinctive nature is attended to 
after the fact of one’s being as the being of all is ascertained. If we observe from the 
passage  I  lifted  from  Hallen,  it  is  evident  that  only  the  individual  knows  her  self 
correctly. And she is expected to do something with the knowledge. Individuals do not 
know their potentials only to be left inert. The saying falana gbo tire, tara eni la n gbo 
171 Chukwudum B. Okolo, “Self as a Problem in African Philosophy”, p. 215.
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(Falana, face your project, that is the duty of individuals) supports this claim. The Yoruba 
will revert to this saying in order to redirect the focus of any individual who is merged in 
the social  world of  others.  The  term Falana represents  the individual  as  the ultimate 
definer of her life. Semantically, the concept is derived from two Yoruba words. Ifa and 
lana.  Ifa is the custodian of knowledge and  lana means to pave the way. Hence, the 
concept comes as a reminder to every individual about the need to recognize the fact that 
no  one  else  can  possibly  know  what  is  best  for  one  and  that  one  should  choose 
accordingly.  Roughly  speaking,  it  means  do  not  be  a  conformist.  Thus,  Yoruba 
philosophy  does  not  devalue  the  individual’s  power  of  self  legislation.  Each  self  is 
arguably thought to contain certain unique potentials which are meant to be cultivated in 
the world. Let us recall that we mention in chapter one that emi contains the dynamism 
for growth. Thus, the being of the individual that is identical with the being of all the 
others in the community is also different from the being of these others because of its 
unique content.  This  position  finds  support  in  Idoniboye’s  claim that  the  emi that  is 
constant also individuates itself in diverse forms in the world.172  This is the idea of Spirit 
in Yoruba philosophy, it is the “supreme principle of individuality, plurality and unity”.173 
There is another conception of the world as a market in Yoruba philosophy which 
highlights also the importance that Yoruba gives to self choice. Yoruba says oja ni aiye 
(market is the world). This expression depicts the world as a place that individuals come 
purposely to choose their lives through skillful negotiation. In choosing one’s life one 
needs to engage others. Each individual must utilize his negotiating skills in order to 
maximize his self worth. The negotiation principle is very essential for it is through this 
172 See D. E. Idoniboye, “The Idea of an African Philosophy: The Concept of Spirit in African 
Metaphysics”, pp. 84-85. 
173 See Jim I. Unah, “The Nature of African Metaphysics,” p. 349. 
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that the face of the self becomes defined. In fact, the primacy of carrying out one’s ideal 
through careful negotiation with others, as we shall soon see below, comes out vividly in 
Yoruba conception of self rebirth. The idea of the world as a market also aligns with the 
typification of the world as a community in the sense that both represent life as sharing. 
Just like the individuals in the family need to share their lives and be fair about it in order 
to ensure the continuity of the family, the ideal of the world as a market typifies the need 
for  individuals  to  be  fair  in  their  dealings  with  one  another.  The  essentiality  of 
negotiation is showcased in the synonymous usage of aiye (world) and oja.(market). The 
aphorism  oja ni  aiye may also mean,  in  its  literal  interpretation,  market  is  life.  This 
interpretation comes from the understanding of aiye as life. This aphorism further reveals 
the  importance  of  communication,  consent,  dialogue  etc.  in  identity  articulation. 
Community, it is presupposed, cannot be developed on a rigid identification of the good. 
Just like the prices of the commodities in the market fluctuate due to some economic 
forces, so also must the good of the community be adjusted to the needs and current 
realities of the members. This interpretation suggests the possibility of self development. 
The possibility of life being enriched through the negotiating skills of individuals in the 
community is further stressed in this conception of the world. So, the statement  oja ni 
aiye  thrives on the thinking that being has the possibility of growth. The being of the 
person can never be exhausted by group identities no matter how pleasant they may be. 
Gbadegesin comments,
An  existence,  by  virtue  of  its  source  in  the  Deity,  is  good  and  to  be 
appreciated. It is good to exist. Existence itself is beautiful. But, however 
beautiful  a  thing  is,  there  is  always  room for  improvement.  There  are 
degrees of beauty. Thus an original beauty of existence could be improved 
upon by adorning it with character. The difference between one form of 
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existence  and  another  would  then  be  located  in  the  quality  of  its 
adornment, that is, the quality of its character.174 
By conceiving the world both in the like of a family and a market, Yoruba shows that the 
world consists of free individuals who have special commitments to one another. This 
commitment  is  to  ensure  that  none  of  the  individual  members  inhibit  others’ 
development. Hence, Yoruba points out that the world is a place where individuals come 
to choose their lives but within the peculiar social meaning which has accumulated and 
stand to define the good of the community over a period of time. This social meaning has 
come  to  represent  the  cultural  whole  to  which  members  look  forward  to  in  self 
understanding. It has become the constitutive meaning which dictates how we should 
relate  and  adjust  our  inclinations  and  desires  in  our  involvement  with  others  in  the 
community. The underlying assumption is that the individual has the capacity to control 
her natural impulses in light of the shared consensus about the good of the community. It 
is the history of this adjustment that ultimately defines authentic individuality. 
Self Identity: The Socialization Process
A good way to  approach the  question of  the  formation of  identity  in  Yoruba 
philosophy  is  to  start  from the  meaning  of  individual  in  Yoruba  thought.  The  term 
individual is formed from two Yoruba words eni (one) and yan (choice). Eni refers to no 
certain individual. When a certain individual is intended as the point of reference, the 
Yoruba  will  say  eni  yen  (that  person).  Eni is  used  to  represent  the  class  of  human 
individuals in contrast with the class of other individuals such as animals, trees etc. Eni 
cannot be used for these other classes of things. All individuals in the class of human 
individual have the capacity to choose among varied alternatives. The person, Yoruba 
174 Segun Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community and the World Order”, p. 304.
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affirms,  is  a  rational  subject  though  the  rationale  of  the  choice  associated  with 
individuality  has  not  been  free  from  criticism.  I  will  return  to  this  shortly.  The 
consideration of choice as the important nature of the individual seems to imply that 
anyone who is unable to display this capacity has lost out from the class of the human 
individual.  Hence,  the saying  eni to  yan to ye lo yanju (the person that  chooses and 
chooses successfully is the fulfilled person). Any individual who fails to demonstrate this 
capacity is said to wa sa (be in vain). 
The term wa is literally used for being. Yoruba does not use any other word to 
represent the being of the human individual and the non-human individual. Everything 
that is is said to wa (be). However, Yoruba does not spare any entity which, due to sheer 
negligence, refused to perform its function the appellation of wa sa (be in vain). Anything 
or any person who is tagged as wa sa is represented as not utilizing its essential nature. 
When used for any person, it indicates that the person is not utilizing her rational and 
moral capacities. Therefore, it could be legitimately said that the concept of eniyan refers 
to something that ought to make choices. I will show shortly that this idea of choice 
making does not exclude the choice of one’s life plans. Before I do this, let me mention 
that the procedure of the choice of life plans that is articulated in Yoruba philosophy has 
been  variously  discussed.  Some  say  that  the  rationale  of  the  choice  associated  with 
eniyan in Yoruba philosophy entails a support for determinism. We shall attend to this 
argument in section two. The other camp thinks differently, arguing that the choice that is 
associated with eniyan depicts the Yoruba belief in soft determinism. My position is that 
the analysis of the choice associated with individuals in Yoruba philosophy describes the 
Yoruba belief that self determination is possible only within the structure of community’s 
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social meanings. This implies that authentic choices can only be made from within the 
sets  of  alternative  goods  that  are  available  to  the  individual  as  a  member  of  the 
community and within the social structures of the community. Consequently, identity is 
valuable within the particular set of community social meaning. It may be said that this 
position will tie the individual to the community. I will show how the Yoruba position 
escapes this end. At this juncture, I should mention that Yoruba position shares certain 
similarity with Walzer who thinks that individuals as members of the community “do the 
choosing,  in  accordance  with  our  understanding  of  what  membership  means  in  our 
community  and  of  what  sort  of  a  community  we  want  to  have”.175 In  Walzer,  we 
understand that the end of the community dictates the idea of the good of the individual 
member. Walzer thinks that this does not amount to the marginalization of the individual 
who, in the first instance, is only able to make sense of her self from the prevalent social 
life of the community. A similar view is echoed by Coetzee.
Non-contextualized accounts of moral agency alienate agents from their 
autonomy because they alienate them from the conditions that enable them 
to  claim  their  lives  as  their  own  and  to  comprehend  moral  situations 
through their own self understanding.176 
 
Now, let us attend to the question raised previously. To what extent can it be said 
that the Yoruba individual is a free chooser? We shall reflect on this by considering the 
implication  of  name  on  the  individual  in  Yoruba  philosophy. 177 Usually,  a  child  is 
identified with the community on the seventh or eight day when she is given a name. 
175 Michael Walzer, “Membership” in Communitarianism and Individualism, p. 66.
176 Pieter H. Coetzee, “Particularity in Morality and its Relation to Community”, p. 288.
177 For detail discussion into the role of the parents, extended family and the community in child naming, 
see Segun Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order”, p. 292. Barry Hallen, 
“Phenomenology and the Exposition of African Traditional Thought”, p. 83. P R McKenzie, Hail Orisha: 
A Phenomenology of a West African Religion in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, (Netherland: Brill Academic 
Publishers, 1997). For a comparison of the Yoruba in Trinidad, see, Maureen Warner-Lewis, Trinidad 
Yoruba: From Mother Tongue to Memory,  (USA: University of the West Indies Press, 1999).
151
Prior to this time, the new baby is welcomed into the family as “ayo abara tintin (a little 
thing of great joy)”.178 Before I proceed on this discussion, it is important that I explain 
the idea of ‘abara’ as entailed in Yoruba worldview. The term ‘abara’ is commonly used 
to depict something that is unique or original. This thing may be strange, attractive or 
appalling but it is unique and in most cases rare. For example, some people with certain 
special  abilities  are  identified  as  ‘abara meji’.  This  means  that  they  have  certain 
potentials which make it possible for them to do certain things which others could not do. 
But every person is identified as ‘abara’ at birth. The term refers to the originality of 
persons. Any child is distinct and for this reason members of the family and the larger 
community  are  joyful  because  the  little  tiny  thing  endowed  with  certain  distinctive 
potentials will soon blossom and enrich the community life. Everyone looks forward to 
the naming ceremony where the identity of the child is to be disclosed. Name is crucial 
among  the  many  ways  the  Yoruba  provokes  self  understanding.  There  is  a  strong 
indication  that  Yoruba  develops  the  naming  system  as  a  way  of  bringing  people’s 
attention to their responsibilities in the community. Firstly, name is used to highlight how 
people’s identity is associated with immediate family. Names are also coined in a way 
that identifies the extended family and community that an individual belongs to.  The 
names Akintayo, Oguntayo, Adeolu represent each of these individuals as belonging to 
certain distinctive communities. The prefixes Akin, Ogun, Ade are symbols of strength, 
courage and royalty respectively. Thus, Akin is commonly used to identify anyone with a 
community of  warriors,  Ogun for  courageous people  and Ade for  people  from royal 
lineage. But Yoruba goes beyond the symbolic attributes of names because names do not 
exhaust the identity of persons. It is not uncommon to see someone whose name depicts 
178 Segun Bbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order”, p. 292.
152
say X function performing the function of Y in the community. A child’s name may be 
known prior to the time she is conceived or born, but it is impossible to apply any name 
to any child unless she is actually born. This means that the physical presence of the child 
and  the  community  she  belongs  to  are  necessary  factors  in  naming.  Also,  identity 
becomes meaningful partly through the family and the community one belongs to.  A 
person is first identified as a son or daughter of someone else and part of the individual’s 
identity is the family she comes from and so on. Viewed from this end, personal identity 
is a product of the social meaning of the community. On the other hand, the identity of 
the individual is not limited to the community meaning. Name is conceived as a creative 
power of the individual. It is like a magical power of ordinary speech and evokes a kind 
of energy in the person to engage the world. 
The idea of name in the latter position is suggested by the Yoruba view of name 
as a descriptive concept. In this sense, name is a description not merely of gender or 
community but a rough description of the essence of life that an individual comes to lead 
in the world. This is why name is understood as a symbol of self understanding. On a 
common notation, the mere mention of some people’s name gives some clue about the 
circumstances  that  prevail  in  their  family,  prior  to  and  during  their  birth.  More 
significantly, names indicate the possible path that an individual ought to follow. The 
system of divination plays a crucial role in this respect.179 But prior to the determination 
of the futuristic identity that is associated with name, every child is respected and loved. 
This owes to the Yoruba belief that human beings are the most valuable entities in life. 
179 Philip M. Peek defines divination as “a standardized process deriving from a learned discipline based on 
an extensive body of knowledge. This knowledge may or may not be literally expressed during the 
interpretation of the oral message. The diviner may utilize a fixed corpus, such as the Yoruba Ifa Odu 
verses, or a more diffuse body of esoteric knowledge”. Philip M. Peek, “ “Divination”: A Way of 
Knowing?”, in (ed.) Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, African Philosophy, (USA, UK: Blackwell, 1998), p. 171. 
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The person contains some immeasurable possibilities which should be realized as she 
engages the world. The divination system assists the family of the child to apprehend the 
correct name to be given to the child. This quest amounts to the quest for the meaning of 
being.180 The divination process also takes into consideration the family history, the social 
and natural conditions that obtain prior to and during the birth of the child. I take this 
space  to  explain  this  in  detail  in  other  to  show  the  relevant  steps  that  lead  to  the 
derivation of what may be called preliminary identity in Yoruba philosophy. 
The question that may be raised from the above discussion is whether there is a 
strict relation between a given name and the life that individuals must lead in the world. 
In other words, is it the case that a given name must determine necessarily the life that the 
bearer of the name ought to lead? For example, the name Adepetu refers to someone from 
the royal family, in particular, those who ought to take leadership responsibilities in the 
affairs of the community. But is it the case that the given name is a sufficient condition 
for  this  individual  to fulfill  this  responsibility? Are there other  conditions which this 
individual must meet before she can be qualified to occupy this office? What is reflected 
in the above queries is whether identity is given from outside i.e.  by the community 
which creates the name. Two issues are entailed in this conception of identity. Firstly, it 
presupposes that identity is a given but secondly, if identity is notably considered to be a 
given, is it given from outside? The latter is not the same as the former because if the life 
plan articulated for the child is already contained in her being,  it  will  be difficult  to 
ascertain that the identity delineated for her is from the outside.      
180 See Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze, “The Problem of Knowledge in “Divination”: The Example of Ifa” in 
(ed.) Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, African Philosophy, p. 174.
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So,  what  is  it  about  name  in  Yoruba  philosophical  system?  Does  a  name 
necessarily freeze the individual to a particular end? How does name enhance the chances 
of the individual to structure her way of life as she likes? These questions are engendered 
in the association of identity with name in Yoruba philosophy. If names are believed to 
define, without remainder, the identity of the person, it will mean that once an individual 
is  named,  she  is  destined  to  become  what  is  delineated  in  her  name.  Then,  she  is 
irredeemably lost under the practices and values which ought to guide her given name. 
Thus, Oguntade must lead her life solely by the principles and practices of the religious 
community,  namely,  Ogun.  Now,  assuming in  adult  life,  someone discovers  that  the 
values and practices associated with her name are contrary to those things she would have 
chosen personally, will this not imply that the identity is coerced on her from outside? 
Embedded in this observation is another issue which dwells on whether the identity that 
is suggested by a name is fixed. Before we attempt these questions, let us allude to Robin 
Horton on Yoruba’s view about name. 
The  magic  which  is  so  prominent  a  feature  of  African  and other  pre-
industrial cultures turns out in nearly all cases to be an extension of this 
belief  in  the  creative  and  controlling  power  of  ordinary  speech. 
Sometimes,  human  magic  is  explicitly  linked  to  the  operations  of  the 
creator-as when Yoruba say that the secret of sorcery is the discovery of 
the hidden ‘real’ names of things that the supreme being used in creating 
them  …  Their  function  is  not  to  ‘say’  something  that  words  cannot. 
Rather,  it  is  to  give  the  ephemeral  words  of  oral  speech  an  increased 
durability and power of penetration, and hence to increase their creative 
and magical efficacy.181 
To start with, name does not freeze. On the contrary, name creates. Name identifies the 
raw content of being. Name is devised to have a creative and controlling influence on the 
individual. Through a name, the individual is reminded of certain life mission. Name 
181 Robin Horton, “The Romantic Illusion: Roger Bastide on African and the West”, pp. 90-91.
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points to an end but it does not determine how the end is to be reached and whether the 
end will surely be reached. In name, the ‘being-yet-to fully become’ of the individual is 
perpetually kept in view. Hence, name contains the being even as the being contains the 
name. Name is a symbol of self understanding. Name assists the individual to reflect on 
her  inner  being  as  it  finds  reflection  in  her  external  form,  when  this  external  form 
develops  from  time  to  time,  the  individual  sees  herself  as  moving  towards  self 
actualization or the accomplishment of her real name. Let me point to one objection that 
may  be  raised  at  this  juncture.  We  may  think  that  this  explanation  contradicts  our 
previous claim. We observed earlier that only the individual has a privileged access into 
the content of her being. But, here, our claim is that the identity that is represented in 
name is determined by a system of divination which actually decodes the meaning of an 
individual’s  being.  The  only  way  to  grant  this  possibility  is  by  acknowledging  that 
someone else has access into the content of the individual’s being. How can a person 
elucidate the meaning of another person’s being if she does not gain insight into the 
content of the being? This is an interesting point as it suggests that others can have access 
to the inner content of one’s being. 
Let us attend to this observation by distinguishing between someone else having 
insight into the content of A’s being and A having an unmistaken self knowledge. A 
hypothetical case of A involving in a ghastly accident may help us drive home the point. 
A seeks the assistance of C who is a medical doctor. C is able to gain some insight into 
A’s  problem through certain  device  on  C’s  computer.  We may ask  whether  what  is 
displayed on C’s computer is identical with A’s pain. Certainly, what is displayed on the 
computer is the form of the pain, the real pain is only known to A as contained in her 
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being. In the same vein, it is the form of the content of the individual’s being that is 
apparent to the diviner. And when the information is given, it is not specific, it is given 
like a concealed truth which the individual herself needs to thrash out in life. Certainly, 
what is contained in the being of the individual is not precisely or clearly known to the 
diviner.182 It needs to be mentioned that whatever knowledge that the diviner professes 
only belongs to the domain of igbagbo (putative belief). I will say more on this point in 
the last  section.  We said  initially  that  while  the  being (the  emi)  of  the  individual  is 
capable of growth, the different stages of growth which the being must pass through is 
unknown to the diviner. In fact, the diviner is not sure of its end. Another point we need 
to note is that the issue of identity is not finalized at this point; it is the starting point. It is 
like a kind of initiation into the social world of the community. The individual needs to 
step into this world to define her own identity. This explains why Emmanuel Eze wants 
us to understand Ifa divination as a system that facilitates ‘deep self understanding’. 
Ifa-work, is therefore, a quest for discovery of meaning and direction in 
life, personal or communal, through rational discernment and liberation. I 
want  to  argue  that,  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  Ifa  should  be 
understood  as  a  practice  of  “deep  understanding”  (uche omimi).  This 
search  for  deep  understanding,  I  believe,  is  of  philosophical  nature, 
because it is a reflective process of seeking knowledge about human life 
and  action  –  by  way  of  established  discernment  and  epistemological 
processes.183
The Yoruba furthers the question of identity by noting that the identity associated 
with name is preliminary. This means that authentic identity is not defined by any given 
182 See Yemi Elebuibon, Iyere Ifa (Tonal Poetry, the Voice of Ifa) an Exposition of Yoruba Divinational 
Chants, (USA: Ile Orunmila Communications, 1999), pp. 206-225. Olufemi Taiwo, “Ifa: An Account of A 
Divination System and Some Concluding Epistemological Questions”, in Kwasi Wiredu, (ed.) A 
Companion to African Philosophy, (USA: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 304-310.
183 Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze, “The Problem of Knowledge in “Divination”: The Example of Ifa”, in 
Kwasi Wiredu, (ed.) A Companion to African Philosophy, p. 174. Ifa is a system of divination that reveals 
certain facts about individuals’ life. It is a means of self understanding.
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name but by a process of self redefinition also known as self rebirth (atunbi). This is 
expected of any mature Yoruba person. This is the adult role in which the individual 
herself  plays a dominant function in deciding what  she conceives to be her best  self 
interest.  Here,  the  individual  determines  herself  to  be  the  important  factor  that  is 
necessary to bring about the end she conceives as the best good. She conceives of herself 
as  the cause of  her  actions  and that  the end she aims aligns with her  inmost  being. 
Although  this  being  has  roughly  been  defined  at  birth,  the  principle  behind  self 
redefinition says that the individual ought to determine her own end by the law of her 
own causality, the law of doing something for the sake of the end that one deserves. Part 
of what the idea of self redefinition allows the individual to do is to constantly engage the 
social meanings of the community from time to time. The Yoruba saying bi a bini, ko to  
ka tun ara eni bi (natural birth is not as important as self rebirth) illustrates this position. 
The concept of atunbi (self rebirth) emphasizes the necessity of self redefinition. Usually, 
each  member  belongs  to  a  particular  social  status  in  the  community.  Hence,  self 
redefinition occurs from an engagement with the particular contingencies of one’s social 
group. In some important respect, the individual will need to follow decision procedures 
which comply with the particular contingencies of her group, but this does not mean that 
the procedural rules are fixed. Therefore, a name that is given at birth only qualifies the 
individual as a member of the community. The individual needs to prove the worth of the 
given name by redefining it in line with the current challenges that face her within the 
community. The model for determining the value of a redefined identity consists of the 
contributions it makes to the community at large, the family and finally, the individual’s 
life. The good of the individual is not left out in the determination of identity. However, 
158
her dignity is  revealed by the amount  of  her consideration for  the good of the other 
members of the community. Thus, we see that the initial name given to the individual is 
intended to enlist her as a potential member of the community, someone who is qualified 
to redefine her identity through the social structures of the community. One advantage of 
this  philosophy is  that  it  makes the freedom of  the individual  more realistic and the 
individual is able to appreciate her choices better if done within the community. But what 
is the extent of this freedom? Is it absolute in the sense that it can erode all the values of 
the community and define its own values? Our investigation of the nature of the moral 
subject in relation to the specific rules of the community in the next section will answer 
this question. The constitutive consciousness of the community has a lot to do with the 
determination of identity in Yoruba philosophy. The question is whether this concession 
ties the individual to the community. Let us journey into the next section to see how 




In the communitarian moral universe caring or compassion or generosity, 
not justice-which is related essentially to a strictly rights-based morality-
may be a fundamental moral category. In a moral framework where love, 
compassion,  caring,  friendship,  and  genuine  concern  for  others 
characterize social relationships, justice-which is about relations of claims 
and counter-claims-may not be the primary moral value.184
We have argued that Yoruba depicts the individual as having the essential capacity for 
choices. This is the primary understanding of  eniyan (individual) in Yoruba language. 
This notion of individuality essentially underscores the primacy of self choice in identity 
categorization. The destiny of the individual is not in the hand of anyone else: she is the 
master of her fate. This fact, as I will show below, is exemplified in the role that the 
community plays in Yoruba construction of individuality. This section will extend the 
notion of identity that is explicated in the previous section especially as it relates to the 
issue of morality. To be specific, I will concentrate on the moral implications of Yoruba 
idea  of  identity  on  the  individual.  Let  us  proceed  by  exposing  some  of  the  moral 
implications of the main narratives which discuss individuality in Yoruba philosophy. 
Previously, we argue that the capacity of choice is the essence of individuality and that 
any person who refuses to demonstrate this capacity gives others the chance to doubt her 
humanity. The issue that will attract our attention now is the degree to which identity is 
considered a choice in Yoruba philosophy. Is the individual an absolute chooser? In other 
words, are her choices entirely independent of the state of the community? Or, are her 
184 Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 70.
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choices guided solely by community good? How does Yoruba philosophy explain the 
limit of the community good on the choice of the individual? What kind of respect does 
Yoruba philosophy give to the good of the individual if it is contrary to the community 
good? These, among other related issues, will attract our attention here. Our discussion 
will proceed under the following headings: Yoruba on the idea of the subject, community 
as the locus of duty and detachment and self achievement.
Yoruba on the Idea of the Subject
We come to the point where we should discuss Yoruba myths about the moral 
subject.  A lot of things presented in the myths are very much in agreement with our 
earlier position that Yoruba predicates individuality on the idea that the person has the 
freedom of self choice. In particular, Yoruba argues that the individual has the capacity to 
determine her own good prior to the particular conditions that prevail in the community. 
Yoruba believes that the idea of the good exists in the mind prior to the time we join the 
community. This belief construes life as purposeful and insists that individuals ought to 
be determined to realize that which is conceived as the ultimate aim of life. In the like of 
the  liberal  person,  the  Yoruba  individual  is  not  an  aimless  wonderer  in  the  world. 
However,  Yoruba does not  subscribe to certain things which liberalism upholds.  The 
myth of  ori as developed in defense of individuality will now be discussed to illustrate 
Yoruba viewpoint.  Ori,  to the Yoruba,  is  the symbol  of  individuality.185 The English 
equivalence of ori is ‘head’. But ori does not refer to the physical head. Rather, it refers 
185 Different translators have attempted the English equivalence of ori. See, A. B. Ellis, The Yoruba- 
Speaking People of the Slave Coast of West Africa: Their Religion, Manners, Customs, Laws, Language,  
Etc. (London: Curzon Press, 1974), p. 127. S. Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, (ed.) O Johnson, 
(London: Routledge, 1921), p. 27. P. Amaury Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of their  
History, Ethnology and Languages, (London: Frank Cass, 1961), p. 283. J Olumide Lucas, The Religion of  
the Yorubas, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 283. Bolaji E. Idowu, God in Yoruba Belief, p. 170. Wande 
Abimbola, “The Yoruba Concept of Human Personality” in La Notion de Personne en Afrique Noire, 
(Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1971), p. 80.      
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to the ideas in the mind. This is why it is also called ori inu (the inner head). Ori inu is 
also used to depict the self.186 For brevity sake, I will adopt the term ori for ori inu (inner 
head). Ori contains the idea of the good. This good is schematically portrayed to be prior 
to the community in the sense that the individual has got the idea of the good prior to her 
becoming a  member  of  any  particular  community.  She  only  joins  the  community  to 
unleash this good. Hence, she needs to abide by the precepts of ori if she will actualize 
her  ideal  self.  What  does  this  imply?  It  means  that  the  individual  will  only  need to 
conform to the ideas which are contained in her  ori. This explains why  ori  is the final 
arbiter in self determination.187 Yoruba says ori eni lawure eni (one’s ori is the source of 
one’s success).188 
Three interesting narratives in ancient Yoruba philosophy show how ori comes to 
be the custodian of life plans and why ori is the ultimate arbiter in decision procedure. 
We  shall  discuss  these  narratives  alongside  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  the 
community.  I  need  to  mention,  at  this  juncture,  that  the  three  narratives  support  the 
hypothesis  that  the  individual  knows  her  life  plans  before  joining  the  physical 
community.  However,  the  question  remains  whether  they  are  able  to  conceive  the 
meaning of the good independently of the community. The accounts that we are about to 
explore show that these individuals are already living in a kind of communal setting that 
is beyond the world before they join the physical community. From the outset, Yoruba 
186 Barry Hallen, The Good, The Bad and The Beautiful, Discourse about Values in Yoruba Culture, p. 46, 
45. 
187 We may wonder whether this does not align with the theory of unextended self or, to put it differently, 
the pure individualistic theory of self which claim that the self is nothing more than the ideas on the mind. 
This kind of self is common to the Cartesian self. But, if this claim is true in the Yoruba position, it will 
raise a tension between its metaphysics and epistemology. In this regard, the metaphysical notion of the self 
that goes deep into the most fundamental level where everything there is comes together as the one true self 
will be contradicting the epistemological account of the self. 
188 Ibid, p. 116.
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position highlights the importance of the community. The idea of the good cannot be 
articulated outside the boundary of some community. We will return to this shortly. 
One of the narratives, akunleyan (something that is chosen while kneeling) claims 
that the individual kneels at the presence of Olodumare choosing her life plan. This is 
contained in the ori that the individual chooses. According to Yoruba philosophy, there 
are two kinds of ori- good and bad- one of which must be chosen by the individual. The 
individual is not aware of the good or bad  ori neither is she given any clue on how to 
detect the good ori from the bad ones.189 But whichever one she chooses will be her lot in 
life. We may be puzzled about the kind of choice that is presented before the individual 
in this account. We wonder whether this is a choice at all. At the moment, we need to 
note  that  the individual  knows only that  a  choice was made prior  to  her  joining the 
community but  as  to  the  content  of  what  has  been  chosen,  she  is  ignorant.  What  is 
stressed is the capacity for choice. As for what is chosen, that is left undetermined until 
the individual becomes an active participant in the community. I will show later what 
Yoruba  uses  this  to  illustrate  about  the  idea  of  the  good that  is  known prior  to  the 
community. For now, we understand that the individual’s capacity for choice is prior to 
the  community.  The  second  narrative,  akunlegba  (something  that  is  received  while 
kneeling) simply says that the individual receives her life plan while kneeling in the 
presence of Olodumare prior to her joining the community. Here, identity is construed as 
something that is given. Again, what is given is unknown until the individual joins the 
community. The third narrative, ayanmo (affixed choice) says that the individual kneels 
before Olodumare narrating her life plans seeking Olodumare’s approval. At the end of 
the narration, Olodumare will put the final seal on them. It is outside the jurisdiction of 
189 Ibid, p. 34. 
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Olodumare to alter whatever life plan individuals set for themselves. One question to be 
answered later is whether there is any room for this plan to be revised, reshaped or even 
cancelled by the chooser.  The  difference in  the third  narrative is  that  it  portrays the 
individual as someone that is autonomous and reasonable.  The latter  quality is added 
because the narrator needs to lay down her life plans step by step. I will show later that 
the three narratives are out to demonstrate the limit of reason in the choice of identity 
especially if it is not situated within some cultural context. This highlights the futility of 
the  thinking  that  the  rational  conception  of  the  good  life  is  independent  of  the 
community. 
But, before then, it is important that we reflect on why Yoruba sets three different 
narratives to articulate the ways identity is obtained. On the superficial level of analysis, 
two of  these  narratives  claim that  identity  is  chosen.  One holds  a  contrary  position, 
depicting identity as a thing that is given by Olodumare. What can we discover from 
these  seemingly  contrary  or  inconsistent  positions  about  identity?  One  easy  way  to 
answer the question is to argue that the narratives are developed by different classical 
Yoruba thinkers. But this answer will not suffice because what appears contrary in the 
different narratives can be resolved at a deeper level of analysis. All the narratives are 
pointing to one essential fact about the choice of identity. The point of emphasis is that 
reason can only be a useful guide in the choice of identity when it  is utilized in the 
context of some language users. Yoruba belief about the ultimate status of individuals in 
self  choice  is  revealed  in  Olodumare’s  role.  The  capacity  to  choose  the  good  is 
independent  of  the  community  but  not  the  knowledge  of  the  good.  This  is  why 
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Olodumare is  only present to respect the choice of the individual.190 The idea is  that 
whatever  an  individual  chooses  to  become shall  be.  The  will  to  be is  what  is  being 
stressed and this will must be exercised in the community. This essential nature of the 
individual is not going to be compromised by Yoruba. The nature exists in the person 
prior to her joining the community. And this makes the issue of self definition something 
that is infinitely undetermined by anything external to the person. It is not a matter that 
can be completely defined by the community. However, Yoruba adds that no choice of 
the good life can really be said to be significant or meaningful until it is actually placed 
within the context of the community. The good life or otherwise can only be defined in a 
social context, Yoruba position illustrates. It further shows that one cannot claim to be a 
rational individual except by demonstrating one’s capacities for critical reflection within 
a body of culturally transmitted norms and beliefs. I will support these claims with cases 
of individuals who choose their life plans before Olodumare below. 
Let us revisit the dilemma that is raised about the choice of identity as presented 
in the above narratives. To some, the idea of choice that is presented in the narrative is 
insignificant and ultimately, the narratives depict Yoruba support for determinism. This 
claim, we should note, originates from the idea that what the individual chooses and 
approved by Olodumare will forever be. Wande Ambimbola presents the deterministic 
position in the following, 
A man’s destiny, that is to say, success or failure in life, depends to a large 
extent on the type of head he chose in heaven. The choice of a good ori 
ensures  that  the  individual  concerned  would  lead  a  successful  and 
190 See some possible reasons why Olodumare’s presence indicates that the choice of ori the is the sole 
responsibility of the individual in M. A. Makinde, A Philosophical Analysis of the Yoruba Concept of Ori 
and Human Destiny”, pp. 64-65.
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prosperous  life  on  earth  while  the  choice  of  a  bad  ori condemns  the 
individual concerned to a life of failure.191 
In Wande’s account, the life of any person is, according to Yoruba, determined solely by 
the kind of Ori chosen in the primordial world. This position shows that the individual is 
determined, inevitably, to be what she chooses to become in the world. But going by the 
understanding that the individual does not even know what she chooses, the conclusion 
that  Yoruba  supports  determinism  lacks  any  plausible  grounding.  According  to  the 
narratives, none of the individuals knows exactly the content of the ori presented before 
them. The people are just making blind choices and this makes the choices trivial. Even 
the  narratives  that  claim  that  individuals  narrate  their  life  plan  step  by  step  before 
Olodumare support this point as we shall see below. But assuming the critics argue that 
the knowledge of the choice is  not what  makes it  deterministic,  but  the fact  that  the 
person is bound by what she chooses. If this position is taken, the idea of determinism 
that will be legitimate to attribute to Yoruba philosophy will look like this: the choice of 
the individual determines her to become something and this something is unknown to her 
until  she reaches the community.  If  this  is  the case,  the argument  of  the determinist 
breaks  down.  How significant  will  this  idea  of  determinism be?  For  a  person  to  be 
determined by a kind of choice of life whose content is unknown to her is trivial. Let us 
suppose that the critics’ reply that it  is typically the case that one can be determined 
without knowing. Our response will be that the Yoruba philosophy also takes this to be 
trivial. The triviality becomes evident when the person is given the choice of altering this 
choice  of  life  if  she  deems  fit.  That  Yoruba  condemns  this  way  of  reasoning  is 
191 Wande Abimbola, Ifa : An Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus, (Ibadan : Oxford University Press, 1976), 
pp. 79-80.
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exemplified  in  the  opportunity  given  to  individuals  to  re-define  their  lives.  Some 
commentators like Makinde have argued that the deterministic implication given to the 
three narratives is inappropriate in view of the fact that the individual can change her 
chosen life plan upon joining the community.  
There is always a role an individual, as a person, has to play in shaping or 
reshaping his destiny through a readjustment of his ‘inner head’ by means 
of appropriate sacrifice or propitiation.192   
In  Makinde’s  view,  the  possibility  of  changing  life  plans  makes  the  claim  of  hard 
determinism inappropriate. This reaction is right owing to the fact that hard determinism 
accounts that everything, “including everything that we do, has been definitely booked 
from any earlier date you like to choose. Whatever is, was to be. So nothing that does 
occur could have been helped and nothing that has not actually been done could possibly 
have been done” .193 Hence, Wande concludes that the narratives, properly investigated, 
entail  the belief  of  the Yoruba about  soft  determinism rather  than hard determinism. 
Wande  presents  a  truer  account  of  individuality  in  Yoruba  philosophy.  The  three 
narratives subscribe to the thinking that individuals are capable of making choices. On 
this ground, the ultimate power of self choice is given to none else than the individual. 
Even Olodumare is not allowed to intervene. He is represented as a mere observer and 
approver of individuals’ decisions. This confirms the respect that Yoruba gives to the 
individual as a moral subject. 
Furthermore, the narratives are devised in order to illustrate the importance of the 
community  in  the  exercise  of  autonomy.  The  three  narratives  altogether  show  that 
meaningful  choices  can  only  be  made  within  community  contexts  where  some 
192 M. A. Makinde, “A Philosophical Analysis of the Yoruba Concept of Ori and Human Destiny”, p. 66.
193 Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 15. 
167
preferential systems exist. In the first narrative, the individual is clearly represented as 
someone capable of making choices though the content of the choice is unknown to her. 
The fact that the content is unknowable to the individual illustrates the triviality of the 
choice. Any choice that is made outside some preferential system is meaningless. Any 
claim to a meaningful choice in such a system is false. The possibility of changing or 
revising  life  plans  attests  to  the  consistency  of  Yoruba  position.  Yoruba  philosophy 
suggests that the community is the place where individuals  can choose meaningfully. 
Hence, the first narrative states the necessary condition for meaningful choices. Makinde 
consents that the choice of the individual in this narrative is insignificant. He says,
It  does  not  seem  to  be  a  choice  at  all.  Now,  all  choices  presuppose 
preferences. Given the fact that  human beings are rational, they do not 
make a choice outside a preferential system.194 
The second narrative reveals the limit of external authority (including the understanding 
of community institutions and practices as rigid authorities) in self determination. In this 
narrative,  we  understand  that  individuals’  life  plans  are  given  by  Olodumare.  This 
account is inconsistent with the idea of eniyan in Yoruba philosophy. Going by the nature 
of the individuals, it is obvious that the account demeans the individual’s autonomy. It 
represents the identity of the human individual as something that is wholly determined 
from outside. Olodumare, the supreme deity, is the supreme giver of identity. But Yoruba 
support for the supremacy of the person in self choice appears in the rejection of the 
given life as the ultimate identity. This life, Yoruba maintains, can also be altered. The 
third narrative illustrates the triviality of rationality which is not grounded within any 
particular language game. The three narratives consent that the identity that is chosen 
194 M. A. Makinde, “A Philosophical Analysis of the Yoruba Concept of Ori and Human Destiny”, p. 59.
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prior to community context is thin and trivial. This highlights the problem with identity 
constructions whose premises are based on the rational cognition that is abstracted from 
the contingencies  of  the community.  Whereas this  account  supposes  that  the  rational 
individual can make intelligent and meaningful choices independently of the community, 
the Yoruba thinks that such choices are impossible. Yoruba emphasizes the social nature 
of the individual. It shows the need for us to be sociable.
To buttress our thinking that the narratives illustrate the need of the community in 
self choice, I will allude to two cases which are prominent in the literature. The first case 
refers to Afuwape who receives the invitation to choose his life plan before joining the 
community.195 Knowing the enormity of the task, his friends warn him to go straight to 
the house of  Ajala  where the choice is  to  be made.  However,  Afuwape declines  his 
friends’ counsel on the ground that seeking the elders’ advice before heading to Ajala’s 
house is more important. Afuwape believes that the advice of the elders can assist him to 
make right decisions. We are told that Afuwape picks the ‘good’ ori having abided by the 
elders’ instruction to perform some sacrifice. I will not discuss what the idea of sacrifice 
may mean for lack of space. The second case relates to the story of a young man who is 
joining the community for the first time. Gbadegesin relays the story in the following 
passage,   
He recited his destiny for the approval of Olodumare, the Supreme Being. 
His  destiny was to  go into the  world,  live  a  youthful  age,  have  a  girl 
friend, fix a date for the wedding, and, on the wedding day, go into the 
bush to relieve himself, and be bitten by a poisonous snake.196 
195 See the detail of the story in Segun Gbadegesin, “Toward a Theory of Destiny”, in A Companion to  
African Philosophy, p. 313.
196 Ibid. p. 319.
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The two cases do not disprove the fact that these individuals are reasonable. Afuwape’s 
reasonableness is highlighted in the way he handles the choices before him, namely, his 
ability  to  prioritize  his  personal  reflection  over  his  friends’  counsel  to  go straight  to 
Ajala’s house. The person who is coming to the world for the first time is also reasonable 
because he lays his project step by step before Olodumare. But what we need to pay 
attention to is the triviality of this person’s rationality compared to that of Afuwape. It is 
doubtful if he understands the significance of his choice. Having achieved some success 
in life including the blessedness of courtship, one wonders why this person will think that 
the right action to take is to end his life on the very day of his wedding. Moreover, one 
would  expect  that  if  the  significance  of  the  decision  on  the  yet  to  be  wife  and  the 
extended families of both parties is well known to the chooser, he will probably think 
otherwise. What the Yoruba is illustrating is that reason is trivial if it is not situated in a 
given experience. Outside a particular context of meaning, human thoughts, feelings and 
behavior  become  incoherent  and  meaningless.197 This  finds  support  in  the  following 
remarks by Taylor.
My  identity  is  defined  by  the  commitments  and  identifications  which 
provide the frame of horizon within which I can try to determine from 
case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I 
endorse or oppose.  In other words it  is the horizon within which I  am 
capable of taking a stand.198 
Afuwape’s case supports the need for the community in self choice. As a reasonable 
individual, it is possible for him to make his choice independent of the elders’ advice but 
because the elders are quite experienced and knowledgeable, he thinks that their advice 
197 See Daniel M. Savage, John Dewey’s Liberalism,  Individual, Community, and Self-Development, p. 42.
198 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 27.
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will  be  useful.  That  Afuwape rates  the  experience of  these  elders  higher  reveals  the 
importance which the Yoruba places on community experience in self understanding. The 
reasonableness of Afuwape’s action is illustrated in the passage below.
For as a matter of moral psychology, no longer of logic, people are often 
confronted  with  complexities  in  trying  to  live  according  to  their 
conception of a good life, but they find themselves unable to resolve them. 
These complexities arise because the conventions of their moral tradition 
provide  inadequate  guidance  about  how  they  should  respond  in  some 
particular  situation.  They  recognize  that  their  intuitive  responses  have 
become unreliable, but they do not know how to find a reliable response 
because they are wanting in knowledge, commitment, or reflectiveness. 
This is the situation in which people feel the need to rely on the judgment 
of others. If they are reasonable they will rely on those whose lives and 
conducts are better than their own and who therefore can be supposed to 
have a greater extent the qualifications which they themselves lack. If they 
receive the help they need because the people to whom they turn have the 
qualification to provide it, then it is justified to recognize them as moral 
authorities, with all that such recognition entails.199  
On the issue of identity, Yoruba sees the community as a need, but not in the 
sense  that  the  community  can  define  the  entire  possibilities  of  the  good  which  the 
individual  is  capable  of  imagining.  The  imaginative  capacity  to  conceive  one’s  own 
identity in anyway that one deems best is depicted as transcending the boundary of the 
community, but how one could identify a plausible identity is to think of its consequences 
on others in the community. The fact that Yoruba claims that any individual can alter her 
life through certain efforts indicates that the choice of identity is ultimately left in the 
hand of the individual. However, this does not demean the importance of the community. 
This claim is corroborated by the literal meaning of Afuwape. The name Afuwape means 
a person with a wholesome character. This kind of life is generally regarded by Yoruba as 
199 John Kekes, “Pluralism and Moral Authority”, in Kim-Chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan and C. L. Ten, 
(eds.,) The Moral Circle and the Self Chinese and Western Approaches, (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: 
Open Court, 2003),p. 90.
171
one that respects the freedom of others. By implication, it means showing respect for the 
freedom and equality of others in the way one conducts his life affairs. Fundamentally, 
such a life is lived by respecting what others believe as the good, it involves listening 
patiently, attentively and with the willingness to see how the conception of the good held 
is consistent with that of the universal community. The individual has the priority in the 
choice of identity; this is why the Yoruba says mo iwa fun oniwa (know and respect each 
people’s  way  of  life).  But  the  community  remains  a  valuable  entity  which  aids  the 
individual to adjust in relevant respects. To further support the idea of the community as 
a need, Yoruba argues that the conception of the good which any individual has prior to 
the community can only be validated by active participation in the community. Hence, it 
is the life in the community that authenticates any conception of the good that is prior to 
the community life. The idea here is that the presence of the community is a necessity in 
the determination of individuality. Individuality is not a thing that is complete prior to the 
community. However, Yoruba does not deny that the individual’s view of the good can 
transcend  the  good  of  a  particular  community  because  the  community  derives  its 
existence from the existence of the individual members.200 Each of these individuals is 
autonomous.  The  fact  remains  that  they  agree  to  operate  by  the  constituent  of  the 
communal  structure.  This  is  what  reduces  the  freedom of  the  individual.  It  is  what 
Yoruba intends to show by introducing the notion of soft determinism in the articulation 
of individuality. The idea is that the society has a kind of soft influence on individuals 
through its  moral traditions.  This consideration shows that  people come to undertake 
genuine moral autonomy not just from an abstract possibility but from pressing practical 
200 See Gyekye Kwame Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought” in Kwasi Wiredu and 
Kwame Gyekye, (eds.,) Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, p. 105.
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need. This is not to imply that the autonomous individual does not have some control 
over her own development within the community but her conception of the good is not 
complete as if it is a thing that transcends time. The freedom to choose one’s life is not 
denied  but  the  delineation  of  this  choice  as  good  or  bad  requires  the  community’s 
presence. Failure to construe oneself as a moral chooser in line with community facts 
leads to the disintegration of individuality. Why is the community so important? It is 
because that is where the individual’s authentic development as a continuous process of 
growth  takes  place.  This  is  the  reason  for  action  and  this,  we  shall  see,  does  not 
necessarily tie the individual to the community.  
Community as the Locus of Duty
We have presented the idea of the self whose source of identity is freely known 
and yet has a communitarian face. The choice of identity is free in the sense that only 
individuals have the privileged access into their inmost nature. Consequently, this makes 
the individual’s  nature transcend the community.  However,  our  thesis  shows that the 
means of self development is largely social. This is because the capacity for moral choice 
and development can only be exercised in certain social settings.  By implication, the 
human nature which Yoruba acknowledges to transcend the boundary of the community 
meaning is the uninhibited intelligible force, that is, emi. But since this intelligible force 
is  the  inmost  reality  of  all,  its  nature  cannot  be  asocial.  It  follows  that  though  the 
individual is not limited to the community, she cannot lead a balanced life if she lives 
without a careful intention to preserve the order of the community. This is why she ought 
to appreciate the institutions and practices of the community which define the common 
good. In other words, it becomes very crucial for her to understand that the idea of the 
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common good in  the  cultural  structure  in  which  she  belongs  defines  the  substantive 
conception about the good life. Without much disputation, the individual’s choice of way 
of  life  will,  to  a  large extent,  be influenced by the cultural  tradition in  which she is 
situated. However, the problem occurs when her chosen lifestyle is ranked solely from 
the point  of  view of  what  it  contributes  to  or  detracts  from the  common good.  The 
difficulty in the above position lies not in the fact that the individual can lead her life 
differently from what is commonly accepted in the community as the way human beings 
ought to live. Her new ideals may further the community conception of the good life, it 
may even contribute to the flourishing of the members in the community. But a problem 
ensues  when the idea of  the good life in  the community is  fixed such that it  cannot 
accommodate  any  new ways  of  living.  Yoruba  does  not  agree  with  the  latter  view. 
However,  regardless  of  the  right  of  the  individual  to  choose  her  own  life,  Yoruba 
maintains  that  it  is  mistaken  to  conceive  that  this  right  can  be  exercised  on  an 
individualistic  basis.  Yoruba  subscribes  to  the  idea  that  individual’s  right  and  the 
conception of justice all depend on the cultural tradition of the community. Therefore, the 
community becomes the locus of duty and the focus of the individual before acting.201 
One important question that may be raised from the foregoing (a question that 
liberalism takes to be crucial) is whether the dignity of the person as an autonomous 
subject is duly recognized. As a subject, the individual’s right to live and choose what she 
considers good ought not to be inhibited by any specific good set at the community level. 
The above submission that the community becomes the focus of the individual before 
acting is a communitarian ideal and I surely agree with it. It implies that the person is 
born into an existing community and indeed into human culture. As a dignified subject, it 
201 See Pieter H. Coetzee, “Particularity in Morality and its Relation to Community”, p. 279. 
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is legitimate for the individual to pursue her rights but this must be with an unwavering 
determination not to infringe on others’ freedom. Up to this point, there may not arise any 
disputation but the central issue that needs to be addressed is how the individual can 
possibly exercise the right of self choice within the context of this thesis. Advocates of 
individualism may reject this ideology on the contention that it pays scant attention to the 
rights of individuals. Such position may be said to devalue human dignity.  Since we 
propose  that  the  reason  for  action  is  to  realize  the  good  which  is  inherent  in  the 
individual,  how  will  the  individual  realize  this  good  in  case  the  community  good 
contradicts her own good? This is the point. It is an insistence on the individuality of the 
person  within  the  community  and  the  Yoruba  does  not  dispute  that  this  should  be 
appreciated. This claim finds support in our initial position that the individual is a unique 
being and that her identity is determined by her privileged access into the inner content of 
her  being.  Advocates  of  individualism  go  by  this  means  of  self  identification. 
Consequently they hold that the good should be decided on a personal basis rather than 
communal basis. My argument is that this conclusion is mistaken. What does the position 
of  the  individualists  imply?  It  surely  implies  that  the  determination  of  the  good  of 
individuals by certain central good is inconsistent with the conception of individuals as 
free choosers. 
Yoruba describes two senses of identity, one that comes with given name and one 
that is associated with self redefinition or self rebirth. The two senses of identity are 
means of self understanding. The individual under the former identity is passing through 
a process of social transformation until she attains the full status of a person who can 
reconstruct her given identity.  The community plays a vital  role in this process.  The 
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individual  must  forever  be  mindful  of  the  part  that  the  community  plays  in  her  self 
definition. At this stage, the right to be introduced into the conceptual categories of the 
community meanings belongs to the individual. Right is acquired by virtue of one’s place 
in the social structure of the community. The objective of the socialization process is to 
gradually lead the individual into the mature stage where she will be able to further the 
course of self development on her own. At first, the individual is merely introduced to the 
institutions  and  practices  of  the  community.  At  a  later  stage,  she  is  tutored  on  the 
rationale of the institutions and practices. This tutorship is meant to prepare the individual 
for self achievement. The role of language in this preliminary stage is crucial. Language 
presents the particular outlook which has shaped the ways of life of the community. It is 
in language that individuals understand the various histories behind the traditions and 
practices of the community. Through language, members understand their relatedness to 
their kins and ancestors. Language is a valuable tool of identity formation in this regard. 
The  accumulation  of  the  linguistic  content  of  a  culture  does  not  happen  for  mere 
preservation  of  the  culture,  but  for  the  purpose  of  acquainting  the  individual  with 
practical reason which will aid her understanding about the distance between practice and 
reasonable living. The need for an indepth understanding of language is very necessary. 
This finds much emphasis in Yoruba culture because of the huge role it  plays in the 
discovery  of  private  good  and  community  good.  The  importance  of  this  training  is 
reflected in the Yoruba saying, ile ti a fi ito mo, eri ni n wo (the house that is built with 
spittle will be destroyed by dew). Furthermore, any individual who is unskillful in the 
epistemological  and  moral  traditions  with  which  matters  of  community  and personal 
import are driven is immature and can only belong to the category of the alaimo (roughly, 
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ignorant). The community is a place to argue out one’s conception of the good, and this 
conception will gain acceptance if it aligns with the image of the community self. Let us 
note that the community self as determined by the accumulated culture of the community 
is not fixed. Though this self is abstracted and depicted as the defining principle of the 
individual’s mode of being in the world, in this regard, it appears like an independent 
entity but this is not truly the case. It is not a rigid entity that defies change. It is only a 
symbol which helps individuals to understand themselves. 
But  once  the  individual  has  been  integrated  into  the  social  structure  of  the 
community,  she  is  expected  to  redefine  step  by  step  her  own identity.  As  a  mature 
member of the community, the individual stands in a dialogical relation to the community 
and  this  involves  meeting  various  obligations  ranging  from  the  ones  she  owes  the 
immediate members, extended members and non members of the community. The moral 
identity  which  reflects  her  humanity  is  contained  in  the  cultural  tradition  of  the 
community. For example, a husband and perhaps a father is morally obliged to provide 
for the needs of his household. Failure to do so implies a loss of moral identity. Yoruba 
believes that anyone who refuses to fulfill her moral obligation without any conclusive 
reasons has failed as a human being. The status of humanity will be stripped from the 
person. Yoruba will  usually refer to such person as  kii se eniyan (he is not a human 
being). But the individual is also a bearer of right as a social member of the community. 
Her right depends on the particular place which she occupies in the social structure of the 
community. Assuming a person is unable to fulfill her moral obligation for certain valid 
reasons,  she  will  be  assisted  by  other  members  of  the  society.  This  person  will 
177
legitimately recur to the society to demand the right other members of the community 
owe her. I will discuss the idea of rights further in the next section. 
Why is it that the individual conception of the good ought to be consistent with 
the cultural structure of the community? The reason is that the very idea of the good 
which the individual holds is nurtured by the cultural material of the community. The 
maintenance of the cultural meaning becomes prior in self pursuit in a similar sense that 
the  maintenance  of  the  foundation  of  a  building  is  prior  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
building.  Here,  the thinking is  not that  the individual  must  conform to the traditions 
which have been handed down over the ages, but encountering them with the aim of 
reconstructing them through deeds and thought, rethinking those ones which no longer 
meet current realities. Hallen notes, 
But  knowledge  about  traditions,  and  being  an  accurate  source  of 
information generally, need not imply that such persons are regarded as 
relatively passive repositories, sort of living libraries. It also implies being 
able to discriminate among traditions and information to choose whatever 
is particularly relevant to a situation, and being able to reason on the basis 
of  that  information,  being  able  to  apply  that  information,  so  as  to 
determine what would be the best thing to do.202    
This  is  the  expectation  from  every  individual  as  a  part  of  the  larger  community. 
Individuality is respectably demonstrated through wholesome reflection. The expectation 
for critical reflection and argumentation begins as early as possible in Yoruba society. 
Even children  are  not  spared  from this  exercise.  When a  child  is  not  demonstrating 
ingenuity in family discussions for instance, his inability to show productive reflections is 
greeted with the expression, omo eni iba jo ni a ba yo, (one would rejoice if one’s child 
resembles one). The thinking here is not intended to encourage conformism. It challenges 
202 Barry Hallen, The Good, The Bad and The Beautiful, Discourse about Values in Yoruba Culture, p. 47.
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the individual to contribute ideas which can rejuvenate the cultural material by which the 
family or the society at large conducts its affairs, that is to say she is expected to achieve 
a creative personality which is able to produce a productive life. This negates Menkiti’s 
view that the child is not considered as an individual in African belief systems.203 Yoruba 
believes  that  creative  ideas  can  bring  about  productive  relationship.204 Thus,  good 
thinking is seen as a precedent to productive action. The ultimate goal of action is to 
preserve the order and the harmony of community. 
  Individual goods differ in certain respects and sometimes the differences may 
cause  conflict  in  the  community.  When  this  occurs,  conflict  is  resolved  by  the 
consideration of the overall utility which each good can yield. Practical reason is the 
means of deciding how a consensus can be reached. The parties in dispute present their 
cases before a third party,  sometimes an institution provided by the community.  The 
Yoruba  legislative  procedure  starts  with  the  premise  that  one  individual  cannot  be 
entirely wrong while the other is entirely right. Hence, both parties are treated as suspects 
in  the  sense  that  they  are  both  right  and  wrong.  Interestingly,  the  same  position  is 
maintained at the resolution of the dispute. What underlies this conclusion is the idea that 
both parties have misunderstood the ultimate end which human beings seek in action. 
Individuals are encouraged to pursue private goods but these must be consistent with the 
overall  interest  of the members of the community. What is sought mainly in conflict 
resolution is where both parties have misunderstood the idea that the good ought to be 
determined by the overall interest of the community. Without denying the affective mood 
of  the disputants,  the adjudicator invites them to understand where their  dignity lies. 
203 See I. A. Menkiti, “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought”, in Richard A. Right, (ed.) 
African Philosophy, An Introduction, (Lanham, Md.: University Press of Americas, 1984).
204 N. K. Dzobo gives a similar idea in the essay  “The Image of Man in Africa”, in Kwasi Wiredu and 
Kwame Gyekye, (eds.,)Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies p. 131.
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Individual dignity lies in being able to transcend personal interests for the good of the 
community.  Thus,  the  umpire  reflects  on  the  arguments  of  each  party  and  carefully 
reason with the disputants about the implication of their positions on themselves and the 
community. As much as the disputants are given ample opportunities to demonstrate the 
strength of their arguments, the umpire is out to discuss the consistency of their position 
in line with the shared experience of the community. The goal is to redirect the attention 
of disputants to the ultimate end of self pursuit which is the realization of the overall 
good of the community. 
The position of these parties may bring about the restructuring of the communal 
systems. The end which every striving individual must bear in mind is communal unity 
and harmony. This is the ultimate end of being itself. Every conception of the good and 
its consequent pursuit must bear this in view. What needs to be reiterated is the fact that 
the communal traditions which stand as means of self understanding is not fixed. This is 
why  critical  reasoning  can  take  place  within  such  a  system.  The  inhabitants  of  the 
community structured roles are interpreters of the social foundation which determines 
their moral obligations and rights. The only important character which every member is 
expected to demonstrate is respect for other people’s views and ways of being. This is 
why the harmony sought is reached without confrontation. This is the difference between 
the traditional  individual  whose ultimate good is  not  separated from the good of the 
community and the modern individual who is chiefly concerned with atomic good. But 
how  fulfilled  is  the  individual  who  leads  her  life  by  the  overall  interest  of  the 
community? This will take us to the last discussion in this section.
Detachment and Self Achievement
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One of the important presuppositions of Yoruba is that the human person is the 
most valuable thing in life. And one important way in which the respect for human value 
is  demonstrated  in  the  Yoruba  worldview  is  by  entertaining  the  individual’s  inner 
consciousness  which  contains  her  perceptions,  interpretations  and  feelings  about  the 
external  world.  But  what  will  likely  strike  the  modern  mind  is  how  a  life  that  is 
supposedly treasured can be so entrenched in the good of the community? The agenda of 
the modern economic person attests to the fact that her concern for the community is only 
little.  The pursuit of private interests dominates her thinking. This is the result of the 
thinking that self actualization comes from an unwavering commitment to personal goals. 
To the modern mind, what typifies self realization in the Yoruba context amounts to self 
loss. The value of life, the modern mind conceives, can be preserved only when it is 
within the boundary of the individual who owns it. What I mean here is better illustrated 
in the following text. 
To be human, on this view, is to be a self contained, bounded individual, a 
center of experience and will, with no essential or defining relations to 
anything or anyone outside oneself. Philosophers have labeled the self so 
regarded  as  a  subject.  To  be  human,  according  to  the  modern  way of 
thinking, is to be a subject,  a sphere of subjectivity containing its own 
experiences, opinions, feelings, and desires, where this sphere of life is 
only contingently related to anything outside itself.205    
The modern position thrives on an erroneous conception of the self. This conceives the 
self as a thing that is wholly divided. It is a unit of its own and its content is strictly 
unconnected with the content of other unitary selves. This position depicts the human 
individual as an atomic agent. Yoruba thinks differently: the self is mostly revealed in its 
intrinsic connection with other selves. To the Yoruba, the self retains the greatest value 
205 Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 108.
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and this is mostly cherished in the mode of being of the person. Being is intrinsically 
beautiful and this intrinsic nature is reflected in character. This is the idea behind the 
saying  iwa lewa  (being or life is beautiful).  Those who are alive are partaking in the 
beauty of being and the only way to demonstrate this beauty is to reflect it in character. 
This is  what the maxim  iwa lewa omo eniyan (character is  the beauty of the human 
individual) intends to convey. The Akan expresses this view thus: su nkwa na mma nsu 
adze (cry or pray for life and not for things, because it is the most important of all things). 
Because life’s value is depicted in sharing, the value of the self is best expressed through 
its social relations in the community.
The beauty of life is further reflected in its dynamism and its extensive capacity to 
contemplate  with  others’  interests.  This  capacity,  in  Yoruba  viewpoint,  reflects  the 
important nature of the self. The prompt of sympathetic identification with the interests of 
others  is  exerted  as  the  manifestation  of  the  true  self.  In  order  to  demonstrate  the 
worthwhile status of a human person, one needs to follow this prompt. Hence, the saying 
iwa rere ni eso eniyan (good character is the value of the human person). The good life is 
one that is founded on the dynamics of being. This kind of life works towards wholeness 
and synthesis.206 The development of this life, in Wiredu’s view, leads to a possession of 
the “frame of mind which facilitates the mind’s ability to contemplate with equanimity 
the possible abridgment of one’s own interests in deference to the interests of others”.207 
Not until an individual has developed this mind, it will be difficult to lead an authentic 
life, pursuing those things which are worthwhile. Contrary to seeking the good life in 
pure  personal  interests,  the  realization  of  the  good life  is  believed  to  be  entailed  in 
206 N. K. Dzobo, “Values in a Changing Society Man, Ancestors and God”, in (eds.,) Kwasi Wiredu and 
Kwame Gyekye, Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, p. 227. 
207 Quoted from Peter H. Coetzee, “Particularity in Morality and its Relation to Community”, p. 282.
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detachment from private interests. This ideal finds justification in the conception of emi 
as a dynamic life  force which works towards wholeness and creative development.208 
Although the idea of authenticity involves turning inward, discovering what lies within 
one and truly expressing it, the authentic life for Yoruba is more than just having a clear 
focus about what one wants to achieve for oneself as one participates in the society. This 
shows  certain  remarkable  difference  with  the  modern  conception  of  authenticity. 
Authenticity in the modern sense involves having a well calculated focus, which aids one 
to participate in public affairs with a degree of courage. In this  sense, authenticity is 
considered  a  virtue  that  is  predominantly  concerned  with  personal  fulfillment.  The 
motivation for being authentic is mainly to be true to oneself in one’s actions and living 
in line with one’s feelings, desires and belief. Inevitably, the authentic life becomes a 
kind of life that sets issues of personal interests as the topmost in self realization. Yoruba 
maintains  a  different  approach  in  the  notion  of  the  authentic  life.  The  need  for  the 
individual to consider her inmost worth in order to lead the authentic life is regarded as 
crucial but the authentic person will focus on those things which only are worthwhile. 
One  may  want  to  know  how  anyone  could  determine  the  kind  of  things  that  are 
worthwhile. This is by reflecting on one’s way of life and dwelling on those things which 
will contribute positively to the social whole.         
Yoruba describes the self not in isolation. The kind of subjective awareness which 
is instantiated singularly and distanced from everything else because they are external is 
foreign  to  Yoruba  ideology.  Since  the  basis  of  self  awareness  is  the  non  divisible, 
unifying  substance,  the  social  orientation  characteristically  referred  to  as  the  ‘we 
orientation’ plays a significant role in self definition. The moral space of Yoruba self 
208 N. K. Dzobo, “Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God”, p. 227.
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extends to the whole of creation and the person must readily cultivate this profound space 
in  order  to  appreciate  her  moral  identity.  The  whole  of  creation  is  included  in  this 
extensive process. Human beings are respected as the only creatures having the dynamic 
consciousness  which  could preserve  the unity  of  all  creation,  hence  they  occupy the 
center  position  in  the  scheme  of  things  in  the  universe.  Individual  members  of  the 
community are deeply respected and treasured more than every other elements of nature 
because they are capable of exercising the virtue of ‘consent’. Individuals are able to 
preserve it where it is found and have the capacity to create the condition that will make 
it  to  occur  where it  is  absent.209 Yoruba elevates  this  virtue simply because it  is  the 
essential feature of our humanity. The true mark of humanity is revealed firstly in the 
ability to reach consent in the midst of varied notions of the good. Our dignified nature 
shows forth  when we respect  the free  nature  of  others.  Yoruba  says  eniyan laso mi  
(human  beings  are  my  clothing),  and  this  implies  that  human  beings  who  have  the 
capacity for reflective thinking are best of all acquaintances. Money, status, properties 
etc. cannot fill the part that the person occupies at any time. Hence, the individuals are to 
be treasured above everything else. The need to seek the development of each individual 
in the community is thus prior in view of the interrelatedness of each member of the 
community.  Dzobo  mentions  that  the  awareness  of  this  mutual  interrelatedness  as 
stemming from the vital force leads to the perspective of the individuals’ sense of life 
mission with the mission of the others in the community. 
This awareness is responsible for the unique indigenous social orientation 
which may be characterized as the “we- orientation.” In the we orientation 
life is comprehended not from the perspective of ‘I’ or ‘they’ alone, but 
from that of both which unite to become ‘we’. This ‘we’ comprehension 
209 I borrow the term ‘consent’ from Weil who uses the same to express human ability to form a 
constitutional democracy. 
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of  life  is  given  expression  in  various  forms  of  speech,  greeting  and 
action.210 
The ‘we’ orientation characterizes our moral identity from the perspective of the essence 
of all. This essence is the essence of the universal consciousness. The consciousness of 
one’s individuality in it is not entirely taken to be a separable entity. In this thinking, the 
ultimate  purpose  of  life  is  construed  from  the  standpoint  of  one’s  responsibility  to 
humanity and the entire universe. What does this suggest? It suggests that the will to be is 
the  will  to  employ  the  dynamics  of  being  for  the  proper  development  of  the  entire 
universe. This is the picture of Yoruba individual. This is the picture of humanity as 
driven by the ultimate purpose for living.    
In Yoruba philosophy, the society is never viewed as a collection of individuals 
without ultimate purpose. Individuals are not just thrown into the world: every person 
comes  with  a  sense  of  mission  and  the  end  of  every  individual  mission  is  to  be 
cooperatively  worked  out  in  the  community.  Individuality  is  rated  according  to  the 
response of the collective consciousness which makes each person to seek the others’ 
development. It is interesting to note that the idea of the social individual occupies the 
center  of  discussion  in  the  medieval  period  where  the  term  individual  means 
‘inseparable’.211 This idea is generally used to define any individual in relation to the 
characteristics she shares with a group. The group identity of the individual is not thought 
to demean the autonomous identity of the particular individual in question because the 
idea of autonomy itself finds meaning in the group. This idea continues to be cherished in 
the works of Rousseau, Hegel, Bosanquet and others. In  Ethical Studies, Bradley, for 
210 N. K. Dzobo, “Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God”, p. 229.
211 John D. Greenwood, “Individualism and Collectivism in Moral and Social Thought” in (eds.,) Kim-
Chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan and C. L. Ten, The Moral Circle and the Self Chinese and Western 
Approaches, p. 168.
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example, argues that the individual is little, if anything, apart from the intellectual and 
moral  membership  in  society  and  the  community  of  values.  He  holds  that  “the 
‘individual’ apart from the community is an abstraction. It is not anything real”.212 These 
philosophers  see  the  community  as  a  need  in  that  it  is  the  vital  force  upon  which 
individuals are to seek moral development and sense of life mission.
We may now consider one important issue that this social theory will need to 
attend to in order to escape certain challenges which may be brought against it. This is 
related to  the  kind of  group that  the individual  will  need to  direct  her  affection and 
whether this  will  be at  the expense of  other  groups.  Since groups are  constituted by 
different ideologies and beliefs, the individual may be defined by one and not all of these 
group beliefs. How is she going to treat or relate with all the other groups? Must she see 
herself as bound in her own social group and other groups should be seen as non-member 
groups? So, if the others are not regarded as members, then it will be justified not to take 
sufficient  care  of  their  interests?  This  problem only occurs  when a  group identity  is 
accounted to be complete. This point has been earlier critiqued as inaccurate. This same 
idea engenders the belief that the constitutive consciousness of a particular community 
exhausts  the  identity  of  the  individual.  Once  this  position  is  maintained,  the  group 
identity is fixed and it becomes the false criteria by which individuality is measured. The 
guiding principle that defines individuality in Yoruba philosophy does not limit identity 
to  any  particular  group.  The  basis  for  the  discovery  of  any  group  identity  is  the 
consistency of its principles with universal principle. This does not mean that the cultural 
structures of all communities must follow the same pattern categorized as the universal 
212 Cited in William Sweet, “‘Absolute Idealism’ and Finite Individuality”, Indian Philosophical Quarterly,  
xxiv, no. 4 (1997): 433.
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pattern, but that none of the contents of these different cultural structures must threaten 
the existence of other individuals as well as other groups. The saying bi a se n se nile yi  
eewo ile miran (what we take to be our manner of life in this land may be forbidden in 
other land) testifies to the Yoruba belief in diversity. 
In order to attain the self,  the person should learn how not  to be emotionally 
attached to any group to the extent that its moral affiliation with other groups becomes 
blurred. We are all,  on the overall basis, human beings. Our reality is compared to a 
single ocean that flows in different directions. This idea is represented in the saying omi 
leniyan.  What  Yoruba  wants  to  illustrate  with  this  is  that  we  should  attend  to  our 
differences with a kind of openness and, in no time, we shall be able to find the rationale 
for other ways of life and we can adopt, at any time, those ones that we are pleased with. 
Following this belief, Yoruba does not set any rigid identification which is limited to any 
particular cultural  structure as the ultimate determination of individuality.213 Although 
one is not asked to pay less respect to the cultural community one belongs to, one is 
expected to sustain her culture as long as one can but there is no shame or humiliation in 
escaping one’s group in order to take on the identity of others. The respect of Yoruba for 
the non members of  any particular  cultural  community is  further revealed in Yoruba 
conception of hospitality. Before any Yoruba person enters into the house of her neighbor 
she will say mo ki onile ati alejo kin to wole (I greet owners of the house and strangers 
before entering). The same respect that is given to members of that community is given to 
213 The importance of an ‘other’ in Yoruba notion of the self features in the work of an African-American 
writer James Baldwin in his presentation in the 1987 New York City exhibition. Baldwin discusses, in his 
piece labeled Yoruba Man with a Bicycle, the mutual interactions which exist between forces of different 
categories makes it possible for the individual to have a deeper sense of self. His piece, according to 
Richard H. Bell, describes “the integrative and accommodative way in which African culture expresses 
itself”. See James Baldwin, “Fifth Avenue, Uptown”. Esquire, June 1960, reprinted in The Price of the 
Ticket, (New York: St Martins Press, 1985).
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non members. However, because affection for people that one has been living with and 
from whom one has  received  treatment  of  love and charity  often grows  deeper  than 
someone that one is not in constant interaction with, the object of moral concern that is 
intended to be channeled towards the whole race of humankind is to start from one’s 
immediate  group and gradually  extend to  others  in  the  degree  of  their  nearness  and 
similarities. The idea behind this kind of belief can be illustrated in the following,
What matters in the end for any person is what his or her psychologically 
potent social group prescribes as its object of moral concern, and the only 
way to promote the expansion of that object beyond the confines of the 
membership of any social group is to work for its expansion from within 
that social  group.  This  suggests  that  if  you want  to promote universal 
concern and fellowship, don’t aim for the world brother-and sisterhood or 
the  society  of  nations.  Aim  rather  to  persuade  your  families,  friends, 
colleagues, or co-religionists, and co-politicals to extend the boundaries of 
heir moral concern. There does not appear to be any other way, East or 
West.214  





When  …  we  meet  those  whose  conduct  and  professed  beliefs  are 
markedly  different  from  ours,  our  own  accustomed  standards  are 
challenged, and we become concerned. In our irritated reaction we may 
turn away in loathing or try to exterminate the strange abomination. But 
when a regime of outer toleration of differences is established, men must 
intellectually adjust themselves in some way.215
The merit of Yoruba communitarianism consists in its reliance on the original knowledge 
which enables us to understand ourselves as we are partly constituted by our various 
cultural traditions. But, the original knowledge is markedly interesting as it defines us 
beyond the purview of our cultural traditions. This knowledge is espoused in a peculiarly 
striking  dimension  that  shows  that  the  human  capacity  for  choice  goes  beyond  any 
cultural boundary. The depth of this human nature is so deep that it sees human moral 
capacity beyond any group interests. On the one hand, Yoruba establishes the freedom of 
the individual,  and surely this  springs from the conception of  the freedom of human 
nature, that is, as something that is not bound or subject to any preconceived ways of life. 
More importantly, the tradition presupposes that once an individual deliberates on her 
real  identity,  at  least  from  a  careful  and  well  considered  reasoning,  taken  the  best 
alternative way of life that ought to characterize the person, she begins to see that she is 
not enclosed within any particular community. Here lies another merit of the philosophy, 
its advocacy gives important recognition to tolerance. Entailed in the original knowledge 
is the idea of our essence as something that is inextricably webbed with the self of all. 
This enhances the knowledge of our identity in two inseparable dimensions, one of which 
215 Richard Kroner, Culture and Faith, (Santa Barbara: The University of California Press, 1949), p. ix, as 
quoted in K. C. Anyanwu, The African Experience in the American Market Place, (USA: Exposition Press 
Inc., 1983) p. 23.
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is  our  essential  connectedness  and  the  other  is  our  differential  identities.  The 
intensification of the original knowledge has a crucial positive effect on human social 
consciousness. The individual realizes first and foremost that she has the all engulfing 
consciousness in her and next that this engulfing consciousness defines who she is in 
relation to some particular contexts. Here, one’s peculiar mode of being is grasped as a 
means of self understanding, i.e. understanding one’s life in comparison with others. One 
lives her life not in isolation; one becomes involved in what Dzobo refers to as the ‘we 
orientation’. But, this progression is not into a kind of fusion where differences are lost or 
marginalized  but  a  kind  of  interface  where  differences  become  the  medium  of 
apprehending our real self. We live in accordance with our mode of being and at the same 
time appreciate the others’ ways of being. We are armed with the tolerant attitude which 
is willing to learn from these others. We assimilate the first principle which presupposes 
that the fundamental reason for self development is harmony and progress. This is the 
African mind, the foundation of the thinking ‘I am because we are’.216 We realize that life 
is incomplete except in the life of our fellow brothers and sisters worldwide. This is the 
anchor on which Yoruba communitarianism hangs. 
There is an increasing doubt as to whether this kind of philosophy can stand as a 
secure base for human unity. Topmost on the list of challenges facing this position is how 
it can protect individuals’ rights. Again, topmost on the list of rights is the right to choose 
one’s life.  This must never be curtailed,  else the liberty of the person is  vitiated, the 
argument suggests. We understand here that the choice of one’s life is essentially private, 
even the common values that prevail in the community are external in the understanding 
of one’s life.  This claim has been interpreted to mean that the life  that people share 
216 John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, p. 108.
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together  and  the  values  by  which  they  identify  themselves  as  human  beings  are 
insignificant in the exposition of human nature. This nature is essentially characterized 
with freedom and each person has the privilege to choose her own life the way she likes. 
Something is fundamentally wrong with unchosen lives, this position assumes. This is an 
insistence  on  individualism.  This  emphasis  gains  momentum from the  halting  of  the 
engulfing or the all pervasive nature of the self. Here, the vital force which binds us into a 
universal community is overlooked, the false self with its notably assuming character (the 
flagrant attitude to control and marginalize other faces of the self) is uplifted as the real 
self.217 However, Yoruba philosophy claims that this results from aimo (ignorance) about 
the nature of the individual.  Aimo makes us lose the insight into the core of our own 
nature. It makes us to forget, on the one hand, the importance of the cultural materials 
which identify us as we are in the community and, on the other hand, help us to know that 
the different ways of being in the world actually summon us to an adventure where we 
find out, ultimately, that our ultimate identity is not limited to any cultural tradition. This 
is the core of Yoruba philosophy and this explains why Yoruba defends a unitary view of 
reality.218 In  this  last  section,  we  shall  explore  Yoruba  conception  of  duality  as  it 
facilitates the philosophical discussion of alterity. The idea of rights will be discussed in 
relation to Yoruba conception of human dignity. Three important subjects will attract our 
attention, namely, analysis of  aimo (ignorance), self dignity: rights and the communal 
217 The false self is characterized with fear, anxiety, anguish etc. According to C. Solomon, this experience 
is developed from frustrations about the self’s inertia. Solomon remarks that peculiar experience of suicide 
is an attempt to point to the frustration of the self that lacks the vital force. Suicide in this instance may not 
necessarily imply dwelling in any relationship, which is, of course, close to death but that “the ego, rightly 
or wrongly, is felt to be an extremely dangerous, dubious and doomed germ of nature; that he is always in 
his own eyes exposed to an extraordinary risk, as though he stood with the slightest foothold on the peak of 
a crag whence a slight push from without or an instant’s weakness from within suffices to precipitate him 
into the void”. See C. Solomon, Existentialism, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 
109.
218 See K. C. Anyanwu, The African Experience in the American Market Place, p. 25.
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structure and being in the world.        
Analysis of Aimo (Ignorance)
The term aimo has two interrelated meanings, one epistemic, the other moral. In 
the  epistemic  sense,  it  is  roughly  rendered  ‘ignorance’.  Aimo is  derived  from  two 
compound words, ai and mo. Ai is usually used as a negation, for example, ailoye means 
‘not having wisdom’. Literally, mo means ‘to know’. When thus used, it usually refers to 
someone who knows something. For example, emi nikan ni mo mo ero okan mi (I am the 
only one who knows my inner thought). Following this usage, aimo is used to negate a 
knowledge claim. This, we should mention, is different from negating knowledge itself.219 
The Yoruba word for knowledge is imo. Imo can never be negated for that will imply the 
negation of  emi  (self) which is the subject of awareness in the individual.  Emi  is that 
which knows and its cognition is true independently of what the state of affairs happens 
to be. Aimo does not stand for lack of knowledge. So, it should be understood differently 
from the English term, ignorance. When articulated correctly,  aimo refers to a kind of 
knowledge, but this knowledge cannot be verified publicly. Strictly speaking, imo is used 
in Yoruba language to refer to the subjective awareness of the individual. My inmost 
awareness about myself, for example, will ever remain my imo even if the conditions in 
the  objective  world  oppose  it.  Hallen  describes  imo as  firsthand  knowledge.220 He 
contrasts imo with igbagbo (putative belief) which is secondhand knowledge. Igbagbo is 
derived from the root words  igba and gbo.  Igba means ‘time’ but when it is written as 
219 See a varied understanding of aimo in J. A Isola Bewaji, “Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture”, in 
Kwasi Wiredu, (ed.) A Companion to African Philosophy, p. 400. The author is more interested in the 
ethical and social implication of aimo on the individual and the community. Our positions are similar in 
this regard. However, I share a different view with his claim that aimo is used by the Yoruba in the same 
way that ignorance is used in the English language.  
220 Barry Hallen, “Yoruba Moral Epistemology” in Kwasi Wiredu, (ed.) A Companion to African 
Philosophy, pp. 298-300.
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gba  it means ‘receive’.  Gbo  means ‘heard’.  Igbagbo then stands for knowledge that is 
received in some time or context and from some sources other than one’s immediate imo. 
The trustworthiness of igbagbo depends on the sources of its origin. When that which we 
gbagbo (believe) cannot be validated objectively, it is rejected and counted as false. We 
need to note that igbagbo needs objective validation to gain the status of objective truth 
whereas imo is ever true to the knower. But when imo is communicated, it needs to be 
proved for then it has come to the public domain. If found wanting in the sense that it 
does not acquaint with reality as understood in the community, it will be classified as 
aimo. The imo (knowledge) is that of the individual herself. No one can claim that what 
she knows in her immediate consciousness is untrue. But, for the community, it is false 
and cannot be categorized under  igbagbo.  All  the informal education that individuals 
receive prior to their mature stage is categorized under igbagbo. 
The distinction made in Yoruba-language culture between “imo” (putative 
“knowledge”) and “igbagbo” (putative “belief”) reflects a similar concern 
about  the evidential  status  of  firsthand versus  secondhand information. 
Persons are said to “mo” (to “know”) or to have “imo” (knowledge”) only 
of experience they have witnessed in a firsthand or personal manner … 
“imo” is said to apply to sensory perception generally, even what may be 
experienced  directly  by  touch  is  more  limited  than  is  the  case  with 
perception.  “Imo”  implies  a  good  deal  more  than  mere  sensation,  of 
course.  Perception  implies  cognition  as  well,  meaning  that  persons 
concerned must comprehend that and what they are experiencing.221   
It is not the case that the individual who operates under aimo does not know that 
she is aware of something but the interpretation she gives to the awareness does not 
correspond to what is objectively taken as truth. When the claim associated with imo is 
verified and confirmed to be false the Yoruba does not categorize the awareness itself as 
221 Barry Hallen, The Good, The Bad and The Beautiful, Discourse about Values in Yoruba Culture, p. 15.
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false.  However,  the  content  of  the  awareness  which  could  have  become  igbagbo is 
notably rejected. Hallen puts it thus,
In  other  words,  we  both  may  have  witnessed  the  same event,  making 
whatever we saw  imo and  ooto  for each of us individually. But when it 
comes to agreeing that we saw the ‘same’ thing, that agreement amounts 
to igbagbo222.  
As indicated in the above passage, while the imo (knowledge) and ooto (truth) of the two 
individuals are not the same, their  igbagbo may be the same. Here,  imo refers to the 
content of awareness whereas ooto (truth) refers to the different individuals’ perceptions 
of the scene. What is beyond dispute to the two individuals is the fact  that they saw 
something which upon further probing corresponds to something that we have named so 
and so in the community.  This  knowledge is  categorized as  igbagbo.  Igbagbo is  not 
absolutely true: it  may eventually turn out to be false. A similar idea is illustrated in 
Wiredu’s discussion of truth. 
Whatever  is  called  the  truth  is  also  someone’s  truth.  For  a  piece  of 
appellation to be awarded the appellation “true”, it must be discovered by, 
known  by,  defended  by,  human  beings  somewhere,  sometime. 
Furthermore, what human beings defend as being “true” can prove to be 
false. Therefore whatever is called “truth” is more accurately described as 
opinion.223
Once the  imo  of an individual is communicated, it  becomes  igbagbo for others. That 
which is imo for a person is igbagbo for another person and not until the imo is carefully 
verified and found to be true, its degree of truth remains low.  Igbagbo cannot gain the 
status of absolute truth. Hallen writes,
What makes it different from the English-language “believe” and “belief” 
is that igbagbo applies to everything that may be construed as secondhand 
222 Ibid, p. 26.
223 Cited in Ibid, p. 27.
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information. This would apply to most of what in English language culture 
is regarded as propositional knowledge: the things one is taught in the 
course of  a  formal  education,  what  one  learns  from books,  from other 
people, and, of particular interest in the special case of the Yoruba, from 
oral  traditions.  Whereas  English-language  culture  decrees  that 
propositional or secondhand information, since classified as “knowledge,” 
should be accepted as true, Yoruba usage is equally insistent that since 
classified as igbagbo (putative belief), it can be accepted as possible (o se 
e se).224
Imo is the only certain knowledge and it is certain only to the knower. It is important that 
we note that though Yoruba philosophy acknowledges the fact that individuals do have 
certain knowledge of their inner awareness, the philosophy goes further to point out that 
the knowledge that is derived from firsthand information (imo) can be verified by public 
criteria and perhaps modified in the light of more convincing evidences. The worth of the 
individual lies in her ability to appreciate other people’s view and adjust  to the most 
compelling position which serves the interest of the community better. 225 This is contrary 
to the individualist position which makes individual’s knowledge primary at the expense 
of public knowledge. In Yoruba worldview, the important virtue which human beings 
need to demonstrate is consent. Human relation is thus inclined to follow a cooperative 
model where each person needs to “listen attentively and tirelessly; to pick up the essence 
of each word spoken; to observe every look, every gesture, every silence; to grasp their 
224 Ibid, p. 16.
225 Hallen’s study of the Yoruba concepts of imo (firsthand knowledge) and igbagbo (second hand 
knowledge) yields the important criteria for exemplifying the humane nature in Yoruba society. Hallen 
identifies four important positive behavioral values that the Yoruba count to be significant in the moral 
identity of the human person. Hallen says, “with specific reference to moral epistemology, at least four 
positive behavioral values are emphasized: (1) being scrupulous about the epistemological basis for being a 
good listener, with the emphasis upon cognitive understanding rather than a polite respectful demeanor: (3) 
being a good speaker, with the emphasis upon speaking in a positive, thoughtful, and perceptive manner 
rather than merely having beautiful elocution: (4) having patience, with the emphasis upon being calm and 
self-controlled in judgement and intellect rather than merely in manner and demeanor”. Barry Hallen, 
“Yoruba Moral Epistemology” in (ed.) Kwasi Wiredu, A Companion to African Philosophy, p. 302.   
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respective significance … and to elaborate … arguments to counter … unjust positions 
and/or to re-affirm or reinforce correct positions”.226 
 Implied in Yoruba philosophy is the thinking that the individual is herself and not 
another person when she apprehends and articulates that which is given to her in her 
subjective consciousness. However, Yoruba maintains that the firsthand knowledge of the 
individual needs to be explored with others and not until the point of commonality is 
reached, the knowledge is trivial. Part of why this is so has been explained earlier on. The 
idea that is being expressed in Yoruba position is that the individual is a social individual. 
Hence, no single individual can claim to have the imaginative capacity upon which the 
whole community is to be guided. The moral ideology by which the community is to be 
orchestrated is to be reached by dialogue and this is why once an imo is communicated, it 
becomes  igbagbo,  i.e.  something that needs to be deliberated upon. A similar idea is 
expressed in Dewey’s construction of the community. 
Community is  created by and consists  in  communication.  “Society  not 
only continues to  exist  by transmission,  by communication,  but  it  may 
fairly be said to exist  in  transmission,  in  communication. There is more 
than  a  verbal  tie  between  the  words  common,  community,  and 
communication. Men live in a community by virtue of the things which 
they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come 
to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to 
form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge-a 
common understanding like-mindedness as the sociologists say”.227  
From  Yoruba  position,  we  see  a  conception  of  authenticity  from  its  social 
perspective,  a  remarkable  blend  between  the  traditional  and  modern  views  of 
226 See E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, “Experience of Democracy in Africa: Reflections on Practices of 
Communalistic Palaver as a Social Method of Resolving Contradictions among the People”. An 
Unpublished paper presented in the Department of Theory and History of State Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 17 May 1985, p. 31.
227 Cited in Daniel M. Savage, John Dewey’s Liberalism Individual, Community, and Self-Development, p. 
34.
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authenticity.  In  the  latter  context,  one  is  guided  by  the  social  experience  of  the 
community and the life that one leads become acceptable only when it is in accordance 
with some laid down traditions. But, in this context, the choice of the authentic life takes 
an  outlook  in  which  one’s  responsibility  to  others  and  the  choice  of  life  becomes 
fundamental.  As  much  as  it  is  important  for  the  individual  to  take  note  of  the 
circumstances of her birth, local community and status in that community, she is also 
responsible for discovering the alternatives that are presented to her in the world. These 
will enable her to have a profound insight into her own interests, desires and needs. To 
Yoruba, the position which gives primacy to the awareness of the individual as a subject 
over the awareness of the community fails to apprehend the essential nature of human 
sociability. It erroneously conceives the individual as an absolute and this conception is 
self defeated as it does not take into account the fact that the individual’s disposition to 
lead  the  good  life  is  socially  determined.  Although  it  is  not  being  denied  that  the 
individual needs to choose among the many goods available in the community-she can 
even transcend these goods-yet in all of this, the individual’s conception of the good is 
not entirely independent of the community. Yoruba position acknowledges the important 
presence of the community without submerging the individual within its social world. 
Firstly, it shows that the knowledge of the good is only as apprehended by the individual. 
Secondly, it agrees that the body of knowledge which constitutes the cultural tradition of 
the community belongs to the domain of igbagbo. Thirdly, it categorizes all the informal 
training which the individual acquires from sources such as parents, family and the larger 
community under igbagbo. This shows the status of the individual within the community. 
The individual that understands her cultural tradition as something to be gbagbo will be 
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able to come to terms with the fact that the tradition is a kind of cultural material which is 
necessary for self construction. Though the knowledge of the good may be contained in 
the individual’s imo, the significance of this good is determined by consensus. Once an 
individual’s  imo is  communicated  and  it  denies  the  agreed  moral  identity  and  by 
implication violating social identity, it cannot become igbagbo. However, individuals are 
able to engage the cultural tradition by proposing the varied ideas of the good that can 
better serve the overall interests of the members of the community. Yoruba philosophy 
accords significant respect to every experience regardless of its background. Each family 
group, religious and ethnic identities come together to share their  imo so as to reach 
consensus on the good of the community. 
The central point of Yoruba philosophy is that individuals have certain essential 
attributes which are not created by the community. The capacity for choice is not created 
by the community;  neither  is  the essence of  the individual’s  rationality  made by the 
community. The community only discovers and nurtures them. In return, the individual is 
morally responsible for the continuity of the community. 
Self Dignity: Rights and the Communal Structure
How does Yoruba espouse the concept of human dignity?  I raise this question 
because of the important connection that it  has with the concept of individual rights. 
Rights belong to the individual. A right is necessarily the right of some individual. This 
idea ought to be given due regard in political philosophy because the respect for human 
dignity entails the respect for his rights. Rights, Rawls wants us to see, are associated 
with individual’s nature i.e. someone whose intrinsic worth stems from the capacity for 
moral autonomy. This capacity defines the individual as someone who is free from the 
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social particularities of the community. Immanuel Kant identifies this capacity as what 
makes the individual an end and not a means to be used arbitrarily by some external will. 
In  Yoruba  philosophy,  human worth is  exemplified in  the ability  to  consider  others’ 
interests alongside one’s personal interests. Yoruba position thinks that the conception of 
rights on individualistic basis does not articulate the proper meaning of human dignity. 
The individual’s conception of the good can only be validated by the common 
good of the community, Yoruba observes. The good of the individual is linked with the 
good of the community but there is no community that could legitimately be referred to 
as an independent entity except the one jointly defined by the shared understanding of the 
participating members of the community.228 What is implied here is that the community 
has no rigid independent structure which articulates the natural rights of individuals prior 
to their shared agreement to form the community. Hence, rights are construed in such a 
way that  allows for  membership participation in  decision procedures  that  affect  their 
lives.  This  gives  members  the privilege  to  redefine their  rights  in  light  of  their  new 
awareness and the statuses of each group in the community. Rights are acquired by virtue 
of the position that one occupies in the group. Whereas this conception of rights allows 
the flourishing of the moral virtues of love and compassion because they are taken as 
‘intrinsic  to  satisfactory  moral  practice  in  the  Yoruba  communitarian  society’,  it  is 
difficult for such values to develop in the individualist rights-based society. Bell explains 
why it is difficult to cultivate these virtues in the following,
There are no obligations to be kind or generous or compassionate-though 
the liberal ideas of fairness and equality may provide some motivation for 
generosity and charity. For example, if a friend is being mugged, I may 
believe it is the right course of action, morally, to intervene and prevent or 
228 Kwame Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought” in Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, 
(eds.,) Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, p. 105. 
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stop the mugging. But, on a “right based” liberal view moral ambiguity 
creeps in. There is no intrinsic “right” that a person be helped, and there is 
no “positive” right that obligates me to help. Or if I see poverty, I am 
under no obligation to be generous. Because my notion of a good and any 
life-plan I may have to realize the good may be different from yours and 
everyone else’s goods and plans, I am in no way compelled to agree with 
your course of action. I may criticize your good and your plan, but I will 
be  inclined  not  to  choose  to  interfere  so  that  I  do  not  invite  your 
interference with my good and plan. You can see the easy slide into moral 
relativism or moral neutrality.229  
To Yoruba, the idea of self liberty which is espoused in the individualist rights-based 
society lacks the essential virtues that it needs to acquire the human face. Though Yoruba 
approves the need to choose our lives because the capacity for choice is our essential 
nature, this essence of life must be maintained for our humanity to remain progressive. 
Moreover, it is this capacity that really makes us demonstrate our real worth. However, 
when we grasp our inmost self as that which is essentially connected with those of the 
others, the focus on our personal interests begins to decrease and the compassion and 
love for others heighten in us. In other words, the confinement of natural  right to an 
individualistic  category demeans human nature,  Yoruba holds.  On this  basis,  Yoruba 
philosophy finds it more appropriate to explicate right as a moral concept rather than a 
legal concept. Contrary to the conception of right as a legal concept, the moral conception 
of right lays emphasis not on its individualistic tone but the communal tone. From the 
moral perspective, the spirit of truth and love gains pre-eminence in the exercise of rights. 
Here, the individual pursues her rights with the intention of preserving the bond of unity 
which exists  between people  sharing their  lives  together.  Weil  distinguishes  between 
right as a legal concept and right as a moral concept.
229 Richard H. Bell, Understanding African Philosophy, A Cross Cultural Approach to Classical and 
Contemporary Issues, p, 71.
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The notion of rights is linked with the notion of sharing out, of exchange, 
of measured quantity. It has a commercial flavor, essentially evocative of 
legal  claims  and  arguments.  Rights  are  always  asserted  in  a  tone  of 
contention; and when this tone is adopted, it must rely upon force in the 
background, or else it will be laughed at. Justice consists in seeing that no 
harm is done to men … [it is associated with the cry] “why am I being 
hurt?”. The other cry, which we hear so often: “why has somebody else 
got  more  than  I  have”,  refers  to  rights.  We must  learn  to  distinguish 
between the two cries and to do all that is possible, as gently as possible, 
to  hush  the  second  one,  with  the  help  of  a  code  of  justice,  regular 
tribunals, and the police. Minds capable of solving problems of this kind 
can be formed in law school. But the cry “why am I being hurt?” raises 
quite different problems, for which the spirit of truth, justice, and love is 
indispensable. The spirit of justice and truth is nothing else but a certain 
kind of attention which is pure love.230
In Weil, we see right as a restorative tool. In a similar vein, Yoruba construes right as a 
restitutive tool of justice. Rights, Yoruba believes, needs to be exercised in the spirit of 
truth and love. This is the essence of human dignity. It entails that each individual in the 
community is accepted and valued as he or she is (see the example of this in the myth of 
Iwa below). Yoruba position regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on 
sharing and co-responsibility, and mutual enjoyment of rights by all in accordance with 
their positions in the community.  In Weil’s as well as in Yoruba views, the obligation to 
participate in the common tasks of the public value takes precedence over right.231 
What obtains in Yoruba philosophy is that rights as acquired from the community 
ought to be utilized as a corrective and restorative moral tool. One point to be noted is 
that this idea of rights recognizes the fact that people can refuse to fulfill their duties in 
the  community.  When this  happens,  it  becomes  legitimate  for  the  members  that  are 
affected to demand their rights. Yet, the ultimate goal that is entailed in the pursuit of 
230 Quoted from Richard H Bell, Understanding African Philosophy A Cross-Cultural Approach to  
Classical and Contemporary Issues, p. 68
231 Ibid.
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one’s right is to correct the defaulter and restore her to the community. The importance of 
restoring the errant individual back into the humanity threshold is highlighted by the 
saying omo eni o ki n buru titi ka fi fun ekun paje (one child cannot be so bad that we 
give her to the tiger to devour). Along this line of thinking, Yoruba does not see the need 
to encourage individuals to insist  on their  rights.  The ultimate reason for living is to 
create harmonious and productive relationships. Members of the community owe one 
another the duty to preserve themselves. It is possible to raise an objection against the 
Yoruba position saying that the modern world cannot be ordered with such an idealistic 
or simplistic paradigm.232 But this argument suffers in view of the fact that the modern 
world is also governed by certain ideological construction of the self. As a matter of fact, 
the modern ideology lacks credit in terms of its ability to organize the inner aspirations of 
both individuals and the community. This communitarian model, on the other hand, fares 
better because it gives a better account that allows individuals to actualize their potentials 
and  at  the  same  time  preserve  the  community  as  an  utmost  need.  Yoruba 
communitarianism presupposes  that  when we adequately  understand ourselves  as  the 
eniyan who is capable of choosing the good that aligns with our nature, i.e. the good that 
aligns with the good of others, then we truly manifest our moral identity.                     
This is what Yoruba considers as human essential nature: we owe one another 
certain reciprocal obligations, which, when we fail to observe, our humanity comes to be 
doubted. Yoruba does not strip the identity of humanity from a person merely because 
she is hot tempered (oninu fufu), weak (alailokun), impatient (ainisuuru) etc. But if any 
individual refuses to fulfill her obligation as dictated by the place she occupies in the 
232 See Robert J. Condlin, “Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limits of a Communitarian 
Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All Just Get Along?”, University of Maryland 
School of Law, 2005, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/recent_scholarship.asp   
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structure of the community, her humanity will be subjected to doubt. At this point, the 
worth of the person is called to question and her existence is taken to be worthless i.e. 
unproductive. Gbadegesin argues:
The question, ‘What is your existence for?’ (Kini o wa fun?) is not always 
posed. It is posed when a person has been judged to be useless to his/her 
community. It is therefore a challenge, a call to serve. It presupposes a 
conception  of  human  existence  which  sees  it  as  purposeful,  and  the 
purpose is to contribute to the totality of the good in the universe. This is 
achieved  by  a  life  of  selfless  devotion  and  sacrifice  to  the  communal 
welfare.233
What is abhorred in Yoruba delineation of individuality is selfishness. Selfishness stems 
from (aimo). A selfish person is referred to as eni ti o mo tara re nikan (someone who 
knows her own good). Here, the selfish individual is not denied of knowledge (imo). She 
is construed as knowing her own good alone. The problem here is not with the good 
known by the individual but that the good does not comply with the kind of good that 
allows for the development of others’ nature. This knowledge is self destructive and the 
Yoruba is keen to urge everyone to desist from it. It demeans human dignity. As a person, 
others  should  be  able  to  share  from one’s  knowledge,  understand it,  estimate  it  and 
evaluate  it  in  line with the overall  utility  it  procures  for  the  community.  This is  the 
standard a creditable knowledge must meet. It must be productive and creative.234 The 
idea of the good that the individual will be liable to pursue will  be the one that she 
consciously articulates and rationally endorses to be the guiding principle for everyone in 
the community. For this to happen, the individual must be sure that her conception of the 
good does  not  inhibit  others’  development.  Among other  things,  the individual  must 
make sure that the pursuit of the good she embarks upon does not slight, discredit or 
233 Segun Gbadegesin, “Eniyan: The Yoruba Concept of a Person”, p. 191.
234 N. K. Dzobo, “The Image of Man in Africa,” p. 128..
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marginalize the freedom of others to do the same. This will make everyone to be mindful 
of the constitutive meaning of the community by which self understanding is structured. 
I  need  to  mention that  this  criterion  for  self  determination  is  so important  in 
Yoruba philosophy that even the first child of Olodumare (the utmost god in Yoruba 
belief) is not spared when he was found wanting. The myth, as recorded in  Ifa literary 
corpus, goes thus,
Iwa, the daughter of  suuru-the first child of  Olodumare- was married to 
Orunmila.  Iwa  was extremely beautiful,  but  lacked good behavior  and 
character.  When  Orunmila  could  no  longer  accommodate  her  bad 
disposition, he sent her packing. However, he later experienced a terrible 
plunge in his fortunes which had been made possible by Iwa’s  presence. 
He therefore decided to seek out Iwa again, even if it meant selling all his 
property. He eventually went looking for Iwa, singing the praise names of 
Iwa  along the way: “Iwa,  Iwa l’a nwa, Iwa.  Kamuragba taragbaa, Iwa;  
Iwa, l’a nwa, Iwa” etc. He got her back finally; but he (not  Iwa and her 
misbehavior) was blamed.235
The above myth depicts the need to show respect to others. Respect must be shown to our 
associates,  recognizing  and respecting  their  moral  autonomy.  In  this  passage,  Iwa is 
merely portrayed as living her life inside out and Orunmila is expected to adjust  and 
accommodate  her  and  his  failure  to  do  so  makes  him guilty.  Orunmila  is  convicted 
because he fails to respect  Iwa for who she is (mo iwa fun oniwa).236 The point is that 
individuals have the moral right to be respected as an end. The myth also stresses the 
importance of mutual understanding in cooperative association. Interestingly, the myth 
supports the pursuit of personal interest. This explains why Orunmila is not accused of 
selfish motivation when he journeys around to recover Iwa. It is obvious that he wants 
Iwa back because Iwa is the secret of his fortune. But this pursuit is not discouraged as it 
235 Cited in Segun Gbadegesin, “Individuality, Community, and the Moral Order”, pp. 304-305.
236 See Ibid.
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does not entail using Iwa as a means to an end. As an end,  Iwa needs to be loved and 
respected by Orunmila. Iwa has the right to be loved and respected. We may ask why 
Orunmila and not Iwa is the one called to adjust his lifestyle. By this, we think that it is 
legitimate for Iwa to readjust her ways of life having noted that she is the bad person. The 
concession to Orunmila’s change of attitude shows firstly, that no matter the degree of 
virtue  that  is  demonstrated  in  the  life  of  an  individual,  there  is  still  room  for 
improvement. Secondly, the position shows that the badness that is associated with any 
individual based on some personal idea of morality can be changed. Iwa may actually be 
hot  tempered,  impatient,  indiscriminate  in  the  way  she  attends  to  Orunmila  and  his 
acquaintances  but  this  does  not  make  her  essentially  bad.  A  little  patience,  an 
understanding attitude,  a display of love,  in sum, a selfless love from Orunmila may 
probably change Iwa for the better. This idea is maintained by Gbadegesin.
Agba to ni suuru, ohun gbogbo loni (The elder who has suuru (patience) 
has everything). Suuru is the source of gentle character (or Iwa pele) and 
good character (Iwa rere). A demonstration of iwa pele is to be mindful of 
the  individuality  of  others,  to  treat  them  gently,  to  be  tolerant  and 
accommodating  of  the  peculiarity  of  others’  existence.  the  Yoruba 
expression  Iwa  l’ewa depicts  their  understanding  of  existence  itself  as 
constituting beauty,  while  the cognate expression  Iwa rere leso eniyan 
(Good  character-good  existence-is  the  adornment  of  a  human  being) 
depicts the significance attached to good character.237               
  
Therefore, we understand that the kind of life we lead ought to be characterized 
by a kind of love that is not responding to the qualities that one only perceives in the 
beloved. One’s love springs from the recognition of the value of the being of the person. 
Being is valuable in its own right. Although this does not deny that there may be certain 
characteristics  of  the  beloved  which  is  notably  attractive  to  the  lover  and  perhaps 
237 Ibid, p. 304. Parenthesis is mine.
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something that  motivates their  mutual  friendship,  but  the love that  values the human 
person on the basis of intrinsic worth is to be given the ultimate place in relationships. 
This is the moral responsibility that Yoruba challenges every individual to display. The 
need  to  live  one’s  life  to  support  and  motivate  the  growth  of  those  virtues  and 
characteristics which attract one to one’s beloved is further expressed in Orunmila-Iwa 
relationships. One’s choice of love is not to be determined purely by the characteristics 
possessed by the beloved alone for the same or higher degree of such characteristics may 
be found in someone else and one will not on that basis think that it is right to substitute 
this other individual for one’s beloved. This is how the idea of rights is connected with 
the person’s moral identity in Yoruba philosophy. Rights are understood as corrective 
and preservative moral tool. Rights are exercised in order to preserve the order of the 
community  and  the  ultimate  goal  is  to  restore  any  errant  soul  to  her  specific  social 
position. This is the ultimate purpose of life, the idea behind the thinking since we are, 
therefore I am. 
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Being in the World
Unlike some of the existentialist philosophers who think that human beings are 
thrown into the world without any essential purpose, Yoruba argues that human existence 
is purposeful. If the Yoruba person is asked about why we live, the anticipated answer 
will probably be that it is to create our own story. The individual exists in the world to 
define a remarkable identity by which she shall be known forever. The stories behind the 
individual’s identity will later become some historical monument which later generations 
will use as some kind of model to define their own identity. The life that anyone lives at 
any particular generation, if it makes a very significant contribution to the world, it will 
enter into the historically extended constitutive memories which later generations will 
look up to for meaningful existence. Yoruba philosophy, like most African philosophies, 
delineates the position of humankind as oriented towards creativity. Dzobo describes this 
in a brief but interesting way,
The  individual  therefore  is  to  grow  in  the  development  of  a  creative 
personality and to develop the capacity to maintain creative relationship. 
He is to see his individual life and that of his society as fields that are 
sown with life’s experiences and which should yield fruit.238 
The ultimate purpose of life as maintained in the above passage is productivity.239 
This echoes the charge given to the Yoruba ancestors who undertake, in the beginning, 
the task of world reordering. Aramfe, we are told, enjoins his sons to make the world a 
living home.240 Specifically, Aramfe instructs that important attention must be paid to 
238 N. K. Dzobo, “The Image of Man in Africa”, p. 130.
239 The need to be productive permeates every aspect of life in the Yoruba society. For example, someone 
who deliberately refuses to procreate is considered immoral. Except in the case of infertility, the dignity of 
the human person will be stripped off from the person. The reason is because of his/her deliberate refusal to 
extend his/her family lineage.   
240 See “Ile-Ife Forum”, Encyclopedia of Myths, 2006,  http://www.mythencyclopedia.com/Ho-Iv/Ile-
Ife.html.     
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human wellness  and advancement.  This,  to  Yoruba,  is  the right  of  humankind.  Each 
person must be responsive to this moral intuition. The essence of life is sharing and our 
primary mission on earth is to live for the wellness and advancement of all individuals. It 
is very crucial that any individual who chooses not to follow suit is not fit to be called a 
human individual. The charge that Aramfe gives his sons before their departure to the 
world is as follows: 
My son, your day approaches. Far-off, the haze rests always on the outer 
waste which skirts. Our realm; beyond, a nerveless Mass lies cold 'Neath 
floods which some malign unreason heaves. Odúwa, first-born of my sons, 
to you I give the five-clawed Bird, the sand of power.  Go now, call a  
despairing  land  to  smiling  life  above  the  jealous  sea,  and found sure 
homesteads for a new race whose destiny is not the eternal life of gods. 
You are their judge; yours is the kingship, and to you all gods and men are 
subject.  Wisest  of  my sons,  Orísha,  yours  is  the grateful  task to  loose 
vague spirits waiting for the dawn—to make the race that shall be; and to 
you I give this bag of Wisdom's guarded lore and arts for man's well-
being and advancement. And you, my younger sons, the chorus and the 
dance, the voice of worship and the crafts are yours to teach—that the new 
thankful race may know the mirth of heaven and the joys of labour." Then 
Odúwa said: "Happy our life has been, and I would gladly roam these hills 
for ever, your son and servant. But to your command I yield; and in my 
kingship pride o'ersteps sorrow and heaviness.241 
Odua’s task is to develop a conducive and progressive home for humankind. Odua is the 
head of the team, accompanied by Orisha who possesses the art of wisdom. Orisha is to 
use  the  given  wisdom  to  guide  humanity  to  their  wellbeing.  From  this  preliminary 
exposition of the idea of the community, Yoruba highlights that the emergence of the 
community requires the development  of  social  cooperation among individuals  having 
different  gifts  and  talents.  The  community,  as  highlighted  above,  has  so  great  a 
differentiation and hence the need for ordering of  its  parts  is  essential.  Orisha is  the 
generic name for the deities. Here, we have no clue as to which of the deities is the point 
241 Ibid. Italics is mine. 
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of reference. However, other similar narratives give an indication that it  is Ogun and 
Odua is Obatala.242 The youngest of them all is supposed to teach the art of music so that 
the heart of humankind will be drawn to the ‘mirth’ of heaven. Each of them is equipped 
with  the  necessary  virtues  or  powers  to  accomplish  the  given  mission.  The 
intercommunication  of  functions  is  supposed  to  be  the  goal  of  each  member  of  the 
community and the ultimate function of each member is the well-being of the whole 
community rather than simply its narrow self-interest. From the context of the Yoruba 
ancestors, they are expected to maintain a team spirit  that  will ultimately lead to the 
production of a lively and progressive home, i.e.  the world. This is the image of the 
human  individual  in  the  world.  The  human  nature  is  not  an  asocial  nature,  Yoruba 
stresses. 
This is how far Yoruba will go in every account of the world and human relation 
to  it.  The important  thing to  understand is  that  human beings  are  equipped with the 
capacities to make the best possible world and that they must work together in order to 
realize  the  good.  But  whether  this  will  surely  happen  or  not  depends  on  how  the 
capacities are utilized. The blue print for the good is contained in individuals’ ori (inner 
head), Yoruba believes, but its actualization lies solely on how each person is able to tap 
the potentials in her ori. This is the reason for the saying, alagemo ti bimo re tan, ai mo 
jo ku somo lowo (the chameleon has given birth to her child, the cultivation of the art of 
242 Bolaji Idowu, Olodumare God in Yoruba Belief, pp. 18-29. For further studies about the relevance of 
orisha to the social structure of the world see  Olatunde Bayo Lawuyi, “Ogun: Diffusion across Boundaries 
and Identity Constructions”, African Studies Review, 31, no. 2 (1988): 127-139, N. A. Fadipe, The 
Sociology of the Yoruba, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press: 1970), J. Gleason, Orisha: The  Gods of Yoruba 
Land, (New York: Atheneum, 1971), Karin Barber, “How Man Makes God in West Africa: Yoruba 
Attitudes Towards the “Orisa” ” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 51, no. 3 (1981): 
724-745. 
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dancing  is  however  left  to  the  child) .243 The  proverb  relays  the  character  of  the 
chameleon to suggest that identity is self made. Conformism to any external will other 
than the one the individual argues out in the community to be good is off the context of 
this philosophy. The imagery of the chameleon suggests that individuals possess great 
potentials which when properly utilized can make them adapt and survive all odds. Much 
as the Yoruba will like to encourage people to adapt to various circumstances, emphasis 
is laid on the maintenance of one’s distinctiveness. To survive an odd condition is, for the 
Yoruba, not to be swallowed in that condition. The individual, like the chameleon, must 
always define the condition, in her own authentic way. She must maintain the consistency 
of her self worth while engaging others in the world. 
Let us return to the mission of world reordering to further support  this  point. 
Having received the different charges from Aramfe, the Oosas proceed to the world to 
accomplish the assigned mission. Obatala is supposed to take the leadership role while 
others follow. But the baton of leadership changes as Obatala becomes drunk on the way. 
Obatala loses the focus and the work of world reordering is finally going to be halted. 
Ogun can’t  wait  to see this happen and he takes the initiative to lead the group. We 
understand  that  Ogun  meets  with  many  strenuous  challenges  which,  in  my  opinion, 
require the assistance of Aramfe. I succumb to this view because the world of Aramfe 
and the actual world are not far apart at this period.244 But this is not the case. Aramfe is 
not going to engage in any rescue mission. It seems that the intervention of an external 
agent in self defining mission is enough to nullify the worth of one’s originality. The idea 
243 See Bolaji Idowu, Olodumare God in Yoruba Belief , p. 20 for further explanation about the role of the 
Chameleon in the Yoruba account of creation. 
244 See Ibid, pp. 21-22. Also, Kwasi Wiredu, “Death and the Afterlife in African Culture”, Kwasi Wiredu 
and Kwame Gyekye, in  (eds.,) Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, pp. 138-140.
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is that Aramfe has accomplished his own portion by giving the children what they need to 
determine their own identity. 
This has become a perpetual symbol of self provocation in Yoruba community. A 
Yoruba  woman will  naturally  refuse  to  intervene  in  her  child’s  problem in  order  to 
stimulate the will for productivity in the child. Her attitude does not stem out of hatred 
but rather,  she seeks to provoke the child to unleash the vital force of creativity and 
progress  that  dwells  in  her.  Ogun  understands  this  and  engages  his  problems 
courageously. Soyinka remarks that only “Ogun experienced the process of being literally 
torn  asunder  in  cosmic  winds  or  rescuing  himself  from the  precarious  edge  of  total 
dissolution by harnessing the untouched part of himself, the will”.245 Ogun is a symbol of 
individuality in Yoruba land till date. Ogun redefines his given name by rupturing the 
order  given  by  his  father,  Aramfe.  Not  until  he  has  successfully  accomplished  this 
mission can he win the title of a human individual. 
Yet none of them, not even Ogun, was complete in himself. There had to 
be a journey across the void to drink at the void of mortality … But the 
void had  become impenetrable”.  For  this  void between the  divine  and 
human worlds was also the “abyss” of lacking being, the “disintegration of 
consciousness”, where Orisa-nla was originally shattered. Ogun, however, 
“with  an  instrument  which  he  had  forged  from  the  ore  of  mountain-
wombs, … cleared the primordial jungle, plunged through the abyss and 
called on the others (the various orisas) to follow.246 
Ogun’s individuality, according to Soyinka, is first expressed in his decision to take over 
the task of world reordering. The originality of this individuality is further expressed in 
his technological proficiency by which he creates implements which he uses to further 
the  course  of  creation.  In  Soyinka’s  words,  the  “shard  of  original  oneness  which 
245 Cited in Mark Pizzato, “Soyinka’s Bacchae, African Gods, and Postmodern Mirrors”, The Journal of  
Religion and Theatre, 2, no. 1 (2003): 52.    
246 Ibid.
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contained the creative flint appears to have passed into the being of Ogun, who manifests 
a temperament for artistic and creativity matched by technological proficiency”.247 
This illustrates Yoruba notion of independence in self choice. This independence 
is  not  the  kind  that  makes  the  individual  to  be  insensitive  to  the  condition  of  the 
community. Contrariwise, it is the independence that makes one to explore problems with 
every talent that one has and the prior aim is to contribute the best good to the world. The 
Yoruba  individual  is  not  supposed  to  conform  or  submit  blindly  to  any  constituted 
authority. This is highlighted in the act of Ogun against the order of Aramfe. There is no 
indication that Ogun receives any specific command from Aramfe to take over the task of 
world reordering. The unusual respect that Yoruba philosophy gives to the individual as 
an autonomous agent is demonstrated in most Yoruba narratives. Abraham claims that 
these narratives are primarily intended “to guide will and plan”.248  Gbadegesin says it is a 
form of pedagogical instruction which Yoruba philosophers use to identify the meaning 
and purposes of existence.249 James Bode Agbaje depicts narratives as important means of 
conveying truth in Yoruba society by saying that narratives are not only limited to verbal 
communication, they can be set in motion through music, through designs on cloth, on 
walls, on the staffs of elders and through behavior.250 
We need to mention that the idea of self legislation that is warranted by one’s 
engagement with the world does not necessarily mean that the Yoruba individual will be 
obsessed with how to face the challenges that will make her achieve the true mark of 
247 Ibid, pp. 51-52. 
248 W. E. Abraham, “Sources of African Identity” in K. Wiredu and K. Gyeke, (eds.) Person and 
Community : Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, p. 41.
249 Segun Gbadegesin, Aspects of Yoruba Tradition: Importance, Richness and Limits in the Context of  
Unfreedom, Isokan Yoruba Magazine, 3, no. 3 (1997). Available at 
http://www.yoruba.org/Magazine/Summer97/File4.htm.
250 James Bode Agbaje, “Proverbs: A Strategy for Resolving Conflict in Yoruba Society”, p. 238.  
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individuality. This is not the case as there is no specific time or test that is readily set by 
the community by which the identity of the individual is to be defined. Experiences of 
life come and go in their natural ways. The individual’s way of coping and shaping her 
life plans within these natural occurrences will determine her overall identity. However, 
the point is that no one should submit to fate, everyone must stand up and define her self 
in the way she deems fit, utilizing her inner capacities. There is room for improvement 
and people  can always  start  again  even though they fail  at  some point.  The case  of 
Obatala readily comes to mind: though he seems to have failed in the mission of world 
reordering, he proves his worth in some other involvements and later becomes a very 
significant deity in Yoruba society. Because of Obatala’s significant achievement, both 
his initial mistake and his subsequent success become a kind of defining monument for 
all his adherents. What of Elegba who is formerly respected as ‘a phallic divinity’ but 
later becomes a representation of evil? Originally, Ifa is the ‘god of fecundation’ but later 
he is known as a foreteller of the future. All this shows that failure or success at any 
particular time in life matters little; what counts most is the need to be responsive to 
future challenges and to bear in mind the moral intuition that defines our humanity. The 
important thing is for everyone to stand up to the test of time with the consciousness of 
engaging one’s real experiences, seeing them as opportunities for self development and 
this must necessarily take the community into consideration. Yoruba construction of self 
actualization stems from a free, relaxing engagement with the world believed to be an Ile 
(home). Therefore, the individual operates on the basis of this knowledge taken the others 
that she dwells with as vital part of her being. The Yoruba individual is never expected to 
give up to fate. She must always see life from its many ramifications, fighting on till the 
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end desired is realized. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONTEXTUALIZING ADVAITA AND YORUBA CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
IDENTITY 
Every  descriptive  finding  pertains  to  a  certain  region  of  phenomena. 
Speculative philosophers sometimes generalize it to some other regions, 
far beyond the limits within which it had originary intuitive support”. 251 
However, there are two basic factors of human experience – the duality of 
the ego and the world, or the subject and the object.  All peoples in all 
cultures face this question of the duality of experience, and the manner in 
which different cultural groups of people approach it would determine or 
expose their basic assumptions about the nature of reality.252 
As indicated from the outset of this study, we target the notions of identity in Advaita and 
Yoruba  philosophical  traditions  and  their  implications  on  the  community.  In  the 
introductory chapter, we highlighted two opposing views of identity. These schools of 
thought take radically different stands regarding the source of identity. We maintained 
that both philosophical positions thrive on two extreme positions that require important 
adjustments. Common to the first political theory is the claim that the fundamental value 
that ought to guide the articulation of identity is liberty. Advocates of this philosophy 
resent the views that establish identity articulation on community rather than individual 
choices. To them, this way of conceiving identity necessarily hinders individuals from 
flourishing and ultimately, sacrifices autonomy.253 But the other political theory contends 
that  the  advocacy  of  the  former  school  detaches  individuals  from  the  reality  of 
251 J. N. Mohanty, Transcendental Philosophy, p. 15.
252 K. C. Anyanwu, The African Experience in the American Market Place, p.57.
253 See, for example, David Gauthier, “The Liberal Individual” in Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit 
(ed.), Communitarianism and Individualism, p. 157.
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experience. This detachment, this school argues, stems from the theoretical exposition of 
the self as something that is “antecedently established, fashioned prior to the choices it 
makes in the course of its experience”.254 Interestingly, the ideas of these political theories 
stem from certain understanding of the self, the main subject that gains attention in the 
philosophies of Advaita and Yoruba. We delineate on the subject of identity in Advaita 
and Yoruba philosophical traditions. We explore the profound assumptions that guide the 
constructions  of  the  self  in  Advaita  and  Yoruba  in  order  to  see  the  roles  that  the 
philosophies  give  to  the  individual  in  self  determination.  Consequently,  we  examine 
whether the two philosophies take individuality as antecedent to community or immersed 
in the community’s social world. The implication of the latter position as reflected in our 
study is that it subjects identity exclusively under the group that the person belongs to. 
The former position frees the individual from the community. This chapter will now set 
in a comparative style the various ways in which Advaita and Yoruba attend to the three 
main issues (the articulation of identity, its moral relevance to the community and the 
philosophical problem of alterity) that are associated with identity construction in this 
study. 
I
Advaita and Yoruba philosophies make the subject of self their central focus in 
order to guide humanity on the path to successful life. The common presupposition of 
these philosophies is that  anyone who knows the real  self  will  be equipped with the 
knowledge of authentic living. We may ask why this will automatically be so. This is 
because the utmost knowledge is embedded in the real self. This knowledge opens the 
mind of persons to the harmony that exists among the manifold realities of the world. The 
254 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 21.
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possession  of  this  knowledge  enables  people  to  discern  the  linkages  that  permeate 
manifoldness. Not only will this knowledge enables us to apprehend the link between our 
plural  identities,  it  will  also  enable  us  to  apprehend  how we  are  linked  with  others 
regardless of their differences. Essential to the realization of the authentic life is the need 
to lead life in light of the connections that exist between the many faces that we carry.255 
This  will  help us  appreciate  the fact  that  we are  all  human beings  and live together 
seeking the fair development of everyone. On the one hand, the knowledge of the self 
that  is  enunciated  in  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  frees  one  from  any  slavish 
attachment  to  community.  On  the  other  hand,  it  reveals  one’s  responsibilities  to 
community. Advaita and Yoruba expositions of self show why people ought to embark 
on inner searching, pulling themselves back from the entanglements of the social life, 
refusing to go with the flow except when an internal approval is found. This is when the 
‘I’ (the subject of one’s individuality) is in perfect agreement with it. The ‘I’ will be in 
perfect agreement with our actions when the motivating principle for the actions supports 
the development of others’ free and equal nature. 
This  impulse  for  action  is  largely  revealed  in  the  way Advaita  construes  the 
ultimate nature of the person’s identity. On the question of the nature of our identity, 
Advaita has but one profound answer, which is ‘Tat Tvam Asi’ (That art Thou). This is 
the  original  background  of  self  knowledge  and  it  suggests  that  the  individual  is 
essentially  non-different  from others.  Firstly,  primacy is  given to  the equality  of  our 
essential nature. Moreover, this essence is also revealed to be indivisible. Brahman, the 
255 One interesting similarity between Advaita, Yoruba and western liberal philosophies appears here. 
Rawls, for example, argues that our nature presupposes that we are first plural and then unified. The three 
traditions seem to suggest that the person has an essential nature that is able to make her engage in a co-
operative venture in the society. The difference of Advaita and Yoruba with Rawlsian position however lies 
in the kind of emphasis Rawls gives to the plural nature of persons.  
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essence of the person, remains the fundamental essence which we must always bear in 
mind in identity delineation. Its preeminence, we should understand, does not submerge 
the reality of our plural nature as evident in the statement “That art Thou”.256 Back to the 
original  nature,  Brahman,  as  the  essence  of  unity,  gains  primacy  because  it  is  the 
fundamental principle that embraces the reality of all and yet different from all. It is the 
overseer, the one that watches itself in actions yet not an agent of actions. Brahman’s 
nature cannot be increased or reduced by actions. What does this illustrate for us who live 
in the world today? The original background of self knowledge predisposes us to take as 
uppermost our free and equal nature. Free because our innermost identity surpasses what 
may be revealed in the world and equal because we have the moral capacity to engage in 
a system of fair co-operation regardless of our differences. This philosophy believes in 
the reality of our distinctiveness but, at the same time, it argues that emphasis ought to be 
placed on the development of the moral capacity which is able to make us respond to 
differences  in  the  right  manner.  Right  from  the  outset  therefore,  the  philosophy  of 
Brahman  puts  in  view  the  reality  of  our  plural  nature  and  set  an  ideal  background 
principle by which this plural nature should function.  
Thus,  Brahman  being  the  unifying  essence  of  all  presupposes  a  notable 
recognition of duality. The Advaita person understands that duality is real  and that it 
culminates in the ultimate Brahman. Hence, the idea of Brahman sets the basis for co-
operative  association.  It  situates  members  in  an  environment  where  the  good  of  all 
becomes  elevated  to  the  topmost.  Members  work  together  with  the  ultimate  goal  of 
preserving the bond of unity that exists among other members in the community. The 
idea of one’s identity being fixed to a group is not supported by this philosophy. Each 
256 See a fuller explanation in the first section of chapter two. 
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person  is  free  to  join  any  class,  group,  associations  etc.  which  could  enable  him to 
cultivate his natural talents. As the underlying reality of the person is Brahman, unity is 
prior in this philosophy, the reason being that it  is the sure path that opens us to the 
reality and richness of our individuality. To understand ourselves better, the philosophy 
of  Brahman  presents,  at  the  basis,  the  state  of  equilibrium  where  every  person  can 
function in fair terms. Brahman is not at once separated from the person’s experiences. 
The  community  experiences  therefore  remain  important  in  the  knowledge  of  one’s 
identity. However, dwelling on the very nature of Brahman, the notion of the good which 
is supposed to cement the community is not tied to any of the values upheld by any 
particular groups. Brahman transcends them all. And even though Brahman contains all 
the differences that are revealed in individuals, it does not prohibit them from flourishing. 
Thus, it becomes evident that the thriving of one’s individuality is also prominent in the 
idea of  Brahman as the basis  of  social  co-operation.  One may wonder  how this  will 
happen when the unity of individuals in the community ought to be preserved.             
Advaita  directs  us  to  understand the  fact  that  our  nature  is  not  exhausted  by 
anything that we may be affiliated with in the world. This implies that anything which 
identifies  us  externally  as  this  or  that  person  does  not  hold  an  eternal  grip  on  us. 
Therefore, we are free to re-evaluate our lives and choose that which aligns with our 
moral nature. We are beings capable of making reasonable choices. Regardless of how 
complex  a  matter  may  be,  we  are  capable  of  thrashing  it  out  and  reach  consent. 
Representing this moral capacity of the person as it is, Advaita philosophy suggests that 
our freedom is not revealed unto us prior to our joining the community. We only come to 
know that we are free beings as we begin to participate in community life. Our choices in 
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life depict the fact of our freedom. This point stresses the interesting role that community 
plays in the understanding of our selves as free beings. But, more importantly, it reveals 
the positive aspect of our freedom in self understanding. Against the narrow assumption 
that the freedom of the self to choose privileges individuality over community, Advaita 
theory  suggests  that  our  individuality  commands  us  to  choose  with  the  aim  of 
contributing to the development of others’ free nature. Ultimately, this is a respect for the 
continuity  of  the  community.  In  particular,  the  exercise  of  this  freedom deepens  the 
knowledge of our moral identity. We would be able to see beyond our limited affiliations, 
comprehending  the  many-dimensional  nature  of  diverse  human  beings  the  reality  of 
which we all share. 
The Yoruba notion of individuality is close to the Advaita position. For Yoruba, 
Emi is the basis of individuality.  Emi is the ultimate permeating consciousness which 
contains  all  things.  Emi  is  also  regarded  as  the  ultimate  differentiator,  that  which 
differentiates things  but  remains  undifferentiated.  Originally,  Emi contains  everything 
within itself.  In this regard,  Emi stands as the basis of community. The original state 
therefore stresses our essential unity rather than our plurality. In the original state, our 
real being is presented in its purest form. What is apprehended in this primary state is 
Emi. Firstly, the account of human subjectivity is described from the perspective of the 
ultimate  unifying principle  (Emi).  But,  like  the  Advaita  philosophy,  this  presupposes 
human plurality (our distinctiveness). Interestingly, the plural nature becomes meaningful 
only from the standpoint of its relatedness to community. The realization of our pure 
nature lies in a systematic cultivation of the plural nature. Now, since the community 
refers to no one entity but the conscious principle by which people agree to lead their 
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lives, and because this community consciousness is not regarded as fixed, any account of 
the unity of human subjectivity in Yoruba philosophy also presupposes plurality. The 
knowledge of our unity invites us to seek the development of our equal nature. Also, our 
plurality suggests our freedom. It demonstrates that as the  eniyan (persons capable of 
choices) that we are, we have the capacity to engage in mutual relationships.  
Since Yoruba argues that the basis of community is  Emi, its idea of community 
also  flourishes  on  the  free  and  equal  nature  of  individuals.  The  intuitive  idea  of 
community is developed on the moral capacities of persons. Yoruba argues that these are 
essential for the development of a harmonious and progressive society. Community is 
thus likened to a family in which a fair system of co-operation between family members 
becomes dominant. This is highly valued in modern conception of democratic society. 
The typification of community as a family forbids the viewing of the community as a 
fixed structure, or some institution justified by certain fixed laws. Just as the family lacks 
any existence of its own outside the members, community existence is based on the social 
co-operation of its members. So, community good is formed from the mutual consensus 
of  members.  However,  this  good  changes  with  the  awareness  of  members  of  the 
community.  The  chief  goal  of  the  community  good  is  to  enable  each  member  to 
maximize her distinctive nature. It is in this respect that it must not coerce people in their 
choices except when such threatens the development of others. Thus, Yoruba argues that 
the development  of  the  community on  mutual  co-operation is  a  fruitful  ideology for 
identity construction.
Like Advaita philosophy suggests, Yoruba holds that the reality of our identity 
transcends what any community good can exhaust. Individuals are responsible for the 
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development of their identity, but within the community and as revealed to them by their 
Emi. The individual needs to develop her nature for this is like a seed that needs to be 
nurtured in order to grow. This is one major difference between  Emi and Brahman as 
exposed by Shankara. The emi of the person is capable of further development whereas 
Brahman is self complete. But the emi that contains the possibility of development is like 
the spark of the supreme Emi. Yoruba believes that this emi dwells in the individual but it 
is not disconnected from its very origin which is the permeating essence of all.  This 
difference between Advaita and Yoruba describes the diverse ways that both philosophies 
construe the roles of actions in self actualization. The Advaita subject only looks inward 
and seeks to be connected with the inmost feeling, that is, the good that is not realized in 
physical  actions;  the  Yoruba  subject  connects  the  inner  content  of  his  being  to  his 
physical development. While both the Advaita and Yoruba subjects will need to connect 
to the inward feelings in order to lead the authentic lives, there is no serious fear that they 
will adhere to some personal interests the end of which can fragment the community. Due 
to  the  belief  that  Emi  is  capable  of  further  development,  Yoruba  describes  identity 
construction  in  two phases,  one  of  which  is  preliminary,  to  be  accomplished  by  the 
community and the other permanent, to be accomplished by the individual herself. The 
latter is given utmost significance on the ground that only the individual knows how it 
should grow and this should be in accordance with her own self knowledge. Thus, the 
person is conceived as having the priority of self choice. The identity that is constituted 
by the community is articulated as a kind of raw material with which she should define 
her  own  distinguished  identity.  The  right  to  determine  one’s  identity  within  the 
community stems from the Yoruba understanding of the  emi of  the individual as the 
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ultimate awareness of the individual’s good. For the individual to lead a fulfilled life, she 
must engage the community meanings and not just conform to its tenets without personal 
consent.  This  consent  comes  from a  critical  reflection  on  the  good  proposed  as  the 
community good. The individual is here articulated as having the capacity to choose the 
principles that are definitive of her own will. However, this choice, Yoruba contends, will 
be meaningful when it is exercised within some social settings. 
The concepts of Brahman and Emi share certain commonalities. Topmost of these 
is that they are the ultimate grounding in self knowledge. Brahman and Emi underlie the 
consciousness  of  any  person’s  identity.  Our  distinctive  identity  is  brought  into  our 
knowledge by the subject of awareness denoted by the two philosophies as Brahman and 
Emi respectively. Like Brahman, Emi is the indivisible consciousness which individuates 
itself in the world. Although Brahman and Emi are identified with the physical entities of 
the world, they are none of these things. Though Brahman and Emi underlie the operation 
of the finite thought, they transcend what the mind can comprehend. The mind cannot 
conceptualize them and articulate them completely. No language can exhaust the nature 
of these two realities. They are not identical with anything that we perceive in the world. 
But we should be careful not to take this to mean that Brahman and  Emi are entirely 
antithetical to mental and physical entities. These entities are only different from them in 
their temporal forms. Again, we should note that this does not imply that Brahman and 
Emi are nothing in the sense that they are non-entities. 
Both the realities of Brahman and Emi are confirmed by individuals’ experiences. 
The  philosophies  of  Brahman  and  Emi agree  that  the  contingent  particularities  of 
individuals are very crucial  in the understanding of their identity. Advaita philosophy 
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holds that the ultimate identities of individuals remain true independent of what the world 
happens to be. These identities are different from the ones that individuals are associated 
with in the world. However, the ultimate identity becomes comprehensible to the person 
as she engages the contingencies of her world. She comes to the realization that her very 
nature is not limited to any community meanings. The group identity which she shares 
with  the  community  only  reveals  her  ultimate  identity  as  something  that  is  in  view. 
Unless the person comes to the point where she knows that the supreme consciousness 
which constitutes her true identity is not limited to any group consciousness, she will 
remain under the delusion of the lower self. The point is that the individual is more than 
what the community meaning can exhaust. Yoruba argues that the ultimate identity of the 
individual transcends what the community can define. Community consciousness is able 
to stimulate its direction to a particular stage after which the individual herself needs to 
take over.  The constitutive meanings of the community, for Yoruba, are like the raw 
materials which individuals need for permanent self redefinition. The originality of self 
redefinition is often showcased when any individual is able to rupture the community 
status  quo,  like  Ogun  did,  creating  a  new  order  through  the  faculty  of  intelligence. 
Yoruba  believes  that  human  capacity  of  choice  and  reflection  is  not  limited  to 
community.   
In Yoruba philosophy, one’s real identity (the eniyan that one is) is exemplified 
by the demonstration of one’s capacity of choice. It is by choosing one’s life through 
one’s causal actions that one’s real identity is formed. But, for Advaita, the structure of 
our identity is exemplified through a kind of rigorous reflection on what is given to us in 
the  world  until  we  apprehend  that  its  truest  essence  is  the  Brahman  in  us.  What  is 
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suggested in the Advaita position is that any form of identity which we imbibe in the 
world must constantly be examined and remain open to new interpretations. We must 
keep reflecting on the manner of life, and perhaps the cultural meanings that we have 
chosen and we must never relax until we have reached the point in which we are sure that 
our choices do not impair others’ development. We know our own self truly when we 
know it not to be different from Brahman, the self of all. Advaita philosophy describes 
the process of identity in a radically stimulating manner which suggests that we need to 
remove  all  those  structures  of  the  community  which  hinder  us  from  seeing  our 
connectedness with the universal community. One thing that we may worry about at this 
juncture  is  what  the  implication  of  seeing  cultural  meanings  as  possibilities  of  self 
understanding will likely be on the individual. There are two ways to attend to this. On 
the one hand, we may say that it will prompt the individual to hold that cultural meanings 
are impermanent.  Hence,  the individual will  likely conceive her freedom as absolute. 
This will mean that she can acquire any identity that works for her as she is not bound by 
the notion of the good that is upheld in her community. Moreover, since the good of the 
community is taken to be contingent, she will probably think that she does not have any 
obligation  to  be  subject  to  any  standards  other  than  her  own.  This  reaction  may be 
considered as the weakness of the communitarian model that Advaita and Yoruba defend. 
But if it is possible for the individual to free herself from the contingency of her cultural 
community and yet maintain her loyalty to the culture, participating in the evolution of 
her culture, then, it means that she is genuinely free in the sense that her mind is not 
frozen by her cultural tradition. 
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The positions that are presented in the philosophical traditions of Advaita and 
Yoruba make it  possible  for  the individual  to  experience the latter.  For  Advaita  and 
Yoruba persons, the cultural traditions which depict identity in the world are contingent 
but this does not mean that individuals are not obliged to measure up to the prescribed 
standards. Alternately, they are supposed to understand that their identity is not exhausted 
by the cultural traditions they happen to share. In this regard, the standards exemplified 
by the cultural traditions are to be held as subject to review. This position challenges us 
to extend the possibilities of our cultures and not to close them. The latter is more likely 
to be experienced when individuals fail to cause their unbounded nature to flourish. This 
may make the individual either deny that cultures are inadvertently unimportant in the 
creation  of  identity  or  deny  that  it  is  the  ultimate  determiner  of  identity.  When  an 
individual  gives  some  considerable  regard  to  the  historical  development  of  her 
community’s  cultural  principles,  she  is  likely to  be  rescued from the  irony which is 
involved in the position that  says cultural  meanings are  not  binding because of their 
contingency. This irony is presented in the following:
Recognizing the contingency of all self-interpretations also opens the way 
to a stance of irony toward all self-definitions. For if I see that every self-
description  and  self-evaluation  is  arbitrary,  having  no  basis  other  than 
contingent  facts  about  what  has  popped  up  in  my  culture,  I  will  also 
realize  that  my  own  most  basic  commitments  and  defining  ideals  are 
ultimately up for grabs, temporary resting places on a road of self-creation 
that ends only with death.257
For Yoruba, identity does not terminate at death; it continues as the person joins 
the ancestral  community.  Not  only does the Yoruba person seek to contribute to the 
richness of the community culture by the life she leads, she understands that a life that is 
well lived will gain some merits in the ancestral community. Not only this, the continuity 
257 Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic, p. 116.
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of the ancestral community and in particular the identity of the individual depends to a 
large extent  on the flourishing of  the community.  This  is  the  essence of  the  Yoruba 
saying  bi  ko si  eniyan,  imole o si.  I  mention the foregoing in order to highlight that 
Yoruba persons do not need to shun the cultural community on the basis that cultural 
meanings are contingent. The fact of death deepens, for Yoruba, the need to lead the 
authentic life. The life story of the individual from birth to death becomes the permanent 
identity  with  which  she  will  be  remembered.  Yoruba  cherishes  the  community  of 
memory because of its social import. On the one hand, it stands as the life course or the 
narrative by which others can understand life’s meaning, and on the other hand, it allows 
for the continuity of the person even after death. This continuity is crucial to Yoruba. It is 
an unfortunate thing for any individual to be forgotten in her ancestral lineage. This is 
considered as permanent death. Thus, to Yoruba, the fact of death shows the need to own 
oneself in the sense of owning up to what one wants to become. This means that one will 
have to identify what is most significant to one in the events of life and then takes a 
resolute  stand  on  pursuing  it.  However,  all  this  must  be  understood  from  Yoruba 
conception of individuality as a social concept.
Above  all,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  the  Advaita  and  Yoruba  views  of 
identity rest on the awareness that something other than what can be observed lies deeply 
within the human individual. This is the reality of the person and everything else in the 
world. This is the basis for the traditions social construction of self. Before and after the 
influence of the society on the individual, the self remains accessible in its true form only 
to the person. Thus, living the authentic life involves that one looks inward, beyond the 
social purview of the world, in order to find the self. However, whatever one discovers 
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within to be the self must be possible of being expressed in a social context. When we 
subject  ourselves  to  social  engagements,  our  inner  self  will  be  strengthened and the 
mutual cooperation and trust that ought to depict our real person will shine forth.           
II
To  corroborate  our  arguments  against  the  traditional  readings  of  Indian  and 
African conceptions of individuality, I will analyze a communitarian account of identity 
and  show  how  some  of  its  features  run  contrary  to  Advaita  and  Yoruba 
communitarianism. This account claims that the identity that is defined by the community 
cannot be willed off.258 We cannot shed off the way we have inherited to think, act or 
make judgment about the world etc. The individual is automatically bonded within the 
constitutive meanings of her community. She cannot escape from it no matter how hard 
she tries. Part of what this argument intends to show is that our identities are constituted 
by nothing other than the markedly unique traditions, norms and values of our societies. 
This is the origin of our nature.259 For us to conduct an enriching investigation about 
ourselves, we should refer to the raw materials of our culture. We cannot give meaning to 
our lives outside the boundary of our cultural traditions. This follows that once we step 
out of the community which defines us, we miss our self orientation. The modes of being 
that are peculiarly defined by the community are denied as impermanent. They are not 
the kind of things that can be shed off as in when someone decides to quit an association 
that she joined voluntarily. Therefore, each constitutive ideology of each community is 
conceived as  autonomous such that  escaping from it  will  imply that  one is  eternally 
258 See Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its Critics, p. 124.
259 See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 150-151.
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damaged as joining other constitutive framework of other communities will  look like 
putting a square peg in a round hole. 
Now, Advaita and Yoruba philosophies will not deny the fact that the community 
provides a largely background way of meaningful thinking, a way of judging and acting 
in the world. But to hold that this way of being is deeply and perpetually ingrained into us 
that without it we are better than nothing as our lives will be trivial, insignificant and 
meaningless, is to go too far. It is important enough to understand that our lives are given 
meaning  by  the  community  we  belong  to.  Moreover,  it  is  essential  to  distinguish 
constitutive community from a kind of voluntary association which we decide to become 
a member of and which we can, at anytime, quit when we are dissatisfied with its modes 
of  operations.  The  difference  between  the  community  that  constitutes  us  and  the 
association  we  join  voluntarily  is  that  the  decision  to  escape  from  the  voluntary 
association occurs from our judgment about its operations. When we are dissatisfied with 
the operations of a particular voluntary association, we can decide to quit. But the case of 
the  constitutive  community  is  not  so  and  the  reason  is  not  because  we  cannot  be 
dissatisfied with the community life but because we cannot escape from the way we have 
been constituted to think and make judgment about life altogether. One point to be noted 
here is that the constitutive community, contrary to a voluntary association, makes us 
what  we are.260 We make  the  association  we join  voluntarily  what  it  is.  That  which 
constitutes our being is considered to be so deep and varied that there is no way one can 
possibly articulate it, subject it to doubt and willfully escape from it. For the Advaita and 
Yoruba philosophies, it is not true that the community makes us who we are if this is 
intended to mean that the community is a kind of entity out there whose primary function 
260 See Ibid.
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is to make individuals the kinds of things they are. The community comes into being due 
to the joint efforts and consent of individuals. It assumes its authority by virtue of human 
experiences and the various interpretations given to these experiences. Whatever it may 
be that makes the notion of constitutive consciousness meaningful in any communities 
will be coherently explained when it embraces the systematization of the ideas of people 
who  at  one  time  or  another  reacted  to  their  experiences.  Now,  it  is  the  cumulative 
reactions of the people to their worldly issues that constitute the community. It should be 
noted that this idea of the community is not a thing that can be said to be there eternally. 
Rather, it is brought about by the conscious efforts of individuals. These individuals are 
regarded as important and they become historical figures that subsequent generations will 
use as means of self understanding. All this put together says the obvious, namely, it is 
the people that make the community and not vice versa. It is not being denied that the 
idea of the community may grow in direct proportion to its social, political, economic, 
etc. development. Nor is it denied that as people begin to remember the sacrifices of their 
ancestors, they feel obliged to preserve the good things that have been handed down to 
them.  But  despite  all  this,  the  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  argue  that  the  truth 
should be kept as it is, that is, it is the self that creates the community. This paves the way 
for the respect of persons as choosers above all. This respect includes the fact that the 
capacity for choice is not bounded within the community, rather it transcends it.              
The fact that identity constitution is not as rigid as it  is depicted in the above 
communitarian stance is  revealed in  our ability to detest  anything in  our constitutive 
community.  Furthermore,  if  we  are  so  tied  to  the  consciousness  of  some  particular 
community, it should be impossible for anyone to find meaning to her life when she joins 
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other community. But in these two cases we understand that the argument above fails. In 
real life, people change communities and find new meanings to their lives. This new life 
cannot be said to be superficial as they acknowledge that it gives them a higher level of 
self fulfillment. If this is the case, does it not suggest that identity definition ought not to 
be curtailed within a particular community? Bell illustrates the impossibility of changing 
constitutive communities with the examples of African Americans, Indian Canadians, etc. 
He mentions that when we observe these people’s ways of being, we are provoked to say, 
wow, ‘they are so American’ or ‘they are so Canadian’.261 Bell means that though these 
people have changed their community, yet their identity remained unchanged. By this 
Bell refers to certain of their physical features like the way they talk, the kind of food 
they like to eat, etc. But this argument is logically inconclusive as it is possible to find 
contrary  cases.  Not  only  this,  there  is  nothing  that  hinders  us  from using  the  same 
expression when such contrary cases are found. Then we will imply basically that these 
people’s judgments about the world and their understanding about the way life ought to 
be lived have changed radically to reflect their new community. The fact that the change 
occurs within a constitutive community, though a new one, is not what is being doubted 
here but the emphasis is on the fact  that  the way of being that is constituted by any 
particular  community  is  never  permanent.  Logically  speaking,  there  is  nothing  that 
affiliates one to any community that cannot be overthrown with time.
Nevertheless, this argument does not intend to mean that the significance of life 
can  be  realized  independently  of  the  community.  We  agree  that  the  community  is 
significant, but it is not an ultimate definition of identity. The communitarian credit lies 
261 Ibid, pp. 124- 136. 
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in affirming the former claim. The communitarian moral stance which presupposes that 
we should be committed to the good of  the community out  of which our identity is 
constituted is remarkably important. This shows that the human person is a moral subject 
and that her dignity lies in the ability to work towards the betterment and continuity of 
her  local  community.  But,  more  importantly,  human  dignity  becomes  much  more 
pronounced  when  those  activities,  which  are  designed  to  promulgate  the  local 
community,  respect  the  ideal  of  the  global  community.  Again,  this  suggests  that  the 
nature of the person should not be passionately tied to some particular communities at the 
expense of other communities.  
Daniel  Bell  develops  an  interesting  conception  of  communitarian  notion  of 
community.  Here,  he  reflects  on  the  importance  of  memory  and  imagination  in  the 
determination of identity.262 Bell argues, under what he terms ‘communities of memory’, 
that our identities have a history in that they are constituted by certain past events which 
go back into several generations and which have become the salient characteristics of a 
community of memory.263 In Bell’s position the importance of community of memory can 
never be overlooked for that carries 
a  moral tradition that helps to provide the narrative unity of our lives, 
which  entails  an  obligation  to  sustain  and  promote  the  ideals  and 
aspirations embedded in their history through memory and hope, linking 
our destiny to that of our ancestors, contemporaries, and descendants. If 
individuals fail to nurture their communities of memory, they lose a source 
of meaning and hope in their lives, and very serious harm is done to their 
self-esteem  and  sense  of  personal  competence,  not  to  mention  the 
consequences for future generations when a moral tradition is lost.264
 
262 Ibid.  
263 Ibid. p, 125.
264 Ibid, p. 126.
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Bell considers ‘national communities of memory’ and ‘linguistic communities of 
memory’ to be very prominent in the constitution of identity. He says, and rightly, about 
‘national  communities  of  memory’  that  the  origin  of  nations  matters  less  than  the 
undeniable fact that the histories of nations are capable of evolving into entities which 
“command a profound emotional legitimacy” in people.265 This is a very true saying. By 
participating in the activities of the community we are able to understand some things 
about ourselves. When we reflect about our past and turn on those events which mark 
some defining moments in our lives, we tend to be emotional about them and somewhat 
tie our self to this past. We become fascinated by these historical moments and attach it 
to our inmost self,  identifying them as things that are secluded and sacred, a kind of 
identity that is  remarkably special  and permanent.  Going through the philosophies of 
Advaita and Yoruba, we understand why we should be careful in the way we attach the 
self  to  these  past  sentiments.  This  has  the  tendency  of  clouding  the  mind  from 
apprehending the depth of the self. As the Advaita theory of superimposition puts it, the 
depth of our real self transcends anything that may be given to us in memory.266 When we 
identify ourselves with the past of any kind, we tend to take the lower self as the ultimate 
self.  We  degenerate  into  accepting  the  sentiments  that  we  derive  from  our  past 
involvements in the community, for instance, as the truest expression of our real self. In 
doing this, we relapse into the shallow region of the false self. This blurs our view of the 
true self. Our real moral identity, the one that transcends the community, is given the 
secondary place. 
265 Ibid, p. 129.
266 See a detail discussion of Shankara’s theory of superimposition in pp. 103-107.  
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Now, the histories of our past are very significant. These are not being denied as 
constituting  a  significant  part  in  self  understanding.  But  when they  are  taken  to  the 
extreme in the sense that we acknowledge them as exhausting our ultimate identity, we 
begin to relapse to the dangerous trap of self delusion. Amartya Sen notes:
Concerns of this kind not only indicate an anxiety and a disquiet, but also 
point  illuminatingly to  the positive  and constructive importance people 
tend to attach to a shared history and a sense of affiliation based on this 
theory. And yet history and background are not the only way of seeing 
ourselves and the groups to which we belong. There are a great variety of 
categories to which we belong.267 
When we fail to consider the seriousness of the plurality of our identity, we may easily 
resort to fanaticism and begin to act in a way that will obliterate the importance of others. 
To  further  our  point, the  argument  about  the  permanent  grip  of  the  community  of 
memory on the individual seems unsound in the sense that what attracts and fascinates 
someone may not have the same impact on another person. I may be moved to the point 
of wanting to sacrifice my life for the good of my group because of certain memories 
which we share together in the group. This does not mean that everyone will have the 
same affection for the group though we did experience that which evokes my passion for 
the  group  together.  If  constitutive  memories  do  not  produce  the  same  effect  in  all 
individuals, how are we sure that people cannot get out of any historical memory to find 
meaning  in  new  communities?  The  person  demonstrates  her  moral  worth  when  she 
appreciates her community. However, she must understand that that which makes the 
community dear to her ought not to blur her moral judgment and responsiveness to the 
common good of the universal community. 
267 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, pp. 18-19.
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This is a lesson we ought to borrow from the Advaita position which says that the 
highest  sentiments  of  the  self  cannot  be  compared  to  the  ones  derived  from  our 
involvement in our local community. The joy of rendering good service to all humankind 
regardless of racial or cultural affiliation is immense. Advaita maintains that the deepest 
sentiment of the self is realized when we act without attachment. To bring in the correct 
idea of acting without attachment, The Bhagavad Gita says,
Complete inaction is  impossible  as  already established in  earlier  chapters. 
The omission cannot be of the enjoined duties even. For this would lead to 
hell and other evil consequences. Hence it is clear every view of abandoning 
Karma, if sound, inculcates only the renunciation of fruits and attachment.268
This message “to act without attachment” enjoins us to realize the limitation of our social 
attachments in defining our identity. We relate with everyone in love and cease from 
discriminating against non-members. It means that we should act in accordance with the 
purity of our soul, showing our true nature which is in union with all.  This message 
conveys the crucial nature of our oneness and the need to develop our moral capacity 
which ought to respond promptly to the good of all. On this lies the true worth of the 
human subject. 
Advaita and Yoruba philosophies should be credited for their respect for liberty. 
These philosophies remain significant in the very sense that they both champion the need 
to value humanity as an end in itself.  More importantly, both philosophical traditions 
develop the methodology of the self in a way that embraces the communal nature of the 
human  subject.  As  a  result,  the  advocacies  of  the  two  philosophies  pay  important 
attention to certain essentials about the notion of human dignity. When it comes to ethical 
268 S. Subra Rau, The Bhagavadgita, translation and commentaries by Sri Madhwacharya’s Bhashyas, 
XVIII. v.
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behavior, the two philosophies emphasize the virtue of selflessness. The basic principles 
on which this is founded also make it possible for their adherents to sustain good feelings 
as they act. Unlike the expositions of the self that create a kind of gap between human 
individuals in that they predispose us as units that have no connection with the others, 
Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  do  not  curtail  our  moral  responsiveness  to  one 
another.269 Richard Bell remarks that the individualist based conceptions of right blur our 
moral intuition to respond to the plight of others. Even when we are aware of this moral 
responsibility, Bell maintains that we are afraid to do it because we are not sure whether 
we are not interfering in other people’s conception of the good.270 
Advaita  and  Yoruba  demonstrate  a  notable  respect  for  our  humanity  by 
acknowledging  the  fundamental  attributes  that  we  possess,  and  which  should  not  be 
devalued by the community. These are our essential capacity for reasoning and moral 
choices. Advaita posits that the ability to exercise these capacities indicates that we are 
the highest thing to be treasured. The system does not consider it an abomination when it 
gives such liberty of life the most sacred and godlike flavor. The philosophy flies off the 
domain of the worldly in order to depict the value of the human person. The worth of the 
person is no longer to be conceived from the standpoint of certain endowment that the 
individual derives from some divine being, but the sacred heart of the divine is itself 
present in the form of a person. Advaita makes us understand that we really can live 
together  in  harmony  regardless  of  our  differences,  loving  ourselves  unconditionally. 
Thus, it ensures a balanced attitude to life by making us recognize that as much as we 
ought to be loved singly on the basis of our inner worth, we must also prove our worth as 
269 Richard H. Bell, Understanding African Philosophy, A Cross Cultural Approach to Classical and 
Contemporary Issues, p, 71.
270 Ibid.
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responsible citizens of the global world. At the heart of this philosophy is the assumption 
that the person is god of some kind. The profoundness of the human nature requires that 
each  person  be  respected  as  an  end.  Yoruba  philosophy  acknowledges  the  worth  of 
persons from the standpoint of their potential beings. This is the highest value on earth. 
The person is acknowledged as having the capacity to make intelligible decisions that 
will advance the wellness of every people in the community and beyond. This capacity is 
never to be inhibited and one essential way to prevent this from occurring is by seeing 
community meanings as something that can be revised and possibly repealed. For the two 
philosophies, the natural membership of an individual in the community must not rob her 
of  her  inner  worth  for  that  is  the  attribute  that  makes  us  the  persons  we  are. 
Understanding Advaita and Yoruba positions properly, we realize that there is no entity 
that is called community which is independent of the members that constitute its form. 
So, if the members are going to be true to their worth, they must be ready to consent to 
the collective good that is able to maintain the order of the community. This good must 
allow everyone to flourish.
For both Advaita and Yoruba philosophies, the individual who understands her 
moral status will not pursue rights following the individualist principles. The dignity of 
our humanity cannot blossom when we concentrate on private interests. Our dignity is 
revealed as we lead our lives with the prime motivation to contribute to the many- sided 
goods in the world. Rights, for Advaita and Yoruba, are to be claimed with the spirit of 
truth  and  love,  with  a  caution  not  to  harm one’s  neighbor.  The  moderate  notion  of 
identity  that  is  represented  in  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  is  not  opposed  to 
individual rights. In a communitarian moral universe of the Advaita model, the right to 
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choose the principles that are definitive of one’s will is not prohibited. Since the person is 
purged from selfish motivations, her moral vision is to lead a life that promotes human 
wellness.  The  Advaita  communitarian  ideal  acknowledges  that  the  success  of  the 
community requires the exercise of the unique qualities of the individual. In a similar 
vein, the Yoruba communitarianism will not deny the individual the right of self choice 
on the recognition that the capacity for choice is not given by the community.             
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III
I defend in this study a moderate view of identity which is more suitable to human 
social  nature. This view of identity can be contrasted with the traditional readings of 
Advaita and Yoruba communitarianism. These readings suggest mainly that the virtues of 
equality,  fairness  and  freedom as  associated  with  the  conception  of  individuality  are 
devalued in India and Africa. Moreover, the Indian and African persons are arguably 
conceived as not able to formulate personal goals and demonstrate critical  reflections 
about  their  beliefs.  I  have  argued  here  that  the  above  submission  is  mistaken.  My 
representations  of  both  Advaita  and  Yoruba  philosophies  indicate  that  they  do  not 
advocate an unreflective hold to tradition. The ideas of identity that are developed on the 
concepts of Brahman and Emi runs contrary to any position that requires us to be firmly 
attached  to  the  sentiment  of  our  tradition  and  be  bonded  only  to  the  good  of  our 
constitutive community. Though this conclusion may be drawn from any social theory 
which conceives the human nature as nothing more than what the community makes it or 
as  something  that  is  entirely  abstracted  from  the  community,  Advaita  and  Yoruba 
philosophies reject both the views that the human nature is entirely abstracted from the 
community and that it is discovered only within the community life. For Advaita and 
Yoruba philosophies, our worth is truly exemplified when we understand ourselves from 
the standpoint of our community experiences and recognize that these experiences do not 
exhaust our inmost being. This way of construing identity, in my opinion, is able to guide 
the person to the realization of a worthwhile life. This quality of life seems difficult to 
incorporate into the lives of people who are glued to tradition or entirely disconnected 
from  it.  This  point  becomes  obvious  as  we  describe  the  lives  of  two  hypothetical 
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individuals  below.  Certainly,  these individuals  cannot  be said to  be leading balanced 
lives.        
I will refer to these individuals as the thinking person and the loving person. The 
thinking person is aware of the importance of exercising the moral powers of self choice. 
She  sets  out  her  plans  systematically  to  meet  her  desired  end.  She  defines  her  own 
principles,  evaluating  various  options  and  cautiously  calculating  her  gains  in 
interpersonal relationships. After all, the community is meant for mutual gains. She treats 
those contacts that are able to bring her more gains responsibly and fight against  her 
instinct to respect those who have nothing to contribute to her life. We may ask why she 
necessarily needs to do the latter. It is because of the priority that the thinking person 
gives to self interests. The possessive stance that the self wears, which makes nothing 
other than its  own thought of crucial  importance in self  attainment,  adds to the very 
reasons why the thinking person will need to contend with the moral intuition to consider 
others  equally.  The  thinking  person  sees  the  collective  good  of  the  community  as 
secondary.  She  does  not  see  the  community  as  a  need  because  every  person  in  the 
community, in her viewpoint, is aiming at personal gains. The value of life is rated purely 
on personal achievements. Thus, the thinking person is careful not to share her life with 
just anyone except when the association will yield as much benefits as she gives into the 
relationship. This way of life reckons the self as a unitary whole. Hence, the belief that 
self realization needs to take a self centered route. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  loving  person  does  not  lay  much  importance  on  the 
exercise  of  moral  powers  of  choice.  She  believes  that  the  dignity  of  the  self  is 
demonstrated when one shows loyalty to her community. To the loving person, the will to 
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be authentic must be guided in a way that will preserve the structure of the community. 
The inner desires and aspirations of the loving person will be accounted to be true if they 
align with the aspirations of the community. Mainly the loving person adopts the social 
rules  as  the  guiding  principles.  The  loving  person  sees  the  collective  good  of  the 
community as primary. She will normally fight against her instinct if it tells her to act in a 
way that is different from the standard stipulated by the community. In the same vein, she 
will reject any inner admonition to do anything novel, things that the community is not 
used to. Her sentiment for community tradition is so strong that she will resist  every 
counter position as incommensurate. 
Whereas the thinking person will  not tolerate anything that infiltrates into her 
private conception of the good, the loving person will find anything that demeans the 
community good inappropriate. In some sense, both the thinking person and the loving 
person  are  intolerant.  Anything  considered  external  to  their  conceptions  of  the  good 
should be abhorred. The thinking person acknowledges her mind as the ultimate arbiter in 
self choice. Her motto can be summed up as follows: whatever I am able to reason out 
clearly about myself is what I am. I am what I think myself to be. The instinct of the 
thinking person may automatically be rejected if it approves something good that ought 
to be done but the good repudiates her personal idea of the good, an idea that is derived 
from the so call universal point of view. In Alasdair MacIntyre’s view, this requires that 
we “abstract  ourselves from all  those particularities  of social  relationship in terms of 
which we have been accustomed to understand our responsibilities and interests [so as to] 
arrive at a genuinely neutral, impartial, and, in this way, universal point of view, freed 
from the partisanship and the partiality  and onesidedness that  otherwise affect us”271. 
271 Cited in Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics, p. 6.
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When that which is proposed by the thinking person’s instinct gains moral credit, she 
may likely relapse from acting because she won’t want to interfere with other persons’ 
lives. The very desire and the ultimate inclination to be self determined rather than being 
other determined stands out as the prime motivation of the thinking person. The loving 
person, on the other hand, acknowledges the mind of the community as the final judge in 
self choice. “Whatever the community thinks me to be is what I am” characterizes the 
ideal of the loving person. The loving person takes the willful eradication of culturally 
laid rules as self distortion. Some externally fixed tradition is the causal or creative mind 
of the loving person. Whereas the thinking individual is enclosed within her own mind, 
the loving person is enclosed within the mind of the community. 
Both the thinking person and the loving person are motivated by the desire to 
realize what they take to be the ultimate good, the personal good for the thinking person 
and the community good for  the loving person.  The difference between the thinking 
person and the loving individual is that the former depends solely on her own faculty of 
judgment.  This  individual  takes  her  life  into  her  hand,  believing  that  her  limited 
experiences and understanding about the world are enough to furnish her with the know-
how with which to achieve the ideal self she chooses for herself. Contrarily, the loving 
person believes on the judgment of the community, leading her life with the trust that the 
accumulated experiences of the community are enough to lead her to the path of self 
fulfillment. Whereas the thinking person shuns the moral intuition to acknowledge the 
community which contributes to her mode of being in the world and nurtures her moral 
power of self determination, the loving person shuns the need to stand out and become an 
authentic individual  who defines her life and,  by implication,  defines the constitutive 
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meanings of the community. The inability to maintain the equilibrium state in actions by 
these  hypothetical  individuals  demeans  their  human  statuses.  The  liberal  advocacy 
presupposes that the loving person is typically foolish by leaving her life in the hand of 
some external agent. The communitarian moral vision argues that the thinking person is a 
rational  fool,  a selfish person whose prime concern is  about herself  alone.  The main 
problem with both hypothetical individuals is that they are closely attached to their own 
construed view of the good. The thinking person cannot tolerate any presuppositions that 
are of external origin, and the loving person considers any presuppositions outside the 
domain of her given beliefs nonsensical. The loving person does not believe that such 
proposition  can  engender  a  positive  understanding  of  the  self.  Both  individuals  are 
enclosed within their own worlds. Their assumptions about reality make it difficult for 
them to be able to tolerate others’ views. Advaita and Yoruba advocate a position that 
avoids  the  extremities  in  the  lives  of  the  above  hypothetical  individuals.  Both 
philosophies develop their assumptions on virtues that make the person intelligible and 
sociable.  
Advaita philosophy believes that the root of the problem in the above positions 
stems from a misconception of the self. Both individuals highlighted above are deluded. 
Ignorance veils their mind from cognizing their true nature. When in operation, ignorance 
blurs the human mind from perceiving the fact of our relatedness and the need to live 
together in peace regardless of our differences. Ignorance hinders one from seeing the 
universal mind through the particularities of world cultures. Advaita depicts the thinking 
person as holding to the false self. The true self, according to Advaita translation, is the 
transcendental subject of awareness, the all pervasive being that goes beyond whatever is 
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predicated of the self in the mind. Going by Shankara’s theory, this self is the seat of 
unity. It defies any possible articulation and categorization. What is implied here is that 
we need to transcend the finite thought to that which underlies its function in order to get 
to the self.  This does not  imply that  the mind is  not  a significant  instrument  of  self 
apprehension, but rather that the mind is incapable of exhausting the self’s inmost nature. 
The truth of this position falsifies the thinking (the Cartesian model for example) that the 
foundation of self knowledge must be laid on utterly simple ideas known to the person 
alone, a view that ultimately suggests that the material foundational to self knowledge 
must be context independent. Advaita Vedanta concedes that the reality of the self can be 
meaningfully inferred when the person takes seriously her practical experiences. The idea 
of self liberty which suggests that one avoids the constraints which one inherits as a result 
of  the  structure  of  the  community  is  here  declared  false.  Community  practices  and 
institutions aid self understanding but they are not to be taken as eternally fixed. Advaita 
argues that we must realize the higher nature if we are to avoid the misidentification 
which  attaches  people  to  the  mental  components  of  their  community.  This  position 
suggests  that  human  nature  reveals  certain  transcendence  in  which  others  are 
accommodated. This finds support in the yearnings of the human person to respond to the 
plight of people who may even be unknown to us physically. The worth of humanity, we 
believe, is exemplified when we respond to this yearning. 
W. E. Conn, in the paper “Self Transcendence, The True Self and Self Love”, 
says that the desire for separation, differentiation and autonomy without the desire for 
attachment, integration and relationship is futile and it cannot lead to the realization of 
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the true self.272 The desire to reach beyond the lower self to be at one with the higher self 
is inextricably linked, Conn remarks. He rejects the thinking which suggests that to find 
my own self I must consider my first person singular alone. This, he says, is the root of 
sin. In order to find myself, I must learn to go out of myself and in order to live, I must 
learn to die, this is the paradox of life. Consequently, life is to be lived in sincere love. 
His conclusion is that in order to find myself, I must find Him, and if I find Him, I find 
my true Self.273 A similar idea is also found in Merton’s deliberation on the nature of the 
inner self. He argues that “the wholeness of the inner self is not a part of our being, like a 
motor in a car, it entails our substantial reality itself, on its highest and most personal and 
most  existential  level.274 Merton likens the inner consciousness of the individual  to a 
fountain with an endless depth. This must constantly be dug. The individual enjoys a 
limited freshening from this fountain as long as she believes that the part gotten at any 
time  is  her  full  reality.  Shankara  says  that  when  the  source  of  self  apprehension  is 
thoroughly investigated, it reveals no end, split or distinction. It is an ocean of unending 
bliss. When the being of the self is considered as existence or consciousness, we come to 
understand that it cannot be viewed as bound. 
When the essence of the knowing subject, the self (Atman) is known, all 
reality is known, that which is the finest essence … that is reality. That is 
Atman. Thou art That”.275 
The essence of the knowing subject i.e. the self (Atman) cannot be tied to any cultural 
form.  It  transcends  any  particularities  that  may  be  associated  with  any  constitutive 
272 W. E. Conn, “Self Transcendence, The True Self and Self Love”, Pastoral Psychology, 46, no. 5 (1998): 
327.  
273 Ibid.
274 See T. Merton, Seeds of Contemplation, (New York: Dell, 1960), see also T. Merton, New Seed of  
Contemplation, (New York: New Directions, 1972).  
275 BBS. III. ii. 28.
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consciousness though not in the sense that it is antithetical to it. The self is the ultimate 
reality in the individual. It is the ‘That’ which is aware of its own mode of being in the 
world but is never limited to it. This self is the intelligible, finest essence, the Atman that 
we really are.
Atman, like the face, is always different [from Its reflection]; but as in the 
case of the face these two [Atman and its reflection] are not discriminated 
[from each other].276   
Yoruba philosophy agrees with the above. The famous dictum, ‘I am because we 
are’ says it all. This dictum calls individuals’ attention to their moral duty. The need to be 
united and jointly seek the collective good is taken seriously because it aligns with the 
very  nature  of  the  individual.  The  conception  of  one’s  self  as  the  self  that  exists 
independently  of  others  is,  according  to  Yoruba,  a  shadow  of  illusion.  This  is  a 
theoretical simplification which strips the self from its inmost virtue. Such simplification 
of the self ends in the projection of the illusory self as the true self. It demeans the self by 
curtailing its moral responsiveness to the universal community. In the Yoruba tradition, 
the identification of one’s good in one’s subjective knowledge is important but not as 
important as when that which one identifies to be good is found to be compatible with the 
freedom of others. Not until this takes place will the value of the good gain acceptance. 
And only at this point can one genuinely say that one apprehends the true worth of life 
and actions that are worth undertaking. To the Yoruba, it is aimo that makes anyone pay 
less heed to the moral intuition to live compatibly with the good of the community. Aimo 
is  the  root  of  selfishness.  It  is  what  prevents  the  individual  from  perceiving  her 
relatedness with others  in  the community.  Aimo makes the individual  concentrate  on 
276 A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara, p, 175. 1, 18, 33.
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personal good and pay less heed to the good that allows the development of other’s free 
nature. 
The  moderate  communitarian  ideal  that  is  articulated  by  Advaita  and  Yoruba 
philosophies depicts that individuality is truly exemplified when one engages others in 
the community bearing in mind the order of community. When community values start to 
threaten the virtue of self choice, then people should resort to dialogue and argue out 
issues that appear problematic. The knowledge of the self that is significant is the one that 
can practically preserve the worth of our social nature. This reflects, above any other 
thing,  the  dignity  of  our  humanity.  It  represents  us  as  people  that  are  able  to  make 
intelligible and moral choices. The achievement of this end lies in our preparedness to 
engage our traditions, and our willingness to understand those of others, aiming to learn 
and possibly adjust ours when they seem to be deficient. 
IV
Before  our  discussion  on  identity  is  concluded,  I  should  highlight  the 
major  controversies  that  surround  the  western  liberal-communitarian  debate  about 
identity. This will help researchers comparing the notion of identity between the west and 
any of the philosophical traditions discussed in this study as it will bring to light the 
contrasts  and  similarities  in  the  assumptions  of  western  liberalism  and 
communitarianism. Moreover, it may open the eyes of interested readers to the areas in 
which  Advaita  and  Yoruba  can  contribute  to  the  western  debate  about  identity.  The 
communitarian  critique  of  liberalism occurs  in  two spheres,  one  methodological,  the 
other normative. On the methodological criticism, communitarian philosophers hold that 
the liberal basis of individualism is false. By falsehood, communitarianism refers to the 
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inaccuracy of the liberal view that the rational individual chooses freely. According to 
communitarianism, the term rationality makes sense only within a specified context. To 
be rational is to be reasonable and to reason is to reason about something, not about 
nothing. What this suggests is that rationality is dialogical.  If this is the way rationality 
functions, it  will  imply that the rationality which is  cut off from the dialogical arena 
which, to communitarians, is the community, is trivial. This is the criticism put forward 
by Charles Taylor in one of his many reactions against liberal abstract rationality. Taylor 
asserts: 
our  choices  are  trivial  and  insignificant  if  they  are  made  outside  of  a 
context by which we may judge some choices as being more worthy than 
others. If all of our choices are equally worthy by virtue of being freely 
chosen … then all difference becomes insignificant.277 
The idea above presupposes that there is no way we can give a reasonable account of 
individuals if we do not look into their social, cultural and historical contexts. To discuss 
individuals,  do  not  sever  their  communities  and  communal  relationships, 
communitarianism warns. And when we observe carefully, we shall discover that there is 
no action that is purely motivated by abstract thought. Durkheim writes: 
When we have repeated the same action a certain number of times, it 
tends to be reproduced in the same manner. Little by little, by the effect 
of habit, our conduct takes a form that imposes itself on our will with an 
obligatory force. We feel obliged to cast our action always in the same 
mold.278
Communitarianism holds that the liberal methodology which seeks to articulate 
self’s meaning beyond the context of what is recognized and comprehensible within some 
277 Cited in Daniel M Savage, John Dewey’s Liberalism Individual, Community, and Self-Development, 
(USA: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), p. 33.
278 Cited in Mark S Cladis, A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism Emile Durkheim and Contemporary 
Social Theory, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 32.
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given  social  field  is  inaccurate.  Cultural  narratives,  stories  and  traditions,  the 
communitarian believes, remain the materials on which our identity construction lies and 
these  are  shared  with  those  who  are  recognized  as  the  members  of  the  community. 
Moreover, communitarianism claims that the inherent mistake in the liberal assumption 
engenders an incoherent view of autonomy. Immanuel Kant’s idea of autonomy attracts 
to  a  very  large  extent  the  criticism  of  communitarians.  To  Kant,  an  autonomous 
individual  is  the  one  who  is  governed  by  principles  unconditioned  by  “the  special 
circumstances  of  human  nature”.279 The  principles  that  guide  the  activities  of  the 
autonomous individual do not presuppose any particular ends. Kant maintains that natural 
desires and inclinations as given by nature or circumstances are not fit to be the guiding 
principles of the autonomous individual. Anyone who lives by them is not governed by 
self-governing principles. Alternatively, she is unfree, surrendering to contingent drives 
which ultimately will not allow her to choose freely. She will be unable to exercise her 
freedom, the type that is consistent with others’ freedom. Here, Kant seeks to promote the 
freedom  of  the  individual  but  he  supposes  that  this  freedom  is  consistent  with  the 
freedom of others. In this way, Kant claims that autonomy implies free will. A will is free 
if it is good, that is, if it does not base its judgment about the good on what the world 
happens to be but on pure reason. This is why Kant adds that a good will is rational. 
Since pure reason is, for Kant, entirely disconnected from experience, the self-governing 
rules of the autonomous individual is free from social and psychological inclinations. In 
Kant’s  view,  the  individual  will  only be able  to  act  rightly  and  genuinely  when she 
follows the rules which she wills through the transcendental subject which is “the subject 
279 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 92.
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of all possible ends himself”.280 Interestingly, this transcendental subject is a complete 
entity,  a  thing  that  is  independent  of  anything  outside  itself.  By  virtue  of  this 
characteristic, its identity is prior to the identities shared in the community. This idea of 
the  transcendental  subject,  communitarianism  argues,  distances  the  individual  from 
shared meanings which are prior in matters of personal identity. 
Michael  Sandel  comments  that  the  Kantian  conception  of  the  transcendental 
subject divides the individual from her inclinations, desires, aspirations and others. In his 
words, the position 
describes first of all the way we stand towards the thing we have, or want, 
or seek. It means there is always a distinction between the values I  have 
and the person I am. To identify any characteristics as my aims, ambitions, 
desires, and so on, is always to imply some subject ‘me’ standing behind 
them, at a certain distance, and the shape of this ‘me’ must be given prior 
to any of the aims or attributes I bear. One consequence of this distance is 
to put the  self beyond the reach of its experience, to secure its Identity 
once and for all. Or to put the point another way, it rules out the possibility 
of what we might call  constitutive  ends.  No role or commitment could 
define me so completely that I could understand myself without it.281 
Sandel argues that the Kantian tradition which stands as the foundation of liberalism is 
mistaken. In Sandel’s thinking, the liberal assumption that self identity can be secured 
independent of the community is mistaken. The giving of ultimate priority to the self over 
its  aims  which  is  apparent  in  liberal  philosophy  is,  according  to  communitarians, 
artificial. Sandel holds that the possibility of identifying the self without clear cut aims, 
which are ultimately interconnected with communal ideals, is impossible. Apart from the 
thinking  that  liberalism  holds  an  empty  conception  of  the  self,  communitarian 
philosophers argue that its position gives rise to morally unsatisfactory consequences. 
280 Ibid, p. 89.
281 Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self”, pp. 18-19. Author’s italics. 
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This is the normative sphere of communitarian argument. I will discuss the argument 
below. 
John Rawls attempts to answer the claim that the liberal conception of the self is 
not sufficiently substantive. One way to go about it, in Rawls view, is to reformulate 
Kantian transcendental philosophy. Arguing along the liberal tradition, Rawls holds that 
individuals’ nature is not primarily revealed in their aims but by the principles that they 
understand to preside over the background conditions under which their aims are formed. 
This prior principle is, according to Rawls, the ideal of the self which is independent of 
purposes and ends. This is the principle of equality, fairness and freedom which we, as 
human beings, would find suitable for us to lead our lives. Rawls’ intention is to found 
liberalism on the capacity we have to shape, pursue, and revise our life plans. He also 
wants to stress the necessity of shouldering the responsibility to respect the same powers 
of self determination in others. Rawls claims that the right of self determination precedes 
any good that is defined by the community.282 Charles Taylor agrees with Rawls on this 
issue but disagrees with Rawls on other points which will be mentioned shortly. Rawls 
argues that the fundamental principle of justice in a constitutional democracy does not 
presuppose any particular end. Rawls’ position highlights that the entire nature of the self 
could be known outside what the communitarian regards as some constitutive ends. What 
282 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 44-45, 53, 314, 564. This is the basis of Rawls’ argument 
against teleological views of the good. Rawls contends that the relation between the individual and the 
community good should be seen differently from what is contained in teleological doctrines. Rawls 
condemns utilitarianism for using some as means to the happiness of all. Since utilitarianism conceives the 
good as something to be determined by the majority, Rawls says it fails to respect each member as an end. 
Even when utilitarianism sets out to defend individual rights, Rawls believes that its defense will 
necessarily rest on some calculation, such as, the amount of utility which respecting those rights will 
procure ultimately. This shows the inadequacy of utilitarianism.
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matters is not the end we choose but the capacity to choose them and this capacity should 
not be inhibited.283
In Sandel’s opinion, one of the problems with Rawls’ theory is that it fails to see 
that community is not a voluntary one and that the social attachments which determine 
the self are not necessarily chosen ones. He believes that this is fundamental and that it 
will undermine any effort on the part of liberalism to develop a consistent basis for the 
understanding  of  individuals  whose  aims  and  values  are  not  separate  from  their 
individuality.284 Again, Sandel holds that liberalism confuses the ideas of the good life 
that should be preserved by the state with those ones that should be dismissed. John 
Rawls’ replacement of the good by right on the ground that human aims do not reveal 
their primary nature is, according to Sandel, inappropriate. The reason given by Sandel is 
that Rawls’ position does not represent the true conditions of individuals, especially as 
they develop the understanding of identity and self development in their interactions with 
the  community.  Sandel  thinks  that  the  liberal  position  flouts  the  way  we  think  of 
ourselves as “members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this 
history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic”.285 Moreover, 
Rawls  theory,  in  Sandel’s  view,  reduces  moral  choices  to  arbitrary  expressions  of 
preferences. In this regard, he is committed to moral subjectivism rather than an objective 
view of morality.286 
283 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, in Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit 
(eds.), Communitarianism and Individualism, pp. 196-197.
284 See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 178-179.
285 Ibid, p. 179 
286 For further discussion on this point, see Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and 
Communitarians, (UK, USA: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 40-69. 
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Although Charles Taylor is not out to reject liberalism in its entirety, he holds that 
some of its central claims are worthy of revision, especially the claim that self identity is 
chosen independently of the community. In Taylor’s view, 
human beings are  self  interpreting animals,  creatures whose identity as 
persons depends upon their orientation and attachment to conceptions of 
the  good  which  they  derive  from  the  matrix  of  their  linguistic 
community.287 
If Taylor is right, any theory which holds the view of the human person as having an 
antecedent identity independent of communal shared meanings is wrong. To him: 
this is the sense in which one cannot be a self on one’s own. I am a self 
only in relation to certain interlocutors:  in one way a relation to those 
conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; 
in  relation  to  those  who  are  now  crucial  to  my  continuing  grasp  of 
language  of  self-understanding  –  and,  of  course,  these  classes  may 
overlap. A self exists only within what I call ‘webs of interlocution’.288 
Taylor implies that the individual is able to understand himself as he relates with others 
in the community. Language plays a significant role in this exercise. It is by virtue of the 
community’s existence that the individual is able to form a genuine view of personal 
identity and moral convictions. 
This point of view challenges Rawls’ position. Rawls’ theory of right, read from 
Taylor’s  perspective,  lacks  the  essential  substance  which  it  needs  to  be  practically 
relevant. However, Taylor adds that the ideal for self understanding which, indisputably, 
is derived from the community, is capable of critical evaluation based on wide ranging 
evaluative  frameworks.  In  this  regard,  Taylor’s  position  escapes  the  charge  of 
subjectivism.289 Although Taylor agrees that Rawls’ intention to correct consequentialist 
287 Cited in Ibid, p. 102.
288 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 36.
289 See Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”, The Review of Metaphysics, 25, 1 (1971): 
3-51.
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idea  of  the  good  is  laudable,  he  believes  nonetheless  that  this  can  be  done  without 
invoking a ‘thin’ conception of the good for human beings. By this, Taylor means that the 
idea  of  the  good  can  be  decided  by  practical  deliberation  on  moral  matters.  In  this 
respect,  the good is decided, on a case by case basis, through a careful resolution of 
inconsistencies or contradictions in practice. 
From what has been said so far, it is evident that one of the main points of the 
liberal-communitarian  debate  dwells  on  the  primary  source  of  identity.  The  need  to 
proffer an adequate answer to this question demands that we find the appropriate role of 
the  community  in  the  definition  of  self  identity.  The  communitarian-liberal 
methodologies  take  the  duo  (individuality  and  community)  as  exclusive  rather  than 
complementary concepts. The liberal defends the interests of individuals with little or no 
consideration of the consequence on the community. The communitarian focuses on the 
community as something that must be upheld as an intrinsic good. 
The liberal tradition is developed on the assumption that each individual in the 
community possesses certain distinctive nature and that each person should be free to 
develop her nature. This is the background of the individualist based notion of rights. 
Liberalism  argues  that  individuals  have  the  intrinsic  right  to  develop  their  inmost 
potentials. This, as assumed by liberalism, is the end that all constituted authorities and 
bodies of knowledge must promote. Reflecting on the liberal idea of the innate good, 
especially as it is prior to any good upheld in the community, they argue that the freedom 
to pursue one’s innate good thus implies ultimate independence on the ends stipulated by 
the  community.  Consequently,  the  need  to  eradicate  all  common  ends  becomes  the 
appropriate thing. On this ground, the society becomes an entity merely constituted by 
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individuals  who seek nothing more than the fulfillments of ends which are primarily 
individualistic.  This,  communitarianism  argues,  is  evident  in  Rawls’  thinking.  The 
community exists primarily for humankind to lead their lives purely for themselves the 
way  they  want.290 There  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  this  account  fails  to  describe 
accurately the nature of the person. In some specific respect, it neglects or deemphasizes 
the individual’s  nature which morally  responds to  others  without  any premonition or 
calculation for some gain. Many people can be judged to be not self centered; we know 
people who claim to be happy whenever they have the opportunity to render services to 
others without expectation of any rewards. It may be said that we are unable to determine 
the motive of those individuals, some of which may be shockingly selfish like the desire 
to gain some eternal benefit. But this argument, as interesting as it is, seems to miss one 
important point. That these people deny certain ends at a particular level of reality to 
achieve another end which they deem higher at another level of reality is indisputable. In 
one important sense, this is a mark of freedom. The claim that they are happy doing what 
they  are  doing,  a  claim that  in  most  cases  are  corroborated  by  their  actions,  should 
convince anyone that they are free individuals. This seems to express a truer sense of 
freedom which when possessed makes the possessor live genuinely,  that  is,  living in 
compliance with one’s inner desires. The individualist theory of rights presumes that the 
human life as rooted in the social division of labor, highlighting differences of hierarchies 
in  the  community  as  the  fundamental  and  inalienable  basis  of  human association,  is 
artificial. Hence, it should be devalued, shunned or eradicated so that each individual can 
freely work out her own nature. As we shall soon see, communitarianism believes that the 
liberal respect for the dignity of the individual requires the acceptance of her supremacy 
290 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, p. 197.
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over and against community institutions, values, and norms. This idea of human dignity 
is  hard  to  comprehend.  The  conception  of  personal  dignity  outside  the  sense  of  the 
community history and its own conception of the good means nothing or little. This point 
has been addressed in Advaita and Yoruba. 
Certain problems are also envisaged in the communitarian philosophy, especially 
when  viewed  from  its  fundamental  assumption  that  the  community  necessarily 
determines self identity. This pictures the shared meaning of the community as something 
with fixed forms. And, most certainly, any given identity will not be amenable to change 
upon inheritance. Implied in this position is the thinking that self identity is encapsulated 
within the boundaries of communal meanings. But the truth of this position will deny 
individuals the capacity of self redefinition or reevaluation. While some communitarians 
argue that individuals are not denied the ability to rethink their identity, such enterprise 
can only be done within the barriers of communal meanings.291 This answer,  though, 
poses a less stringent approach to the issue of identity. It confirms that self identity is 
fixed to the community or the class where individuals are nurtured. There is no identity 
except that which is wholly defined by the consciousness of a community or a class, it 
seems. What ‘I am’ is not what I define by myself but what I inherit from the community. 
Here, communitarianism refers to the ‘I am’, that is, my way of being in the world, the 
self  whose  identity  is  founded on the  practices and norms of  the community,  as  the 
highest form of  my self.  Because the way of my being in  the world is  doubtless  an 
essential part of myself, communitarianism holds that I cannot change this mode of being 
291 See Lee Crowley, The Self, the Individual, the Community: Liberalism in the Political Thought of F. A. 
Hayek and Sydney and Beatrice Webb, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 214-220.  
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without  experiencing a  damaged personhood.  In  some sense,  my self  identity  that  is 
entrenched in the community is permanent. 
 V
What  divides  the  liberal  and  the  communitarian  philosophers  is  mainly  the 
primary status of the subject. Communitarian philosophers argue that the problem with 
liberalism goes back to the Kantian formulation of the ‘epistemological subject’.292 This 
subject is essentially a thing that cannot be known empirically. But this subject stands as 
the governing principle behind anything that is known. John Rawls’ attempt to rescue 
liberalism  by  grounding  its  principles  on  ‘reasonable  empiricism’  is,  according  to 
communitarianism,  a  futile  exercise.  Sandel  avoids  the  normal  sociological  objection 
whose main thesis is that neutral identity is impossible. Though it is correct to argue that 
neutral identity is impossible, Sandel maintains that such claim does not capture the force 
that underlies the liberal notion of identity. In Sandel’s position, “what is neutral about 
the principles of right is not that they admit all possible values and ends but rather that 
they are derived in a way that does not depend on any particular values or ends”.293 The 
liberal idea of neutrality, Sandel believes, “describes the persons’ foundation rather than 
their  effect”.  In  saying  this,  Sandel  leads  us  to  think  that  the  main  problem  with 
liberalism lies in its foundational thesis. 
The independence of the subject does not mean that I can, as a psychological 
matter,  summon at  any moment the detachment  required to overcome my 
prejudices or step outside my convictions, but rather that my values and ends 
do not define my identity, that I must regard myself as the bearer of a self 
distinct from my values and ends, whatever they may be.294
    
292 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, (transl.) N. Kemp Smith, (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1965). Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (transl.) H. J. Paton, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
293 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 12.
294 Ibid, p. 12.
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This foundational problem, Sandel says, is very much exhibited in Rawls’ liberal 
philosophy.  For  Rawls,  the community must  be found on the highest  value,  namely, 
justice.  Rawls  holds  that  sacrificing  justice  for  the  greater  good  is  tantamount  to 
disrespecting the person’s worth.  
Each  person  possesses  an  inviolability  founded  on  justice  that  even  the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies 
that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by 
others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed by a few are outweighed 
by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore, in a just society 
the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by 
justice  are  not  subject  to  political  bargaining  or  to  the  calculus  of  social 
interests.295 
Incidentally, that which warrants, for Rawls, the principle of justice is the fact that 
human beings have different interests. But this fact, Sandel would say, is in Rawls view, 
also antecedently established.296 So, for Sandel, Rawls holds that our essential difference 
“characterized by separate  systems of  ends,  is  a  necessary presupposition of  a  being 
capable of justice”.297 
As much as the nature of the person ought to be respected, the person must also 
exercise his equal nature. This equal nature, in Rawls view, presupposes that the person is 
capable of social co-operation. 
The basic intuitive idea is that,  in virtue of what we may call their moral 
powers,  and the  powers of  reason,  thought,  and judgment  connected with 
those powers, we say that persons are free. And, in virtue of their having 
these powers  to  the  requisite  degree  to  be fully  co-operating members  of 
society,  we  say  that  persons  are  equal  …  since  persons  can  be  full 
participants in a fair system of social co-operation, we ascribe to them the 
two  moral  powers  connected  with  the  elements  in  the  idea  of  social  co-
295 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 3-4. 
296 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 53.
297 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 53.
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operation … namely, a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a 
conception of the good.298 
            
Apparently, Rawls’s position is masked with certain communitarian features. Of course, 
this  is  not  in  the sense  in  which the basis  of  identity  is  given  prior  to  the  person’s 
participation in a system of social co-operation. But the communitarian outlook comes in 
the other sense in which the person is seen as “a fully co-operating member of society 
over a complete life”.299 The different interests of people of free and equal nature allow 
them to engage in co-operative arrangements.  More importantly, these interests allow 
them to be ‘fully co-operating members of society’. Rawls highlights the importance of 
community in identity delineation by showing that it aids the exercise of moral identity. 
In this regard, it could be said that Rawls does not detach the individual from community. 
His due regard for the person’s social attachments and contingent attributes is further 
stated in the following passage:
The description of the parties may seem to presuppose some metaphysical 
conception of the person, for example, that the essential nature of persons is 
independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including their final 
ends and attachments, and, indeed, their character as a whole. But this is an 
illusion  caused  by  not  seeing  the  original  position  as  a  device  of 
representation. The veil of ignorance, to mention one prominent feature of 
that position, has no metaphysical implications concerning the nature of the 
self; it does not imply that the self is ontologically prior to the facts about 
persons that the parties are excluded from knowing.300 
    
For Sandel, Rawls reference to co-operative engagements of equal individuals and 
the imports that such may have on the community life remains unsatisfactory. Sandel 
holds that in Rawls, unity is not as essential as plurality. In other words, “it is a mistake 
298 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (ed.), 
Communitarianism and Individualism, p. 197.
299 Ibid.
300 Ibid, p. 203.
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to accord it an equal priority with plurality; it is not essential to our nature in the same 
way”.301 This being the case, Sandel claims that the co-operative engagements of Rawls’ 
equal  and  free  individuals  will  spring  from ‘selfish  motives’.  “The  point  is  not  that 
persons co-operate out of selfish motives alone, but rather that our knowledge of the basis 
of plurality is given prior to experience, while our knowledge of the basis of unity or co-
operation can only come in the light of experience. In any particular instance, we just 
have to see whether or not the basis of co-operation exists”.302 Now, choosing the kind of 
co-operative arrangements that we want to partake in is what the self is capable of, and 
Rawls does not mince words when he claims that the basis of our humanity lies in this 
point. Communitarianism sees this position to be too extreme mainly because it relegates 
to the background any particular conception of the good that may be associated with 
community.  And, indisputably,  it  suggests  that the community is  no different  from a 
voluntary  association  where  members  can  decide  to  quit  anytime.  What  then  is  the 
implication  of  this  philosophy  on  community?  Communitarianism  believes  that  it 
sanctions  the  thinking  that  the  ideal  of  authentic  living  must  be  driven  by  personal 
feelings, desires, beliefs etc. 
301 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 52.
302 Ibid.
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Consequently, the philosophy construes the standard way of living as one that is prone to 
self-absorption.303 
The privileging of the individual over the community, communitarianism holds, 
will surely break down the social tie. It  will lead to a situation where individuals are 
isolated from all  except those people who share their beliefs.  In his notable work on 
authenticity, Charles Guignon highlights the danger of the above position.
There  is  the  danger  of  bull-headed  adherence  to  feelings  and 
beliefs  whose  sole  justification  is  that  one  finds  through 
introspection  that  one  feels  that  way  or  happens  to  hold  these 
beliefs. There is the risk of being so carried away by feelings and 
perceived needs that one turns to actions that are either foolish or 
monstrous.304 
    
But the communitarian theory articulates a kind of ‘singular affiliation’ which makes 
people “to ignore altogether all other linkages that could moderate their loyalty to the 
specially marked herd”.305 The end of this philosophy is also not desirable. In particular, 
it thrives on division rather than unity and thereby puts a kind of limit on such values as 
liberty and toleration. Amartya Sen writes:
The  incitement  to  ignore  all  affiliation  and  loyalties  other  than  those 
emanating from one’s restrictive  identity  can be deeply delusive and also 
contribute to social tension and violence.306
The communitarian insistence that identity can only be discovered within the purview of 
one’s social arena devalues the free nature of the self. The position puts a limit to human 
303 Sandel paraphrases Rawls view in the following passage in order to show that Rawls is liable to the 
above criticism. “No commitment could grip me so deeply that I could not understand myself without it. 
No transformation of life purposes and plans could be so unsettling as to disrupt the contours of my 
identity. No project could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am. 
Given my independence from the values I have, I can always stand apart from them; my public identity as a 
moral person ‘is not affected by changes over time’ ”. Ibid. p, 62.  
304 Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic, pp. 147 – 148.
305 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence The Illusion of Destiny, p. 21.
306 Ibid.
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liberty  in  self  choice.  It  presupposes  that  it  is  impossible  for  people  to  escape  their 
cultural domains. And, ultimately, it misleads us to think that people are incapable of 
detaching themselves from whatever they do not approve of in their own societies and 
take to other ones from other societies. Amartya Sen reminds us that the “presence of the 
conflicting pulls is as real in France, or America, or South Africa, or India, or anywhere 
else, … The basic seriousness of the disparate pulls-of history, culture, language, politics, 
profession, family, comradeship, and so on-have to be adequately recognized, and they 
cannot all be drowned in a single-minded celebration of community”.307   
Both  the  liberal  and  communitarian  theorists  challenge  what  they  take  to  be 
extreme  in  the  other’s  position.  Each  of  these  schools  of  thought  believes  that  the 
extremities in the position of the other school muddle the nature of the person’s identity. 
Our argument shows that the moderate communitarian model of Advaita and Yoruba do 
not  support  either  of  these  extremes.  In  some important  detail,  the  two philosophies 
attend to the notion of identity with the aim of showing who we are really, in particular, 
how our nature extends beyond the domain of community meanings. Consequently, this 
knowledge will make us the kind of persons we are. 
Before  I  end  this  study,  it  is  important  for  me  to  mention  that  the  two 
philosophical  traditions  which  we  have  expounded  show  some  simplified  way  of 
understanding  identity.  For  both  traditions,  human  beings  will  be  truly  free  and 
acquainted with their inmost nature if they learn how to be connected with the purest 
substance of the soul. This connection frees people from the deception of the world and 
the vanity of seeking fulfillment in worldly things. It brings about real freedom which 
307 Ibid, pp. 37-38.
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makes it easy for people to participate in the right way in the universal mind. Then, they 
can enjoy what Huxley calls the peace that passes understanding. 
Finally, I should point the attention of my reader to the significance of this study. 
Three  important  things  come  to  mind  in  this  regard.  Firstly,  contrary  to  many 
commentaries (whose views I have summarized in the introductory chapter), I argue that 
Advaita and Yoruba deliver a robust view of identity. Secondly, the study is an exercise 
in  comparative  philosophy  concerned  with  the  Indian  and  African  traditions. 
Comparative philosophy comparing these two traditions is rare indeed. Thirdly, the study 
shows  that  Indian  and  African  philosophy  can  contribute  to  moral  and  political 
philosophical concerns in the western tradition. 
      
263
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abimbola, W. “The Yoruba Concept of Human Personality.” In La Notion de
Personne en Afrique Noire. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 
1971.
  Ifa : An Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus. Ibadan: Oxford University
Press, 1976.
  Sixteen Great Poems of Ifa. UNESCO: Centre d’Etudes Linguistigue et
Historique Pour Tradition Orale, 1975.
Abiodun, R. “Identity and the Artistic Process in the Yoruba Aesthetic Concept of 
Iwa.” Journal of Cultures and Ideas 1, no. 1 (1983): 13-30.
 “Verbal and Visual Metaphors: Mythic Allusions in Yoruba Ritualistic Art
of Ori.” Word and Image 3, no. 3 (1987): 252-70.
Abraham, W. E. The Mind of Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
  “Sources of African Identity.” Person and Community: Ghanaian Philo-
sophical Studies, 1. Washington, D. C.: The Council for Research in Values  
and Philosophy, (2004): 93-104
Adams, Monni. “African Visual Arts from an Art Historical Perspective.”
 African Studies Review 32, no. 2 (1989): 55-103.
Adeney, W.F. “Toleration”. In Paul Edwards (ed.) Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics 8 
New York: Macmillan, 1967. pp. 143-162 
 
Ackerman, B. Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1980. 
Adepegba, C. O. "Ara: The Factor of Creativity in Yoruba Art."  Nigerian Field 48,  
(1983): 53-66.
Adewale, S. A. The Religion of the Yoruba: A Phenomenological Analysis. Ibadan, 
Nigeria: Department of Religious Studies, University of Ibadan, 1988.
Agbaje, J. B. “Proverbs: A Strategy for Resolving Conflict in Yoruba Society.” Journal
 of African Cultural Studies 15, no. 2 (2002): 237-243
Agrawal, M. M. Aspects of Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: Shree Publishing
 House, 1986.
264
Aithal, K. P. “Review of Advaita Philosophy and Religion.” Bharatiya Vidya 33: (1961) : 
404.
Akingbola, Tunde “Do Witches Really Exist?” Spear, (1975): 103
Albert, E. “Folklore and Literature in the African World.” In Robert A. Lystad,
(ed.) A Survey of Social Research, pp. 469-90. New York: Praeger, 1965.
  “African Conceptual Systems.” In J. Paden and E. Soja, (ed.) The African
Experience, pp. 99-107. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
Albert, Schweitzer. Indian Thought and Its Development. (Transl.), Charles E.B. Russell,
 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1936).
Allen, R. F. and Menan K. Y. Pure Principle: Introduction to Philosophy of
 Sankara. Michigan University Press: East Lancing Michigan State, Michigan,  
1960. 
Allison, P. A. “Collecting Yoruba Art.” African Arts 6, no. 4 (1973) : 64-68
Alper, Harvey. “Advaita Vedanta up to Sankara and His Pupils.” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, 103, no. III (1981): 663.
Ames, R. T. Dissanayake, W. and Kasulis, T. P. (eds.) Self as Person in Asian
 Theory and Practice. New York: State University of New York, 1994. 
Anderson, E. “The Concept of Justice and Morality among the Bakuta in the
 Congo-Brazzaville.” Ethnos 37 (1972) : 5-39.
Anyanwu, K. C. The African Experience in the American Market Place. USA: 
Exposition Press Inc, 1983.  
Appiah, A. In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York:
 Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Apter, A. “The Historiography of Yoruba Myth and Ritual”. History in Africa 14, (1987): 
1-25. 
Asutosh, Bhattacharya. Studies in Post Sankara Dialectics. Calcutta: University of 
Calcutta, 1936.
Atmananda, S. “Sri Shankara’s Teaching in His Own Words.” in K. M. Munshi 
and R. R. Diwakar, (eds.)  Bhavan’s Book Library.  Vol. 52. Bombay: Baratiya 
Vidya Bhawan, 1960. 
Avineri, S. and De-Shalit, A. (eds.) Communitarianism and Individualism. New
265
 York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Awolalu, J. O. “The Yoruba Philosophy of Life.” Presence Africaine 73 (1970) : 79-89.
  Yoruba Beliefs and Sacrificial Rites. London: Longmans, 1979. 
Baldwin, J. “Fifth Avenue, Uptown.” Esquire. Reprinted in The Price of the Ticket,
New York: St Martins Press, 1985.
Banerjee, A. K. “Brahmasutra and the Theory of Illusion.” Calcutta Review 48, (1933) : 
 28-58.
  “Planes of Knowledge and Orders of Realities.” Philosophical
 Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1933) : 322-339.
Banmen, J. “Teachings of Brahman and Atman in Chandogya Upanishad.” Divine 
Life 29, no. 6 (1967) : 235-239.
Barber, K. “How Man Makes God in West Africa: Yoruba Attitudes Towards the
 “Orisa.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 51, no. 3 (1981): 
723-745. 
  I Could Speak until Tomorrow: “Oriki”: Women, and the Past in a
 Yoruba Town. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.
  “Quotation in the Constitution of Yoruba Oral Texts.” Research in 
African Literatures 30, no. 2 (1999) : 17-41.
Bascom, W. O. The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria. New York: Holt, Rinehart
 and Winston, 1969.
  Sixteen Cowries: Yoruba Divination from Africa to the New World. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.
Bascom, W. R. Ifa Divination: Communication Between Gods and Men in West
 Africa. Indiana: University Press, 1969. 
Bauer, N. F. “Advaita Vedanta and Contemporary Western Ethics.” Philosophy 
East and West 37, no. 1 (1987): 36-50.
Beattie, J. H. M. “Understanding Traditional African Religion: A Comment on
 Horton.” Second Order 2, no. 2 (1973) : 3-11.
Bedu-Addo, J. T. “Sense-Experience and Recollection in Plato's Meno.” American
 Journal of Philology 104, (1983) : 228-48. 
266
  J. T. “On the Concept of Truth in Akan.” in P. O. Bodunrin, (ed.)
Philosophy in Africa: Trends and Perspectives, pp. 68-90. Ife, Nigeria: Universi-
ty of Ife Press, 1985.
Beidelman, T. O. Moral Imagination in Kaguru Modes of Thought. Bloomington:
 Indiana University Press, 1986.
Beier, U. Yoruba Myths. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Bell, R. H. Understanding African Philosophy, A Cross Cultural Approach to 
Classical and Contemporary Issues. New York, London: Routledge, 2002. 
Bell, R. H. “Narrative in African Philosophy.” Philosophy 64, (1989) : 363-79.
Bello, A. G. A. “Review of Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft.” Journal of African
 Philosophy and Studies 1, nos. 1-2 (1988) : 93-98.
Ben-Amos, P. “African Visual Arts from a Social Perspective.” African Studies
 Review 32, no. 2 (1989) : 1-53.
Bewaji, J. A. I. “Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture.” In Kwasi Wiredu, (ed.) A
 Companion to African Philosophy, pp 396-403 USA: Blackwell, 2004. 
Bewaji, J. T. “Truth and Ethics in African Thought: A Reply to Emmanuel Eze.”
 Quest 8, no. 1 (June 1994) : 76-89.
Bhattacharya, A. N. Essence of Vedānta. Delhi: Durga Publications, 1986. 
  One Hundred and Twelve Upanisads and their Philosophy.
 Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1987. 
Bird C. S. and Karp, I. (eds.) Explorations in African Systems of Thought. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. 
Blier, S. “Word about Words about Icons: Iconologology and the Study of African
 Art.” Art Journal 47, (1988) : 75-87.
  “Enduring Myths of African Art.” In Tom Phillips, (ed.) Africa: The Art of 
a Continent, pp. 26-32. Munich: Prestel, 1995.
Boone, Sylvia. Radiance from the Waters: Ideals of Feminine Beauty in Mende
 Art. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
Bradley, F. H. Appearance and Reality.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893.
Brian, C., (ed.) Morals and Society in Asian Philosophy. Curzon: Britain, 1996. 
267
Brooks, R. “The Meaning of ‘real’ in Advaita Vedanta.” Philosophy East and West 
19, (1969): 385-398
Chakravarti, S.C. The Philosophy of the Upanishads. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 
1935.
Charles, A. Moore (ed.) Essays in East -West Philosophy: an Attempt at World
 Philosophical Synthesis, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1951.
Chaudhri, S. C. Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedaanta. Calcuta: Progressive Publishers,
1955.
Christ, C. T. The Finer Optic. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1975. 
Christopher  Isherwood,  (ed.)  Vedanta  for  Modern  Man.  London:  George  Allen  and 
Unwin Limited, 1952. 
Cladis, M. S. A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism Emile Durkheim and 
Contemporary Social Theory. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
Coetzee, P.H. “Particularity in Morality and its Relation to Community.” In The African 
Philosophy Reader, (eds.) P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, pp 275,–91. London: 
Routledge, 1998.
Condlin, R. J. “Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limits of a 
Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All 
Just Get Along?” University of Maryland School of Law. http://www.law.umary-
land.edu/recent_scholarship.asp
Conn, W. E. “Self Transcendence, The True Self and Self Love”. Pastoral 
Psychology 46, no. 5 (1998) : 3 - 17.
Cragg, W. “Two Concepts of Community”, Dialogue 25, (1986) : 31 - 52. 
Crowley, L. The Self, the Individual, the Community: Liberalism in the Political
Thought  of  F.  A.  Hayek  and  Sydney  and  Beatrice  Webb.  Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1987.
Das, A. C. “Advaita Vedaanta and Liberation on Bodily Existence.” Philosophy
 East and West 4, no. 2 (1954) : 113-125.
Dasgupta, Surendranath. The History of Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: Motilal
 Banarsidass, 1975.
Dennet, R. “West African Categories and the Yoruba Language”. Journal of the 
268
Royal African Society 14, no. 53 (1914) : 75-80, 
Deussen, P. The System of Vedanta. Transl. Charles Johnson. Chicago: Open Court 
Publishing Co, 1912. 
  Outlines of Indian Philosophy: with an Appendix on the Philosophy of the
Philosophy of the Vedanta in its Relations to Occidental Metaphysics.  Berlin, 
Karl Curtins, 1907.
  The Philosophy of the Upanishads. New York: Dover Publications, 1966.
Deutsch E. Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction. Second Edition.
 Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1962.
  “The Self in Advaita Vedanta.” In Roy W. Perret (ed.), Indian   Philosophy,
 Metaphysics, New York: Garland Publishing Inc. 2000
  “The Self in Advaita Vedānta.” In Indian Philosophy, A Collection of
Readings, edited with introduction by Roy W. Perrett. New York, London: Gar-
land Publishing Inc, 2001.
  “The Self in Advaita Vedanta Philosophy” International Philosophical
 Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1996). 
Devaraja, N. K. “Contemporary Relevance of Advaita Vedanta.” Philosophy East 
and West. 20, no. 2 (1970) : 129 - 136. 
Dhirendra, M. Datta. Six Ways of Knowing; a Critical Study of the Vedanta Theory of
 Knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932.
Dickson, K. A.  Aspects of Religion and Life in Africa. Ghana: Ghana Academy of
 Arts and Sciences, 1971.
Drewal, H. J. African Artistry: Technique and Aesthetics in Yoruba Sculpture.
 Atlanta: High Museum of Art, 1980.
Drewal, M. T. Yoruba: Art in Life and Thought. Victoria, Australia: African 
Research Institute, Latrobe University, 1988.
Drewal, M. T. Yoruba Ritual: Performers, Play, Agency. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992.
Dumont, L. “Hierarchy: The Theory of the ‘Varna’.” In Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), Caste
and Democratic Politics in India, pp. 65-89. London: Anthem Press, 2002. 
  “The Individual as an Impediment to Sociological Comparison and
269
Indian History.” In Religion,  Politics and History in India: Collected Papers in  
Indian Sociology. The Hague: Mouton, 1970. 
  Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
  “Caste, Racism and “Stratification” Reflections of a Social
 Anthropologist.” In Robert Bernasconi (ed.), Race, pp. 20-43. USA, UK: Black-
well, 2001.
Dutoit, B. M. "Some Aspects of the Soul-Concept among the Bantu Speaking 
Nguni Tribes of South Africa." Authors Quarterly 33, (1960) : 134-42. 
Dutton, Denis. "Mythologies of Tribal Art." African Arts 28, no. 3 (1995) : 32-43. 
Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth, 1977.
Eades, J. S. The Yoruba Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Elebuibon, Y. Iyere Ifa (Tonal Poetry, the Voice of Ifa) an Exposition of Yoruba
 Divinational Chants. USA: Ile Orunmila Communications, 1999. 
Eliade, Mircea. Myth and Reality. (Transl.) William R. Trask, New York: Harper
 and Row, 1963.
Ellen F. P. Fred. D. M. and Jeffrey P. (eds.) Natural Rights Liberalism from Locke
 to Nozick. Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Ellis, A. B. The Yoruba- Speaking People of the Slave Coast of West Africa: Their
 Religion, Manners, Customs, Laws, Language, Etc. London: Curzon Press, 1974. 
Erassov, B. “Concepts of ‘Cultural Personality’ In the Ideologies of the Third
 World.” Diogenes 78, (1972) : 123-40.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1937. 
Eze, E. C. “The Problem of Knowledge in “Divination”: The Example of Ifa.” In
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, (ed.) African Philosophy. USA, UK: Blackwell, 1998. 
Fadipe, N. A. "Religion and Morals." The Sociology of the Yoruba. Ibadan: Ibadan 
University Press, 1970.
  The Sociology of the Yoruba. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1970. 
Falola, T. Yoruba Gurus: Indigenous Production of Knowledge in Africa. Trenton,
270
 N.J.: Africa World Press, 1998. 
Filmer, S.C. The Meeting of East and West, an Inquiry Concerning World 
Understanding. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946.
Finnegan, R. “How to Do Things with Words: Performative Utterances among the
 Limba of Sierra Leone.” Man, 4, no. 1 (1969) : 537-51.
  Oral Literature in Africa. London: Clarendon Press, 1970.
Fotin, N. and Elfstrom, G. Toleration. Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama 
Press, 1992.
Fortes, M and Dieterlen, G. (eds.) African Systems of Thought. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965. 
Fortes, M. “On the Concept of the Person among Tallensi.” In La Notion de
personne en Afrique noire, pp. 283-320. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 1973.
Forth, Andrew. The Self and Its States: A State of Consciousness Doctrine in Advaita
 Vedanta. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990.
Gaba, C. R. “An African People's (Anlo) Concept of the SouI.” Ghana Bulletin of 
Theology (Legon) 3, no. 10 (1971) : 1-8.
Gambhirananda, Swami. (Transl.), Brahma-Sutra-Bhasya of Shankaracharya. Foreword 
by T. M. P. Mahadevan, Delhi: Advaita Ashrama, 1983. 
Ganguli, B. N. Concept of Equality: The Nineteenth Century Indian Debate. Simla:
 Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 1975. 
Gates, H. L. Jr. “A Myth of Origins: Esu-Elegbara and the Signifying Monkey.” In 
The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, pp. 3-
43. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Gbadamosi, B.and Beier, U. Yoruba Poetry: Traditional Yoruba Poems. Ibadan:
 Ministry of Education, 1959. 
Gbadegesin, S. “Individuality, Community and the World Order.” In P. H. Coetzee and
A. P. J. Roux, (eds.,) The African Philosophy Reader, pp. 271-291. London and 
New York: Routledge, 1995. 
  "Destiny, Personality and the Ultimate Reality of Human 
Existence: A Yoruba Perspective." Ultimate Reality and Meaning:
271
Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding 7, no. 3 (1984) : 
173-188.
  African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and
 Contemporary African Realities. New York: Peter Lang, 1991.  
  Aspects of Yoruba Tradition: Importance, Richness and Limits in 
the  Context  of  Unfreedom.  Isokan  Yoruba  Magazine,  3,  no.  3,  1996, 
http://www.yoruba.org/Magazine/Summer97/File4.htm 
  “Toward a Theory of Destiny.” In Kwasi Wiredu, A Companion to
 African Philosophy, pp. 313-323. USA: Blackwell, 2004.
  “Ujamaa: Julius Nyerere on the Meaning of Human Existence”
 Ultimate Reality and Meaning 17, no.1 (1994).
  African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and
 Contemporary African Realities. New York: Lang, 1991.
Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic
 Books, 1973.
Gelfand, M. "The Normal Man: A New Concept of Shona Philosophy." Nada 9, (1965) : 
78-93.
George, V. A. Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger, Cultur-
al Heritage and Contemporary Change. Series III B, South Asia, Vol. I. Wash-
ington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998.
  Self Realization  [Brahmaanubhava] :The Advaitic Perspective of Shankara. 
Washington, D.C. : The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001. 
Ghate, V.S. The Vedanta: A Study of the Brahma-Sutras with the bhasyas of Samkara, 
Ramanuja,  Nimbarka,  Madhva,  and  Vallabha,  Poona:  Bhandarka  Oriental  Re-
search Institute, 1981.
Gleason, J. Orisha: The  Gods of Yoruba Land. New York: Atheneum, 1971. 
Goody, J. "Religion and Ritual: The Definitional Problem." British Journal of Sociology 
12, (1961) : 142-64.
  "Review of Conversations with Ogotemmeli by M. Griaule."  American An-
thropologist 69, no. 2 (1967) : 239-41.
  “Intellectuals in Pre-literate Societies?” In The Domestication of the Savage 
Mind, pp. 19-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
272
  The Interface between the Written and the Oral. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987.
Gordon, L. “African Philosophy's Search for Identity.” In  Her Majesty's Other Children: 
Sketches of Racism from a Colonial Age, pp. 139-48. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1997.
Griaule, M. Conversation with Ogotomeli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas. Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Gruzalski, B. “Modern Philosophical Fragmentation versus Vedanta and Plato.” In Ashok 
Vohra et al. (eds.) Dharma, The Categorial Imperative, pp. 349-362. New Delhi: 
D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd, 2005.
Guignon, C. On Being Authentic. London, New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Guenon, R.  Man and His Becoming According to Vedaanta. Transl. Richard C. N. New 
Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Corporation, 1981.
Gundaker,  G.  (ed.)  Keep Your Head to  the  Sky:  Interpreting  African  American Home  
Ground. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998.
Gupta, A. S. “The Meaning of That art Thou.” Philosophy East and West, 12, no. 2 (1962) : 
125-134.
Gyekeye, K.  Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experi-
ence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
  “Person and Community in African Thought.” In P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux 
(eds.), Philosophy from Africa pp. 317-336. Johannesburg: ITP, 1998. 
  “The Akan Concept of a Person.” In P.H. Coetzee & M.E.S. Van den Berg 
(eds.), An Introduction to African Philosophy, pp.369-380. Pretoria: Unisa, 1995.
  “Philosophical Relevance of Akan Proverbs.”  Second Order 4, no. 2 (1975) : 
45-53.
  “The Akan Concept of a Person.” International Philosophical Quarterly 18, no. 
3 (1978): 277-287. 
  An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. 
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.  Revised  edition,  1995,  Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1987.
273
 Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Halbfass, W. On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaisesika and the History of Indian 
Ontology. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
Halbfass, W. “Practical Vedanta.” In Vasudha Dalmia, Heinrich Von Stietencron (eds.), 
Representing Hinduism the Construction of  Religious Traditions and National  
Identity, pp. 211-223. New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, 1995.
Hallen, B. “Yoruba Moral Epistemology.” In Kwasi Wiredu, (ed.) A Companion to African 
Philosophy, pp. 296-303. USA: Blackwell, 2003. 
  The Good, The Bad and The Beautiful, Discourse about Values in Yoruba Cul-
ture. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000.
Hallen, B. and Sodipo O. J. “The House of the 'Inu: Keys to the Structure of a Yoruba The-
ory of the 'Self.” Quest: Philosophical Discussions 8, no. 1 (1994): 3-23.
  Knowledge, Belief and Withcraft. London: Ethnographica, 1986.
Harrison, J. “Utilitarianism and Toleration,” Philosophy 62, (1987): 421. 
Hatab, L. Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths. Illinois: Open Court, 1990.
Hervey De Witt Griswold, “Brahman: A study in the History of Indian Philsophy” Cornell 
University Studies in Philosophy, vol. ii, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900.
Hiriyanna, M. Indian Conception of Values. Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1975. 
Hollis, M. “The Limits of Irrationality.” In Bryan Wilson (ed.) Rationality, pp. 214-20. Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 1970.
Horton, J. and Nicholson, P.  Toleration: Philosophy and Practice. Brookfiled, VT: Ave-
bury, 1992).
Horton, R.  “African Traditional Religion and Western Science.” Africa 37 no.1 (1967): 50-
71
  “Destiny and the Unconscious in West Africa.” Africa 31, no. 2 (1961) : 110-17.
  “African Traditional Thought and Western Science.” Africa 37 (1967) : 50-71.
  “The Romantic Illusion: Roger Bastide on Africa and the West.” Odu, A Jour-
nal of West African Studies. 3 (1970): 87-115 
274
Hountondji, P. “The Myth of Spontaneous Philosophy.” Consequence 1, (1974) : 11-38.
  “The Pitfalls of Being Different.” Diogenes 131, (1985) : 46-56.
  African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 2nd edition. Bloomington and Indiana Po-
lis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
Hume, D.  A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Dent, 1974.
Huntington, C.W. Jr.  The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mad-
hyamika. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. 
Idoniboye, D. E. “The Idea of an African Philosophy: The Concept of Spirit in African 
Metaphysics.” Second Order 2, (1973): 83-89, 
Idowu, Bolaji.  African Traditional Religion: A Definition. London: SCM, 1973.
  Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief. London: Longman, 1962.
Indich, W. M. Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980. 
Ingalls, D.D.. “Sankara’s Arguments against the Buddhists.” Philosophy East and West 3, 
no. 4 (1954): 291-306 
Jackson, M. and Karp, I.  (eds.).  Personhood and Agency.  Washington: Smithsonian In-
stitue, 1990.
Johnson, S. The History of the Yorubas. O Johnson (ed.) London: Routledge, 1921. 
Kagame, A. and Griaule, M. Conversation with Ogotomeli : An Introduction to Dogan Re-
ligious Ideas. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 
Kant,  I.  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  trans.  L.  W.  Beck.  Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 
1956. 
  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton. London: Hutchin-
son & Co, 1964.
  Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1965.
Kaplan, S.  Hermeneutics, Holography, and Indian Idealism. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-
dass, 1987. 
Kautz, S. “Liberalism and the Idea of Toleration.”  American Journal of Political Science 
37, (1993): 610-632.  
275
Kenyatta, J.. Facing Mount Kenya. New York: Vintage, 1965. 
Kim-Chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan and C. L. Ten, (eds.) The Moral Circle and the Self Chi-
nese and Western Approaches. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2003. 
King, P. Toleration. London: Allen and Unwin, 1976.
King, R. “Brahman and the World: Immanence and Transcendence in Advaita Vedanta – a 
Comparative Perspective.” Scottish Journal of Religious Studies 12, no.2 (1991): 
107-126 
  “Review of Andrew Fort’s; The Self and Its States.”  Scottish Journal of Reli-
gious Studies 12, no. 1 (1991): 65-67
  Early Advaita Vedanta and Budhism. Albany: State University of New York, 
1995. 
Kirk-Green, A. H. Mutumin Kirkil: The Concept of the Good Man in Hausa. Bloomington: 
African Studies Program, Indian University, 1974.  
Kohn, A.  The Brighter Side of Human Nature. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 
1990. 
Kokileswar, B.  An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 
1924.
Krishnananda,  S.  “Self-Realisation,  Its  Meaning and Method.”  The Divine Life Society, 
http://www.swami-krishnananda.org/self/self_3a.html 
Kroner, R. Culture and Faith. Santa Barbara: The University of California Press, 1949.
Kuckertz, H. “Selfood and Its Reasons to Be.” In (ed.) J.G. Malherbe,  Decolonizing the 
Mind, Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on African Philosophy, pp. 57-66. 
Pretoria: Unisa, 1996. 
Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
Larsen, S. A writer and His Gods : A Study of the Importance of Yoruba Myths and Reli-
gious Ideas to the Writing of Wole Soyinka. Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 
1983.  
Lata, P. Mystic Saints of India: Shankaracharya. Delhi: Sumit Publications, 1982.
Lawson, E. T. Religions of Africa. USA: Harper and Row, 1884.  
276
Lawuyi, O. B. “Ogun: Diffusion across Boundaries and Identity Constructions.”  African 
Studies Review 31, no. 2 (1988): 127-139 
Levy, J.  The Nature of Man According to Vedanta. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1956.
Levy-Bruhl, L. Primitive Mentality. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1923. 
Lionel, D. Barnett. Brahma-Knowledge: an Outline of the Philosophy of the Vedanta as set  
forth by the Upanishads and Sankara. London: John Murray, 1907.
Lucas, J. O. The Religion of the Yorubas. New York: Macmillan, 1948. 
MacIntyre, A. After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984. 
Mahadevan, T. M. P. Philosophy of Advaita. London: Luzac and Company, 1938.
  Superimposition in Advaita Vedanta.  New Delhi:  Sterling Publishers Private 
Ltd, 1985. 
Mahendranath, S. Comparative Studies in Vedantism. Bombay: Humphrey Milford, Oxford 
University Press, 1927.
Makinde, M. “A Philosophical Analysis of the Yoruba Concepts of Ori and Human Des-
tiny” International Studies in Philosophy 17, no. 1 (1985) : 53-69.
  “Immortality  of  the  Soul  and the  Yoruba  Theory of  Seven Heavens  (Orun 
Meje).” Journal of Cultures and Ideas 1, no.1 (1983) : 31-59. 
Marriot,  M. “Hindu Transactions: Diversity without Dualism.” In Bruce Kapferer (ed.), 
Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Sym-
bolic Behavior. Philadelphia: Ishi Press, 1976.
Marriot, M. and Inden, R. B.. “Toward an Ethnoscciology of South Asian Caste Systems.” 
In Kenneth David (ed.), The New Wind, Changing Identities in South Asia. Paris: 
Mouton Publishers, 1977. 
Matilal, B. Krishna. Logic, Language and Reality, An Introduction to Indian Philosophical  
Studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.
Mauss, M. “A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; The Notion of Self.” In 
Michael Carrithers,  Stephen Collins and Steven Lukes (eds.),  The category of 
Person:  Anthropology,  Philosophy,  History,  pp.  1-25.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1985. 
277
Mayeda, S. (Transl). A Thousand Teachings The Upadesahasri of Sankara. Japan: Univer-
sity of Tokyo Press, 1979. 
Mbiti, J. African Religions and Philosophy. London :Heinemann, 1970.
McGrath, A. E. A Scientific Theology. Vol. 1. Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2001. 
McKenzie, P. R.  Hail Orisha: A Phenomenology of a West African Religion in the Mid-
Nineteenth Century. Netherland: Brill Academic Publishers, 1997.
Mendus,  S.  (ed.)  Justifying  Toleration:  Historical  and  Conceptual  Perspectives.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Menkiti,  I.  A. “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought.” In Richard A. 
Right,  (ed.)  African Philosophy,  An Introduction, pp.  171-182.  Lanham,  Md.: 
University Press of Americas, 1984. 
Merton, T.  New Seed of Contemplation. New York: New Directions, 1972. 
Mill, J. S. ‘On Liberty.’ In Three Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Milton, S. “Industrial Leadership, the Hindu Ethic, and the Spirit of Socialism.” In Milton 
Singer (ed.), When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach  
to Indian Civilization, pp. 423-454. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
Mine, M. “Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual Autonomy in 
India.” In Roger T. Ames, Wimal Dissanayake, Thomas P. Kasulis, (eds.), Self as 
Person in Asian Theory and Practice, pp. 317-334. New York: State University of 
New York, 1994. 
  Public  Faces,  Private  Voices  Community  and Individuality  in  South  India. 
Berkeley, Los Angelis, London: University of California Press, 1994. 
Mohanty, J. N. “Phenomenology in Indian Philosophy.” Proceedings of Indian Philosophi-
cal Congress, (1953) : 253-260.
  “Phenomenology and Existentialism: Encounter with Indian Philosophy.” Inter-
national Philosophical Quarterly 12, no. IV (1972): 485-511.
  “Consciousness and Knowledge in Indian Philosophy.”  Philosophy East and 
West 29, no. 1 (1979): 3-10.
  Explorations in Philosophy, vol. 1 edited by Bina Gupta. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
278
  “A Fragment of the Indian Philosophical Tradition-Theory of Pramana.”  Phi-
losophy East and West 38, (1988). 
  Explorations  in  Philosophy,  B.  Gupta,  (ed.)  New York:  Oxford  University 
Press, 2001.  
Mohini, M. C. A Realistic Interpretation of Sankara Vedanta. Calcutta: University of Cal-
cutta, 1950.
  Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedanta. Progressive Publication,1955.
Momoh, C. S. (ed.) The Substance of African Philosophy. Nigeria: African Philosophy Pro-
jects' Publications, 1989. 
  “African Philosophy, Does it Exist?” Diogene 130, (1985): 73-104.
Moore, C. A. A Source Book of Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957.
  The  Indian  Mind:  Essentials  of  Indian  Philosophy  and  Culture.  Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1967.
Mosley, A. G. African Philosophy Selected Readings. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1995. 
Mudimbe, V. Y. The Invention of Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Universi-
ty Press, 1988. 
  The Invention  of  Africa:  Gnosis,  Philosophy and the  Order  of  Knowledge. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.
Mukerji, A.C. The Nature of Self. Allahabad: The Indian Press Ltd., 1938.
Muller, F. M. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, with an introduction by G. P. Guha. 
New Delhi : Associated Publishing House, 1982.
Murphy, A. R. “Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition.” Polity 29, no. 4 (1997): 
593-623.  
 
Murthy, K. S. (ed.). Reading in Indian History, Politics and Philosophy, New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers, 1967.
Murti, T. R. V.  “The World and the Individual in Indian Religious Thought.” In C. A. 
Moore, The Indian Mind: Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture, pp. 199-
216. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967. 
279
Nederman, C. J. “Tolerance and Community: A Medieval Communal Functionalist Argu-
ment for Religious Toleration.” The Journal of Politics 56, no. 4 (1994): 901-918. 
Nkrumah, K.  Consciencism – Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Develop-
ment with Particular Reference to the African Revolution. London: Heinemann, 
1964. 
Nozick, R. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 1974
Nripendra, K. D. The Vedanta: Its Place as a System of Metaphysics. Calcutta: University 
of Calcutta, 1931.
Nyerere,  J.  Ujaama:  The  Basis  of  African  Socialism.  Oxford  University  Press:  Dares 
Salaam, 1962.
Odunjo, J. F. “Ewi ni Yoruba.” Olokun 6, (1967): 13-16
Okolo, C. B. “Self as a Problem in African Philosophy.” International Philosophical Quar-
terly Vol. xxxii, no.4. (1992): 477-484. 
Onwuanibe,  R.  “The  Human  Person  and  Immorality  in  Igbo  Metaphysics”  In  (ed.) 
R.A.Wright, African Philosophy: An Introduction, (3rd ed.), pp.183-198. Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1979. 
Onyewuenyi, I. C. The African Origin of Greek Philosophy:  An Exercise in Afrocentrism. 
Nigeria: University of Nigeria Press, 1993. 
Owomoyela, O. The African Difference: Discourses in Africanity and the Relativity of Cul-
tures. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1996.  
Pande, G. C. Life and Thought of Sankaracarya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994. 
Paranjpe, A. C.  Self and Identity in Modern Psychology and Indian Thought. New York: 
Plenum, 1998. 
Parthasarathy, A. Vedanta Treatise, third edition. Bombay: Vedaanta Life Institute, 1989.   
Patrrinder, E. G. West African Religion, A Study of the Beliefs and Practices of Ewe, Yoru-
ba, Ibo and Kindred Peoples. London: Epworth Press, 1961. 
Peek,  P.  M.  “Divination”:  A  Way  of  Knowing?”  In  Emmanuel  Chukwudi  Eze,  (ed.) 
African Philosophy, pp. 171-176. USA, UK: Blackwell, 1998.
Perret, Roy W. “Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?” Philosophy East and West 
49, (1999): 401-414.
280
Philips  Stephen  H.  “Padmapada’s  Illusion  Argument.”  Philosophy  East  and  West 37, 
(1987): 3-23
Pizzato, M. “Soyinka’s Bacchae, African Gods, and Postmodern Mirrors”. The Journal of  
Religion and Theatre 2, no. 1 (2003): 35-49  
Potter, K. H. “Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?” Journal of Indi-
an Philosophy 12, (1984): 307-327 
  “Dharma and Moksha from a Conversational point of View.” Philosophy East  
and West 8, no. 2 (1958) 49-641.
  “A Fresh Classification of India’s Philosophical Systems.” Journal of the Amer-
ican Oriental Society 22, no. 4 (1961) : 25-33.
  “Freedom and Determinism from an Indian Perspective.” Philosophy East and 
West l, no. 17 (1967): 113-124.
Prabhavananda,  S.  The Spiritual  Heritage of  India.  London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1962. 
Prabhu, D. S. The Doctrine of Maya in the Philosophy of the Vedanta. London: Luzac and 
Co., 1911.
Radhakrishnan,  S.  and  Moore,  C.A.  (eds.)  A  Source  of  Indian  Philosophy.  Princeton: 
Princeton University press, 1957.
Radhakrishnan, S.  Vedanta according to Samkara and Ramanuja. London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd, 1928. 
Raju, P. T. “The Advaita and the Moral Pradoxes.” Vedanta Kesari. 25, 1940: 252-257. 
  “Comparative Philosophy and Spiritual Values.” Philosophy East and West, 13, 
(1963): 211-226.
  “Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual (The Vedantic Theory 
of Language).” Philosophy East and West 14, no. III (1964): 311-322.
  The Philosophical Traditions of India. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971.
  Spirit, Being and Truth, Studies in Indian and Western Philosophy. Foreword by 
Eugene Freeman. New Delhi : South Asian Publishers,1982.
P. T. Raju and S. Radhakrishnan, (eds.) The Concept of Man A study in Comparative Phi-
losophy. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1995. 
281
Ram, P.  Chakravarth “Dreams and Coherence of  Experience:  An Anti-Idealist  Critique 
from Classical Indian Philosophy.” American Philosophical quarterly 32, (1995).
  Chakravarth “Dreams and Reality; The Sankarite Critique of Vijnanavada” Phi-
losophy East and West 43, (1993): 405-455.
Ramanujan, B.K. “Toward Maturity: Problems of Identity Seen in the Indian Clinical Set-
ting.” in Sudhir Kakar, (ed.),  Identity and Adulthood, pp. 37-55. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1979.
Ramchandra,  D.  R.  A Constructive Survey of  Upanishadic Philosophy.  Poona:  Oriental 
Book Agency, 1926.
Rauch E. A. and Anyanwu, K. C. (eds.) African Philosophy, An Introduction to the Main  
Philosophical  Trends in  Contemporary  Africa.  Rome:  Catholic  Book Agency, 
1981.
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
  “The Basic Structure as Subject.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 2 
(1977): 159-165.
  Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
Rockmore, T. Hegel, Idealism and Analytic Philosophy (New Haven-London: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
Rosenblum, N. (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989.
Ryle, G. Dilemmas. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1954. 
Saha, S. Perspectives on Nyaya Logic and Epistemology. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi and Com-
pany, 1987.
Sandel,  J.  M.  Liberalism and  the  Limits  of  Justice.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 1982. 
Sastri, A. M. The Vedanta Doctrine of Sri Shankaracharya. Delhi: Sri Satgun Publication, 
1986. 
Savage, D. M.  John Dewey’s Liberalism Individual, Community, and Self-Development. 
USA: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002.
Sen, A. Identity and Violence : The Illusion of Destiny. New York : W.W. Norton and Co., 
2006.
282
Senghor, L. On African Socialism. London and New York, 1964. 
Shutte, A. Philosophy for Africa. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995.
Shweder R. A. and Vine R. A. (eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Sicar,  S.  The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture.  Calcuta:  University of Calcuta, 
1925.
Sinha, M. Problems of Post-Samkara Advaita Vedanta. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House 
Private Ltd, 1971.
Sivananda,  S.  S.  “Sankara.”  The  Divine  Life  Society,  2004.. 
http://www.dlshq.org/saints/sankara.htm 
Sobande. A. “Awon Owe Ile Wa.” Olokun. 7, 1967. 
Solomon, C. Existentialism. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Stocker, M. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” In Roger Crisp and Michael 
Slope (eds.) Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Sweet, W. “Absolute Idealism’ and Finite Individuality.”  Indian Philosophical Quarterly 
24, no. 4 (1997): 431-462. 
Tagore,  Saranindranath.  “India,  Europe,  and  Modernity.”  In  Ashok  Vohra  et  al.  (eds.) 
Dharma, The Categorial Imperative. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd, 2005.
Talbot, P. A. The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of their History, Ethnology and  
Languages. London: Frank Cass, 1961. 
Taylor,  C. “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man.”  The Review of Metaphysics 25, 1 
(1971): 3 - 51.
  Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989. 
  Sources: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1991.
Tempels, P. Bantu Philosophy. English Translation. Paris: Presence Africaine, 1959.  
The  Internet  Sacred  Text  Archive,  “Vedanta-philosophy”,  http://www.sacred-
texts.com/hin/rls/rls20.htm 
283
Unah, J. I. (ed.) Metaphysics, Phenomenology and African Philosophy. Nigeria: Hope Pub-
lications, 1998.
Upadhyaya,  K.  N.  “Sankara  on  Reason,  Scriptural  Authority  and  Self-Knowledge.” 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 19, no. 2 (1991): 126-134.
Vinayak, H. D. Vedanta Explained, Sankara’s Commentary on the Brahma-Sutras (vol.1). 
Bombay: Bookseller’s Publishing Co., 1954.
Vivekacūdāmani, verses 102-5. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1921.
Vivekananda, Swami. Complete Works. 8 vols. Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1979.     
Walzer,  M.  “The  Communitarian  Critique  of  Liberalism.”  Political  Theory 18,  no.  1 
(1990): 6-23.
Wamba-dia-Wamba, E.  “Experience of Democracy in Africa: Reflections on Practices of 
Communalistic Palaver as a Social Method of Resolving Contradictions among 
the People.” An Unpublished paper presented in the Department of Theory and 
History of State Law, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam. 1985.
Wande, A. Sixteen Great Poems of Ifa. Niamey, Niger: UNESCO, 1975.
Warner-Lewis, M. Trinidad Yoruba: From Mother Tongue to Memory. USA: University of 
the West Indies Press, 1999.
Weber, M. The Religion of India. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958, 1958.
Wiredu, K. (ed.) A Companion to African Philosophy. USA: Blackwell, 2004. 
Wiredu, K. and Gyekye, K. (eds.) Person and Community,  Ghanaian Philosophical Stud-
ies, Vol. 1. Washington, D. C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philoso-
phy. 
  Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1996.
Wolf, S. “Moral Saints.” In Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker, (eds.),  Encyclopedia 
of Ethics, (2nd Edition), pp. 1170-1173. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Woods, J.H. and Runkel, C.B. (Transl.)  Outline of the Vedanta System of Philosophy ac-
cording to Shankara (2nd ed.). New York: The Grafton Press, 1906.
Yogindra,  S.  Vedaantasaara  (The Essence of  Vedaanta)  of  Sadananda Yogindra,  transl 
Swami Nihilananda. Calcuta: Advaita Ashrama, 1968.
284
Yusuf, Y. K. “Women Speech in Yoruba Proverbs.” Proverbium. 11, 1994: 283-291.
   
285
